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Welcome to The Philosophical Salon
Michael Marder and Patrícia Vieira
Since their emergence in the early part of the sixteenth century, salons 
have been places where the boundaries between the private and the pub-
lic are blurred and where strict class and even gender hierarchies are often 
tipped. One might say that they are the spatial symbols for the exercise of 
a reasoned debate cultivated in European modernity. Reaching their apo-
gee during the French Enlightenment, salons have been places hospitable 
to a discussion of philosophical ideas, of political developments and of 
the latest literary and artistic trends. Responding to, though not limited 
by current events, conversation conducted in this most public area of the 
private dwelling was a semi-formal endeavor: neither a mere casual chat 
amongst family members nor bound by the strictures of political debate. 
A social and intellectual laboratory propitious to experimental modes of 
reasoning, the classical salons injected fresh ideas into the forming body 
of Enlightenment thought.
The Philosophical Salon, published online first as part of The European 
Magazine and later as a channel of the LA Review of Books, is a digital-
age avatar of the Enlightenment gatherings that has adopted many of its 
predecessors’ traits. Though vetted by the two editors, a contemporary 
version of the salonnières of old, the texts published in the salon touch 
upon a wide variety of topics and express multiple, often contradictory, 
points of view. Similar to its Enlightenment counterparts, the salon did 
not impose an editorial line or preconceived notion of what its collabo-
rators should discuss. Rather, it strove to be a place that nurtured a free 
exchange of ideas. It encouraged in-depth consideration of and comment 
upon contemporary socio-political and artistic events, interpreted in the 
context of philosophical and political thought and steeped in cutting-
edge literary and art criticism. 
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But there are also some significant differences that distinguish the 
online from the flesh-and-blood salons. While the Enlightenment 
assemblies took place in a physically delimited space, digital-age salons 
are no longer tied to a tangible residence. Part of the immaterial web of 
the Internet, the new salon can be accessed from the most secluded of 
spaces—a living room, a bedroom, in your gym clothes or pajamas—
while, at the same time, being available to anyone. An incorporeal room 
populated by bodiless visitors, the contemporary salon is a-topic, a-syn-
chronous and, as a result, a-phonic, seeing that in-presence discussions, 
real-time opinions and retorts have been replaced by written texts and 
comments sometimes penned many hours or even days after publication. 
This necessarily changes the kind of society forged around new salon 
debates. On the one hand, it generates an asymmetry between the writers 
of the main articles and the readers, the response of the latter reduced to 
a footnote at the bottom of the page. On the other hand, it creates a more 
inclusive community, since everyone is welcomed into the salon, with 
participation no longer determined by social status. The evolution of this 
informal institution from a determined gathering place for concrete bod-
ies to a communion of bodiless minds is symptomatic of our age, when, 
despite increasing population concentration in large metropoles, social 
interactions are more and more relegated to the intangible, “safer” and 
free-access space of the Internet.
The inclusiveness of the new salon is worth pondering further in light 
of the lines of privilege redrawn in the digital age. While discussions of 
philosophical, aesthetic, and political affairs in the Enlightenment were a 
prerogative of the aristocracy and of the upper bourgeoisie, today a sepa-
rate “intellectual” class has appropriated such activities. Participation in 
the digital salon is, no doubt, more democratic, but it remains confined 
to individuals with enough leisure time, the luxury of Internet access, and 
accustomed to a certain way of presenting an argument. Granted: the 
portion of the online public sphere we have endeavored to open may help 
create communities of interest among people who would not have other-
wise had a chance for a face-to-face encounter, whether due to the physi-
cal distance between them or due to their belonging to different social 
circles. Yet, this expansion still leaves whole swathes of the world and 
social strata outside its scope: those without digital tools, those outside 
Welcome to The Philosophical Salon 15
the originally European tradition of discussion and debate carried on by 
the contemporary salon, those with pressing immediate economic con-
cerns taking up all of their attention… 
No single project is in a position to lift these unfortunate limitations, 
but the transformation of the online salon into a book, which you are 
witnessing, may go some way toward addressing the oft-imperceptible 
global injustices. It is not by chance that the edited volume you are about 
to peruse has been published by Open Humanities Press that is precisely 
open, much like the digital forum upon which it is based. The free PDF of 
the manuscript can be downloaded, printed out, and distributed among 
those outside the fold of the Internet. In and of itself, the book version of 
the salon will provide a mediation between the classical gatherings and 
the digital forum bearing this name: it will be material like the former 
and portable or re-contextualizable like the latter. We hope that its easy 
availability and relevance to our actuality will appeal to readers who are 
not usually attracted to conventional academic works, encouraging what 
Gayatri Spivak calls in her contribution a critical “teaching reading.” If it 
succeeds in this task, it will propose not so much a predigested interpreta-
tion of reality but a possible method (or clues to a method) for approach-
ing the timely and timeless problems facing humanity today.
The other limitation, against which the salon had to struggle, is in fact 
a de-limitation, diametrically opposed to the issue of the unequal access 
and distribution of knowledge and criticism. When any Internet user can 
publish an opinion and double as a critic, for instance ranking books on 
amazon.com or goodreads.com, what is the meaning of public intellec-
tual engagement? That is one of the questions Daniel Innerarity raises 
in his essay, where he contemplates the “algorithms of taste” that set the 
parameters for our “likes” and “dislikes” in a world increasingly under 
the influence of social media. After all, total openness where “everything 
goes” spells out a complete closure of thinking, which, to paraphrase 
Hannah Arendt, first needs its banisters before it risks advancing with-
out them. In the midst of instantaneous reactions demanded of us every-
where, it is necessary to gain the time and space for reflectiveness, for 
weighing, measuring, and judging without objectively pre-given scales or 
standards, but with those scales and standards that harken back to the 
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“inner measure” of the Ancients and derive from the weighed and judged 
matters themselves.  
The immediacy of many online exchanges, whereby anyone can 
express a spontaneous retort to ongoing events through a tweet or 
Facebook post goes back to the salons of old, where all members could 
share their unfiltered thoughts with the group, a situation now extended 
to the wider community of Internet users. Shying away from this model 
of thought as simple riposte, our digital salon cherished the time of and 
for contemplation. Even though the editors encouraged submissions on 
current topics—global warming, the refugee crisis in Europe, the 2016 
US election—the articles published were not mere reactions but specu-
lations, interventions, and reflections, as the title of this collection sug-
gests. The very format of the platform, in which there was a lag between 
the writing of a text, the time when it was posted, the moment it was 
read and the crafting of a comment creates room for thought that was 
absent both from Enlightenment salons and from most social media plat-
forms. The book version of the salon continues to foster this reflective 
attitude in that the various posts are no longer organized chronologically, 
like they were online, but thematically. This structure invites readers to 
establish connections between different topics, allowing them to see the 
“larger picture” even as they immerse themselves in the analysis of spe-
cific issues. The goal is to recognize the broader context framing individ-
ual subjects or events and, at the same time, to understand how particular 
matters shed light on wider trends of our world.
Still, the question of who has the right to pronounce their opinion in 
our online salon and in its print counterpart remains. Following the spirit 
of the Enlightenment salons, traditionally assembled around a hostess 
who, being banned from most public debates, received guest in her house 
for intellectual exchange, The Philosophical Salon endeavored to achieve 
gender parity and actively sought to make the voices of women thinkers 
heard. Furthermore, we tried to publish texts by contributors from dif-
ferent backgrounds, from established scholars to young academics, from 
poets to activists. Far from endorsing a vision of the public intellectual 
as an auratic figure, one who is ready to dictate an authoritative opinion 
on any and all topics, the salon aimed to promote an attitude of rigorous 
thinking that was not tied to given individuals or currents of thought. It 
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was an empty space, or an empty chair, if you like, where anyone could sit, 
provided she or he had something interesting to share with the audience. 
The cultivation of reflection is increasingly needed in an era when 
thought is straightjacketed between the unabashed apologies of neo-
liberal globalization and the nationalist reaction that so often accompa-
nies it. Both political stances are united in the mission of neutralizing 
thinking, the only remaining threat to the status quo and its knee-jerk 
inversion. On the side of globalism, we witness the consensual reign of 
instrumental rationality that replaces ideas with algorithmic functions, 
“zero-sum games,” and other techniques drawn from the sphere of cal-
culation. On the side of resurgent nationalism, the trend is toward the 
entrenchment of highly exclusive traditional identities, toward which its 
proponents flee for safe haven (often fantasized as a physical space pro-
tected by separation walls) from the leveling economic and cultural logic 
of globalization. In this latter case, thinking wanes to the extent that its 
role is transferred to arguments based on the authority of tradition, often 
immune to the questioning drive. In the face of a two-pronged onslaught, 
resisting both economism and traditionalism, the task of thinking is to 
become ecological, that is to say, to develop non-parochial languages for, 
or manners of articulating (logoi), the fragile dwellings (oikoi) we inhabit, 
from the planetary to the so-called private. We would like to believe that 
our salon, inspired in what was initially the most public part of a resi-
dence, provided an opportunity for such articulations.
In this sense, too, as an institutional space for the dissemination and 
exchange of ideas, The Philosophical Salon is rather unique. Globalization 
has its own ideological arm in much of the mainstream media, where 
analyses of contemporary events are utterly predictable, with more dar-
ing suggestions sanctioned. Conservative anti-globalization movements 
have similarly developed their alternative presses and websites, such as 
Breitbart News Network in the US or Katehon in Russia, where often racist 
or downright fascist opinion pieces thrive. Between the Scylla of the first 
and the Charybdis of the second, the missing option—resonating with 
the place of thinking itself—is a context-bound reflection that reaches 
beyond its specific predicament and forges ties to other contexts, a way of 
dwelling that opens itself to other modes of inhabiting the world. When 
we invoked the “empty chair” of the public intellectual, we were not 
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approving of a disembodied, decontextualized space for thought; rather, 
we referred to the singular universality of thinking that, beginning from 
its here-and-now, is capable of transcending a particular situation with-
out betraying its immanence. 
The texts published in a online version of the salon, a selection of 
which is now reproduced in this book, invite different strategies of read-
ing. As mentioned above, the digital salon privileged a chronological 
structure, starting with Jean-Luc Nancy’s comment on the Paris attacks 
on the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo, the first article we published 
in March 2015. This chronological path can still be followed by those 
who are reading the present volume in order to get an image of the events 
that marked the past two years. Even though the book version of the 
salon is organized thematically, we have indicated the date of publication 
at the end of each article, so that readers would be able to situate a spe-
cific text in its context and read chronologically. Such an approach might 
be appropriate for those who would like, for instance, to trace the debates 
surrounding the 2016 US elections or the philosophical assessments of 
“Brexit” before and after the referendum was conducted. 
Another possible avenue for reading the essays in this book is to 
concentrate on topics arising out of the contributors’ shared concerns. 
One could, for example, focus primarily on texts that address environ-
mental issues, among them Kelly Oliver’s “Loving the Earth Enough,” 
Gary Francione and Anna Charlton’ “Veganism without Animal Rights,” 
Patrícia Vieira’s “Is Existentialist a Posthumanism?” and Sarah Conly’s 
“One Child: Do We Have a Right to More?” Or you may decide to con-
centrate on gender and sexuality issues alone, reading T.M. Murray’s 
“Gay Essentialism in a Eugenic Age,” together with Slavoj Žižek’s “The 
Sexual Is Political” and “A Reply to my Critics.”
The themes and patterns woven into the texture of the salon move 
along three general methodological vectors of our thinking relation to 
contemporaneity. The section Speculations includes what are perhaps 
the most conceptually charged, contemplative pieces that, though rel-
evant to the crucial concerns of our day and age, are not bound to spe-
cific events or historical trends. It is as though the authors, whose essays 
are gathered in this section of the book, zoom out of the minutiae of our 
preoccupations and, having opened a bird’s-eye view on the present, 
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enable us to return to social, economic, political, aesthetic, and other 
forms of existence with the baggage of richer understanding. Typically, 
such speculations inquire into the meaning of institutions, phenom-
ena, and expressions that, despite structuring our lives, risk turning into 
empty buzzwords. They ask, among other things: What is the meaning of 
politics? Of art? Of enmity? Of clean energy? Of the Anthropocene? Of 
Europe? The list goes on…
Interventions are the inverse of Speculations, and yet, at their best, they 
achieve a similar outcome, namely a more nuanced appreciation of the 
complex realities we are a part of. For the articles gathered in this section, 
a specific occurrence— for instance, hurricane Katrina, the Chernobyl 
nuclear accident and their respective anniversaries —offers a spring-
board for a theoretical discussion of the cultural, economic, or political 
logics, within which it is ensconced. The singularity of the event is, of 
course, never completely exhausted by these explanatory, semantic nets 
and the work of mourning it calls for is similarly interminable. But it is 
only thanks to discerning interventions that we can indeed work through 
such occurrences, rather than act out, repeating the same tragic errors 
that have claimed thousands of live (in these cases: the insufficiency of 
government response to the plight of those who suffered from a severe 
natural disaster, or our addiction to nuclear power). Zooming in on the 
singular, the authors who contributed their analyses to this section of The 
Philosophical Salon do not remain mired in infinite details but bring their 
subject matter to bear on the predicament of being human today.  
Reflections, in their turn, experiment with a difficult interplay between 
the singular and the universal, alternating between those moments when 
they zoom in on and those when they zoom out of the fine-grains of our 
world. What does the vehement rejection of gun control in the US do 
to the very notion of civilization? How, in making reproductive choices, 
to assume individual responsibility for the environmentally damaging 
effects of global overpopulation? Can universities still fulfill their critical 
function in the epoch of their rampant bureaucratization? These are just 
some of the guiding questions for thinking about the present from the 
midpoint of what Hegel called “mediation,” the in-between of thought 
that, neither entirely abstract nor wholly concrete, neither conjec-
tural nor empirical, holds a mirror wherein actuality-in-the-making can 
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fleetingly espy itself. Unlike Hegelian dialectics, however, our reflections 
do not await the moment when the historical process is almost over so as 
to grasp it; instead, they convey a moving image of rapid developments, 
their outcomes far from already determined.    
The three main sections of The Philosophical Salon—Speculations, 
Reflections and Interventions—are subdivided into thematic clusters, 
such as “Metapolitics,” “Food Matters,” “On Refugees,” and so on. Each 
of these subsections and, in fact, each single salon text, constitutes a 
snapshot of our world, an illustration of a particular issue, problem or 
event. But these photographs do not stand alone. Every article is both a 
still and a moving picture that lends depth to the uniqueness of a given 
image, frames it within a wider context and applies to it the dynamics of 
thought. Salon articles are thus responses to the provocations of thought. 
We hope they will be, in turn, thought-provoking for our readers and will 
provide food for further thought about the pressing issues facing us today. 
Part I
Speculations
A. Metapolitics
The Meta-Crisis of Liberalism
John Milbank and Adrian Pabst
The 2008 financial crash and inner-city riots across the West that began 
in the early 2000s revealed the limitations of the two liberalisms that 
have dominated Western politics for the past half-century: the social-
cultural liberalism of the left since the 1960s and the economic-political 
liberalism of the right since the 1980s. Both may have provided greater 
personal freedoms and individual opportunities, but both can now also 
be seen as arrogant, atomising and authoritarian. For, together they have 
served the interests of the administrative state and the unfettered market 
that have collusively brought about an unprecedented centralisation of 
power and concentration of wealth in the hands of a few. In consequence, 
a new, rootless oligarchy now combines impersonal technocracy with a 
manipulative populism, while holding in contempt the genuine priorities 
of most people.
Historically, each ‘face’ of liberalism seemed to be the opposite of the 
other. The liberal left appealed to the state in order to protect the people 
from the forces of market fundamentalism that the liberal right cham-
pioned, while the liberal right defended conservative values of family 
and the nation against the multiculturalism and emancipation that the 
liberal left celebrated. But far from representing genuine alternatives to 
one another, the two liberalisms are mutually reinforcing in that they 
fuse economic-political individualism with bureaucratic-managerial col-
lectivism and social-cultural atomisation—as Max Weber realised better 
than Karl Marx.
In reality, we have witnessed two revolutions that are but one: the left 
has advanced a social-cultural liberalism that promotes individual rights 
and equality of opportunity for self-expression, while the right has advo-
cated an economic-political liberalism that champions the free market 
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liberated from the constricting shackles of the bureaucratic state. We have 
a ‘liberal right’ celebrating economic and political negative liberty, and a 
‘liberal left’ celebrating cultural and sexual negative liberty. The two liber-
alisms were always in tacit, secret alliance. They have now more explicitly 
fused to proffer the shared creed of the left that recently embraced eco-
nomic neo-liberalism together with an impersonal statism, and the right 
that has openly espoused cultural liberalism in scorn of its own natural 
constituency.
It would be foolish to deny that decades of liberalisation have pro-
vided greater opportunities for many and afforded some protection 
against the worst transgressions upon the liberty of some by the liberty 
of others, especially given the growing disagreement about substantive 
notions of justice and the good life. However, economic liberalism has 
also eroded the social bonds and civic ties on which vibrant democra-
cies and market economies ultimately depend for trust and cooperation. 
Meanwhile, cultural liberalism, including some modes of middle-class 
feminism, has carelessly underwritten the new cult of market choice in 
default of its supposedly radical commitments. And, paradoxically, the 
two liberalisms have engendered a society that is not just more atom-
ised but also more interdependent in the wrong way—too tied to global 
financial processes that leave far less scope for individual initiative and 
the ability to shape one’s own life.
The liberal preference for negative freedom is the direct consequence 
of ruling questions of truth or goodness out of the court of public dis-
cussion, because liberals claim that in diverse societies with rival values 
the pursuit of such and similar shared ends is necessarily intolerant and 
oppressive. Yet, liberalism’s substitution of individual rights and the 
social contract for the common good ends up creating the very effects 
that liberals wrongly equate with positive liberty—ideological tyranny, 
the closing-down of argument, and the ironing-out of plurality. Thus, 
liberal politics engenders the kind of illiberalism that it ascribes to all 
non-liberal positions. Without shared ends, individuals are encouraged 
to maximise their own subjective choice in conditions of growing mar-
ket anarchy policed by an authoritarian state, as Karl Polanyi diagnosed 
in his seminal 1944 book The Great Transformation. Connected with this 
is the progressive loss of a ‘moral economy’ of mutual obligations and 
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the atomisation of society that had hitherto embedded the political and 
the economic.
Here we can go further than Polanyi to suggest that the triumph of lib-
eralism more and more brings about the ‘war of all against all’ (Hobbes) 
and the idea of man as self-proprietary animal (Locke) that were its pre-
suppositions. But this does not thereby prove those presuppositions, 
because it is only really existing liberalism that has produced in practice 
the circumstances which it originally assumed in theory. Just as liberal 
thought redefined human nature as isolated individuals who enter into 
formal contractual ties with other individuals (instead of the ancient 
and Christian idea of social, political animals), so too liberal practice has 
replaced the quest for reciprocal recognition and mutual flourishing with 
the pursuit of wealth, power, and pleasure.
And since in theory and practice liberalism goes against the grain of 
humanity and the universe we inhabit, we are facing not merely a cyclical 
crisis (linked, for example, to economic boom and bust or the decline of 
representative government), nor even just a systemic crisis of capitalism 
and democracy, but rather a meta-crisis. The meta-crisis of liberalism is 
the tendency at once to abstract from reality and to reduce everything 
to its bare materiality, leaving an irreducible aporia between human will 
and artifice, on the one hand, and unalterable laws of nature and history, 
on the other.
This can be seen most of all in contemporary capitalism, which oper-
ates a simultaneous process of abstraction and materialisation. It subjects 
the real economy of productive activities to relentless commodification 
and speculation, while at the same time separating symbolic significance, 
equated with pure exchange value, from material space which is seen 
increasingly as just an object for arbitrary division, consumption and 
destruction. As a result, it renders ecological damage constitutive of our 
fundamental economic processes. This double conception of wealth as 
aggregated calculable number and as private consumption cuts out all the 
relational goods and the ‘commons’ on which shared prosperity depends. 
In the long run, the tendency towards abstraction and materialisation 
leads to destruction that is not creative—as growing economic financiali-
sation exacerbates social dislocation and ecological devastation.
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Thus, liberalism undoes itself and, in so doing, it erodes the pol-
ity it claims to save from extremes on both the left and the right. After 
all, the liberal focus on abstract, general standards (such as subjective 
rights, commercial contracts or formal, procedural justice) is parasitic 
upon a culture of universal principles and particular practices of virtue 
that this obsessive and rigid focus undermines, cutting off the branch on 
which it sits.
04.13.2015
The Politics of Politics
Geoffrey Bennington
Idioms beginning with “the politics of…” are often used to describe a 
dimension of other activities that is thought to be less than essential to 
them. “The politics of the university,” “the politics of sport,” “the poli-
tics of art,” refer to an apparently extrinsic aspect of activities thought to 
have their essence elsewhere. Whatever the essence of the university is, 
the usual thought goes, it cannot reside in its politics, which more or less 
wastes our time and diverts us from the true academic calling that is ours. 
Whatever art is truly about, the same thought goes, it surely cannot essen-
tially involve the politics of, say, its involvement with galleries, dealers, 
and the art market.
Similarly, or so it would seem, with “the politics of politics”: like other 
activities, politics is most often thought to have an essential part (how-
ever it is defined: participating in the life of the city, discussing, militat-
ing, deliberating, voting, enacting and mandating the application of 
appropriate legislation, protesting, demonstrating, organizing) and an 
inessential “politics” or “politicking” (what in Paris is called “la politique 
politicienne” and in Washington “playing politics,” or increasingly, in an 
interesting gesture of disavowal, just “politics”). On this construal, every-
one, including those most energetically and enthusiastically involved in it, 
eagerly denounces the politics of politics as a kind of corruption of what 
politics essentially is or should be, everyone deplores the fact that politics 
seems to be increasingly bound up in its own politics in this way, and we 
invest our hopes in figures who seem to be doing politics in the absence 
of its politics.
But this apparently secondary and supposedly debased dimension of 
politics (its “politics,” then, the politics of politics), cannot satisfactorily 
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be thought of in this way as merely derivative or parasitic with respect 
to a true or essential politics. In fact, it is co-extensive with politics from 
the start. Our fondest desire may be to find or invent a politics unaf-
fected by the politics of politics (a truly moral politics, perhaps, of the 
kind Kant seems to encourage), but that desire is metaphysical through 
and through. The zoon politikon, or political animal, is engaged in the 
politics of politics as soon as that zoon is engaged in politics, i.e. from the 
very first, “naturally,” as Aristotle put it. The logos of politics is irreducibly 
affected by the kind of distortion and deceit that is usually—moralisti-
cally—associated with rhetoric and/or sophistry, with “spin”. Politics is 
always already the politics of politics.
This structure is complex enough to impinge on the issue of truth, no 
less, the truth of truth, even, in its relation to the politics of politics. We 
might be tempted to call it a question of the politics of truth. This expres-
sion “the politics of truth” is of course still relatively indeterminate, and 
already has an uncomfortable sloganizing feel to it. As it happens, “poli-
tics of truth” is one definition Michel Foucault gives of philosophy itself, 
in the context of his late development of the concept of parrhēsia: a kind 
of freedom of speech or “fearless speech,” as it has sometimes been pre-
sented, a kind of “telling truth to power” that for Foucault and many of 
his enthusiastic followers defines the proper role of the philosopher, at 
least with respect to the political sphere.
But Foucault’s concept of parrhēsia is, actually, quite unsatisfactory to 
capture what is at stake here. A quick way of stating why is that Foucault 
repeatedly and insistently needs to separate parrhēsia into a good form 
and a bad form, the good form being the kind of speaking out that is asso-
ciated with a famous and seductive image of Foucault himself address-
ing a crowd through a megaphone; and the bad form being consistently 
associated by him with rhetoric and sophistry. This attempt to distin-
guish a good form of parrhēsia from a bad obviously opens a question 
about parrhēsia “itself,” as it were, prior to its distinction into these good 
and bad forms. And this will mean that Foucault’s analysis founders on 
a simple fact—that Foucault mentions in passing but never satisfacto-
rily deals with—namely, that parrhēsia is the name of a rhetorical figure, a 
name, in Quintilian, for example, for the figure of rhetoric that claims to 
eschew all rhetoric and presents itself as the plain unvarnished truth. Far 
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from being a philosophical answer to politics, or the ground on which 
the philosopher can occupy a salutary position of robust and recalcitrant 
exteriority with respect to politics (which is what Foucault wants from 
it), parrhēsia describes the basic rhetorical figure of politics itself in its 
politics. In other words, it reiterates the eminently metaphysical claim 
(boldly or baldly made by every politician ever, of whatever persuasion) 
to be simply speaking the plain truth in the absence of rhetoric.
This means that achieving the desired position of exteriority, of truth, 
with respect to politics and rhetoric is not going to be so easy (if parrhēsia 
itself is a figure of rhetoric, it will follow that rhetoric—like a Moebius 
strip—has no outside), and that by the same token politics has no outside. 
This does not mean that it is simple or homogeneous, but that it is con-
stitutively doubled up on itself. Again: politics is always already the politics 
of politics.
Political philosophy, that rather disreputable, not very philosophical 
branch of philosophy (as Giorgio Agamben and Leo Strauss agree), has 
always wanted to get out of politics, to put an end to this politics of poli-
tics, by finally speaking its truth, indulging in that undecidable entangle-
ment of teleology and the death-drive that defines philosophy as such—
so that, for a quick and easy example, the best image of Kant’s “Perpetual 
Peace” might always be that of a graveyard. But if politics is constitutively 
the politics of politics, then this ambition is compromised, and political 
philosophy needs to be quite radically rethought.
11.16.2015
The Unbearable Slowness of Change: 
Protest Politics and the Erotics of Resistance
Nikita Dhawan
In the past decades there has been a proliferation of protest movements 
that interpellate a global demos, which has been wronged by the neo-
liberal beast. From Puerta del Sol to Taksim, from Syntagma to Tahrir 
Square, from Hong Kong to New Delhi, street politics seem to have 
transformed the way power, agency and resistance are being perceived 
and performed. By inserting new actors into the political stage, these 
counterpublic spheres are displacing the Habermasian idea of public 
sphere, where rational subjects come together to deliberate over com-
mon interests. Instead, counterpublics can be read as affect worlds, where 
public anger, outrage and frustration reshape the terms of the state-civil 
society relation.
Despite important differences in goals and strategies, it is claimed that 
protest movements like the San Precario movement, the Arabellions, the 
indignados, or Occupy Wall Street are all horizontally organized, mostly 
employing social media like Facebook, blogs and Twitter. Direct action 
on the streets allegedly brings together heterogeneous groups, inducing 
“spontaneous solidarity”. These bodies on the street are vulnerable to 
state violence, even as they demand accountability from their political 
representatives.
The disruptive potentiality of dispossessed masses, as they occupy 
public spaces to protest economic and political disenfranchisement, can 
be read as an exercise of popular sovereignty. Political actions on the 
streets in the form of hunger strikes by asylum seekers in cities like Berlin 
or self-immolation by a Tunisian fruit vendor have become symbols of 
global resistance. A number of concepts like “precarity”, “wasted lives”, 
“the superfluous”, “the outcasts” are mobilized to describe marginal 
The Unbearable Slowness of Change:Protest Politics and the Erotics of Resistance  31
political subjectivities. Despite significant differences in their approaches, 
all these concepts engage with the condition of dispossession. They 
outline how the governmentality of efficiency, profitability, accumula-
tion, optimization renders a vast majority of populations expendable 
and disposable.
Contesting these developments, protest movements in different parts 
of the world evoke promises of radical political change through shaming 
powerful states and international financial institutions into good behav-
ior. However, the question remains: How effective are these fantasies of 
radical change through “Facebook revolutions” and “Twitter insurgen-
cies” in fundamentally transforming social, political and economic rela-
tions in the era of postcolonial late capitalism?
There is an intrinsic ambivalence at the heart of today’s protest move-
ments. On the one hand, without the desire for and vision of another 
political order, resistance is not possible. The movements powerfully 
negate the TINA (There Is No Alternative) principle. On the other 
hand, current protests unwittingly reproduce processes of subalterniza-
tion of marginal subjects and collectivities that have a tenuous relation 
to the state as well as the (international) civil society and counterpublic 
spheres. The romantic enthusiasm evoked by popular movements erases 
the exploitative and exclusionary material conditions that make pos-
sible the exercise of agency of the dissidents. When, for instance, an anti-
capitalist protester tweets with his/her I-Pad, which is produced under 
super-exploitative working conditions in the global South, the phan-
tasm of subverting capitalism reveals itself as a surreal moment of class-
privileged jouissance. Such radical politics is marked by a discontinuity 
between those who resist and those who cannot.
Despite the powerful images evoked by ideas like “bare life” or “dis-
posable lives” that are mobilized by protesters to mirror their vulnerabil-
ity, in my view, many of these concepts tend to reproduce Eurocentrism. 
For instance, the recent focus on precarity is closely related to the break-
down of the welfare state in Europe, which conveniently disregards that 
this situation has been the norm in the global South. The majority of the 
population was systematically denied access to the formal labor mar-
ket, health insurance and unemployment benefits, and for decades has 
been living with the insecurity and anxiety resulting from the system of 
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employment made casual. The irony is that the scene of the crime has 
expanded. What was done to the global South in the name of Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) is now being implemented in the 
global North.
My other concern is that enthusiastic discourses about resistance and 
fantasies of hyper-agency tend to overestimate the scope and influence of 
current political initiatives, even as they ignore the exclusions they pro-
duce. The absurdity of the claim about tweeting one’s way out of capital-
ism is self-evident. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari elaborate the erotics 
of capitalism: “… the way a bureaucrat fondles his records … the bourge-
osie fucks the proletariat. Flags, nations, armies, banks get a lot of people 
aroused”. I would add that fantasies of radical change through protest pol-
itics are getting a lot of urban, class-privileged subjects very aroused. The 
fact that they are complicit in the very structures they are contesting is 
conveniently veiled by the rhetorics of the disenfranchised global demos.
The fabricated fiction that all bodies are equal on the street or in 
cyberspace disavows the hierarchies that permeate social and political 
relations globally. Given that only the elites fulfill the criterion of citizen-
ship invoked in the demographically limited normative concept of civil 
society, subaltern groups can only unevenly access counterpublics. In 
response to Michel Foucault’s claim “where there is power, there is resis-
tance”, I would add “where there is resistance, there is power”. There is 
still a crucial difference between being an unemployed youth in Spain 
and a farmer in India, who loses his land because of being forced to buy 
genetically modified Monsanto BT cotton. The former is contesting his 
precarity on the streets of Madrid as part of the indignados, while the later 
may be one of the nameless thousands who have committed suicide since 
the enforcement of biological patents. Not as an act of resistance, but 
because of his inability to make his interests count and make the post-
colonial state respond to his subalternization. Against the claim that our 
common vulnerability brings us together, I would advance a counterar-
gument that deep asymmetries of power and wealth cannot be corrected 
simply by sharing the street or cyberspace for a common cause or facing 
police violence together.
It is imperative to rework our understanding of resistance to coun-
teract the seductions of the vocabulary of “tweeting the revolution”. 
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We need to guard against the enthusiastic celebration of radical change 
through street politics and digital publics. Protest movements are marked 
by exclusions that are disturbingly overlooked in celebratory discourses 
about their opposition to the state. The staging of the state as enemy 
and civil society as agent of salvation can have vicious neocolonial con-
sequences, particularly for subaltern groups. Transnational counterpub-
lics tend to empower civil society actors, whose “will-to-do-good” and 
“will-to-resist” are marked by feudality and enabled by a neoliberal fram-
ing. We need to confront the question whether enthusiastic discourses 
of resistance really empower disenfranchised communities, or whether 
they simply reinforce relations of domination between those who act and 
those on whose behalf these colorful and lively uprisings and revolts are 
being staged.
The process of de-subalternization is unbearably slow, while the 
fantasies of revolutions via Twitter and Facebook move at the speed of 
thought. Gayatri Spivak recommends that the vanguardism of the inter-
national civil society be supplanted by the slow, patient work of enabling 
subaltern access to hegemony. This is not just about teaching subalterns 
to resist through political indoctrination or consciousness-raising; rather, 
they must be enabled to exercise intellectual labor, while the class-priv-
ileged must unlearn the impulse to monopolize agency in the name of 
saving the world. Such a development would require a shift from street 
politics as the site of de-subalternization to other arenas of intervention 
(e.g., the postcolonial state, which is like a pharmakon, both poison and 
medicine). In contrast to the state-phobic rhetoric of protest movements, 
the relation between the postcolonial state and the subaltern must be 
reconfigured, thereby converting poison into counterpoison.
Those on the privileged side of transnationality have to resist becom-
ing self-selected moral entrepreneurs in charge of finding solutions for 
the world’s problems. “The voice of the people” as an act of political 
speech that authentically expresses the will of the people reveals itself as 
a phantasm, so that protest movements can ironically subalternize the 
masses at the very moment that they seem to let them speak. The con-
tinued reproduction of subalternity complicates easy notions of trans-
national alliances, raising troubling questions about the possibilities of 
post-imperial politics in the era of neoliberal globalization.
09.14.2015
The Dehumanization of the Enemy
Antonio Cerella
The world today appears divided into two opposing camps: the realm of 
Good and the empire of Evil, the free world against the world of slavery, 
“crusaders” vs. “martyrs.” Yet, this riven field is also crossed by a sort of 
invisible mirror that deforms one’s own reflection. Despite their apparent 
difference and asymmetry, in fact, the two rivals follow a common strat-
egy: the dehumanization of the enemy.
Behind these metaphors lies a deep crisis of the classical notions of 
war and peace, guilt and innocence, life and death. It is not merely the 
loss of the fundamental distinction between combatants and civilians 
that both suicide bombers and airstrike bombings signal. In the current 
situation, all the fundamental principles that gave birth to the Laws of 
War seem to collapse: spatial and temporal limitations of hostilities, pro-
portionality of military actions, discrimination of targets, weapons and 
the just methods of using them. In this way, the “enemy” is transformed 
from a juridical concept into an “ideological object.” This figure, pushed 
to a climax from both these “invisible” and “mobile” fronts, becomes 
absolute and de-humanized.
Obama, Cameron and Hollande’s unwillingness to use ground troops 
against the “uncivilized,” as Kerry put it last year, is mirrored by ISIL’s 
call to intensify suicide missions against the “cowards.” But what lies 
behind the asymmetric confrontation between airstrikes and “human-
strikes,” behind the blurring of the distinctions between the state of war 
and the state of peace? What notion of humanity are the physical disen-
gagement of the Western powers (with their tele-killing via drones and 
airstrikes) and the physical engagement of suicide bombers (ready to 
turn their bodies into a weapon) trying to convey? In other words, how 
and to what extent is there a connection between the automatization and 
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biopoliticization of war operated by Western powers and the sacrificial 
nature of the conflict adopted by those who want to fight these powers?
When the enemy is reduced to the empty image of “collateral dam-
age” or the “inverted icon” of the crusader to be destroyed, a frighten-
ing abyss—in which all the legal covers sink—opens, leaving room 
only for naked violence and its intrinsic brutality. German jurist Carl 
Schmitt warned against this ideological drift. The figures of the enemies, 
he argued, are our existential reflections, the shaping of ourselves, the 
embodiment of our own question. Their dehumanization leads to the 
loss of our most intimate humanity. The dehumanizing mechanism rips 
human faces from the Others, thus transforming them into what is infi-
nitely identical to itself and yet ontologically different, into the indefinite, 
abstract, and absolute Enemy of humanity: Islam, the West, America, the 
French, the Arabs. In this way, individual responsibilities are turned into 
collective ones: everyone is guilty, and no one is responsible.
Deprived of a face, fear becomes terror. For, terror is faceless presence, 
the shadow cast by our nightmares upon the Other who is omnipresent 
precisely because he is invisible, because he does not possess a human, 
familiar face. Terror is the black sun shining on the landscapes designed 
by our deepest anxieties, the endless night of our darkest alterity.  But 
what does it mean to deny—un-dialectically erasing—the Other’s face?
The dehumanization of the enemy turns the use of violence, from an 
extrema ratio into “just-terror,” as the massacres of Paris last November 
were called by the official organ of the Islamic State; the Other as a less-
than-human must “evaporate,” as The Times has defined the killing of 
“Jihadi John.” The Other is but the Nothingness to be annihilated: only 
when the last terrorist is wiped out shall we be saved, but our “violent 
salvation” cannot but produce new “terrorists.” Indeed, it is like trying to 
kill the night by stabbing it with a knife.
This is no moralizing game. What is at stake here is not the justifica-
tion of a particular use of violence. This conflict—like all conflicts (and 
the troubled history of Palestine should serve as an example)—is fed by 
the violent reciprocity of weapons, by the ideological and moral figures 
borrowed from the disfigured or unfigured enemy. To restore the face of 
one’s own enemy is a matter of humanitarian law, if it is true, as Giorgio 
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Agamben has argued, that “in the silence of the face, and there alone, is 
mankind truly at home.”
One may be skeptical of this enterprise, and there certainly is no lack 
of reasons for our eventual skepticism as the Syrian war and the occu-
pation of Palestine and Crimea continue to show us. Yet, this conflict—
as every struggle—can only be saved by means of law and, above all, of 
Justice. Franz Kafka, with his life and work, offers us a beautiful meta-
phor for this.
One afternoon, while walking with Dora Diamant, his girlfriend at 
the time, in the Steglitz Park on the outskirts of Berlin, Kafka came across 
a little girl who was crying desperately. Worried, he asked her what had 
happened. The little girl, sobbing, said she had lost her doll. Seriously 
concerned, Kafka invented on the spot a long story to explain that absurd 
disappearance: the doll had left for a long journey; she was now married 
and lived happily in an exotic country. He knew these things because the 
doll had delivered a letter to his house. Every morning, for three weeks, 
Kafka, with total devotion close to exasperation, exercised his fantasy by 
writing and reading a letter to the little girl in order to give life and con-
sistency to that imaginary world where the absent was present, and she 
could still live with serenity her dreams, memories and hopes. As Dora 
Diamant realized, in this beautiful story reported by the jurist Antonio 
Cassese, to protect the child “the lie was to be transformed into truth, 
through the truth of fiction.” Kafka knew that it was necessary to create a 
world to restore a moral order with the other, to each other. Fiction is the 
instrument by which we fill the abyss opened by our creaturely nullity. 
Justice, in this sense, is the sharing of our imaginary that restores to the 
Others their faces.
That is also the fate of international law. It can be seen as an “ethical 
lie” that must be constantly told and experienced in order to be believed; 
Law, in other words, must be incarnated in the face of the Other to 
become “true.” Only then does it becomes that “real fiction” which makes 
the idea of justice meaningful. That is why, to break the bad unity of the 
world brought about by the dehumanization of the enemy, we need to 
revive our idea of justice. If we believe in humanity, we must grant it 
to our enemy.
05.01.2016
The Empire of Solitude
David Castillo and William Egginton
One attribute of this year’s presidential contest that has not gone unno-
ticed by the press is the apparent insouciance with which the candidates 
have gone about embellishing their records, denying the embellishment 
when confronted, and outright fabricating nonsensical facts, all with-
out seeming to suffer any consequences when their lies are called out by 
the mainstream press. As Michael Barbaro wrote in the Times, “Today, 
it seems, truth is in the eyes of the beholder—and any assertion can be 
elevated and amplified if yelled loudly enough.”
How are we to understand this apparent growing disregard for reality, 
the ubiquitous presence in politics of an attitude or practice denoted so 
memorably by Stephen Colbert as “truthiness,” or in Webster’s definition 
“the quality of preferring concepts or facts one wishes to be true, rather 
than concepts of facts known to be true”? Is this perhaps the result of the 
dismaying rise of cultural relativism, born in the twentieth century and 
now coming home to roost? Such was Dick Meyer’s conclusion in a com-
mentary he wrote in 2006 on the occasion of Merriam-Webster declar-
ing Colbert’s coinage the Word of the Year. Truthiness, Meyer writes, “is 
perfect for the times in every way. It is a fake word invented by a fake per-
son, Stephen Colbert, the comedian whose character, Stephen Colbert, 
parodies cable news talk shows on his own cable show, ‘The Colbert 
Report.’”  Truthiness, Meyer goes on to claim, “is the definitive cultural 
and comedic acknowledgement of moral relativism.”
If we take a second look, though, we should see right away that 
Republican presidential candidates are no more moral relativists than are 
the true believers of the Christian Right that they pander to. While they 
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may be opportunists in their cooptation of certain political positions, 
those positions constitute the polar opposite of relativism. The reason 
truthiness has become such a convincing descriptor in early twenty-first 
century political life is not because of a widespread realization that one’s 
moral beliefs are culturally and historically determined, but because of 
a sharp increase in both the proportion of people who believe that their 
beliefs are direct expressions of reality, and the intensity with which they 
hold and defend those beliefs. Truthiness, in other words, is not an effect 
of the rise of relativism; it is an effect of the proliferation of fundamental-
ism. And fundamentalism is a symptom of today’s medialogy, the term 
we use for the concept of reality determined by a culture’s dominant 
medial form.
The new medialogy is already once removed from the reality con-
cept implied by the prior medialogy, since its prima facie content is now 
the level of the material media that preceded it: books, bodies, images, 
and identities are injected with the aura of the real and endowed with a 
special authenticity. Objects that had become copies of an ineffable real 
emerge as things in themselves with no further regression required. They 
are already real and hence require no transcendent reference to ground 
them. This reification of what had been relegated to the status of cop-
ies is the basis for an unconscious fundamentalism that spreads to all 
walks of life.
In such a medialogical context, the state as the copy of national sub-
stance loses that anchoring in the real and becomes a groundless thing, 
a hollow shell that dissolves into diverse ethnic and religious identifica-
tions. Individuals cease to experience themselves as partial perspectives 
on a shared common ground, and instead start to conceive of them-
selves as the direct expressions of a particular identity that becomes all-
important. In the conditions of the new medialogy, the individual is an 
unanchored island of solitude connecting via the media to others he or 
she conceives of as conjoined members of a community with unfettered 
access to the truth. And as these fellow travelers are always apparently in 
the minority, others are demonized as at best deluded, or at worst, agents 
of a sinister plot.
Neoliberalism, the economic model of the new medialogy, prof-
its from this state of affairs. The medialogy’s concept of reality, where 
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erstwhile copies are now things, promotes an endless war of unanchored 
identities; the notion of the commons abandoned, a new commons 
develops, not “underlying” those identities but “above” them, unseen, 
syphoning off profits at unprecedented levels on a global scale. Terrorist 
fundamentalists strengthen rightwing isolationists, who demonize immi-
grants and hence further reify national, ethnic and religious difference. 
Governments aren’t weakened, though; rather, the constant threat of 
an irrational other bolsters “democratic” regimes that are little else than 
symbolic cover for oligarchies whose purpose is the creation and mainte-
nance of rules leading to greater syphoning power.
This picture is reminiscent of the “reality” revealed in the movie The 
Matrix when the virtual reality program that humanity is plugged into is 
disrupted: thousands of isolated minds each plugged into its own screen, 
all feeding a system none of them is aware of. And make no mistake 
about it: the system of global capital benefits from humanity not realiz-
ing its common ground or its common plight. In this sense, sociopoliti-
cal phenomena like the rise of rightwing, xenophobic parties and candi-
dates in the US and Europe; the apparently ubiquitous threat of terror 
attacks, often committed by home-grown extremists; or the dramatic rise 
in school shootings in the US since the nineties, are not disparate cases, 
examples of a world devolving into chaos. Rather, they are tightly inter-
connected pieces of a machine that is functioning with great precision, 
even as it multiplies death and destruction.
Think about a terror organization like the inaptly named Islamic 
State—inapt because it has neither the attributes normally associated 
with a state nor is its organizing principle Islam in any theologically rec-
ognizably form. In fact, what ISIS most resembles is an online community 
dedicated to a particularly noxious perversion—like those frequented by 
the so-called cannibal cop who fantasized online about killing and eating 
women—the difference being that its members take the next step and 
carry out the grim fantasies they encourage in one another.
Indeed, this is what we’re missing when we point out the racist dis-
crepancy involved in denoting any violence perpetrated by Muslims as 
terrorism while refusing to use the same term for the shootings commit-
ted by non-Muslim white males, despite their often explicitly racist and 
misogynist reasoning in the manifestos they leave behind. Yes, these 
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are essentially the same as the acts of terror committed by ISIS, but not 
merely because of the hate that inspires them. They are structurally con-
gruous acts because they are symptoms of a medialogy in which dispa-
rate islands of solitude meet in a virtual space to commiserate and share 
their fantasies, thereby lowering the threshold to enacting these fantasies 
and hence creating a new reality.
This theory also helps us solve the puzzle of why radicalization fails 
to track accurately with socio-economic oppression. Many of the young 
men who kill and blow themselves up come from well-established 
middle class families. Their allegiance to radical groups is similar to the 
adherence of the other, isolated young white men to the cult of the black 
duster. They believe it is about history, religion, and culture, but it is not; 
it is about an entirely constructed identity whose online proponents 
proffer it as a solution to all their pain.
This is not to say that there aren’t real social and cultural factors 
underlying the fragmentation of groups according to ethnic and religious 
identity. France’s failure to offer equal opportunity for the full economic 
integration of its citizens is absolutely central to the sense of exclusion, of 
being strangers in their own nation, that so many young men of African 
and Near Eastern descent growing up in the banlieue feel. As George 
Packer reports, “Banlieue residents joke that going into Paris requires a 
visa and a vaccination card.” And this is true of young people who are 
French, born in France, and speak only French. But again, it is vital to 
note that the alienation of the banlieue is not founded on a positive, his-
torical identity.
The banlieue as a brewer of extremism and the rise of nationalism in 
contemporary politics are symptoms of the new medialogy. Categories 
such as class, nation, religion, or ethnicity have all migrated from the 
position of copies referring to ineffable substances, and are now self-sus-
taining, self-referential identities floating free of any history other than 
fragmentation and alienation.
Such is the ground of fundamentalism. Not a return to the substan-
tial reality of the past, but the frantic desires of an unmoored present. 
Fundamentalism is fragmentation.
01.04.2016
Trump Metaphysics
Michael Marder
Quite unexpectedly, a whole slew of philosophical—I would even say 
“metaphysical”—issues have come up on the Republican side of the pri-
maries this election season. How to distinguish the real from the fake? 
What level of ignorance is simply unacceptable in public affairs? How to 
view matters of principle, or something like “the inner essence,” behind 
changing appearances? These questions have been, in one way or another, 
the staples of western philosophy ever since its inception. And most of 
them have been now linked to the candidacy of Donald Trump.
Take, for instance, the recent GOP debate organized and aired by Fox 
News. Presenter Megyn Kelly quizzed Trump: “The point I’m going for 
is you change your tune on so many things, and that has some people 
saying, what is his core?” Her point goes beyond the usual flip-flopping 
accusations leveled against presidential candidates. It even overflows the 
opposition between a politics based on immutable foundational prin-
ciples, often called the politics of truth, and an opportunistic catering to 
various groups comprising the electorate. Unwittingly, having thrown 
everything but the kitchen sink at Trump, Kelly has dug up a crucial 
metaphysical distinction between the stable, selfsame inner essence 
and fleetingly superficial outward appearances. In his response, Trump 
insisted that there was no contradiction between his “very strong core,” 
upon which he did not elaborate further, and “a certain degree of flex-
ibility” necessary for learning from past experiences. His inaccessible 
essence thus reconciled with evanescent appearances, Trump has given 
himself a meta-excuse for any and all crude inconsistencies in his take on 
domestic and foreign policies alike.
Along similar lines, Mitt Romney’s March 3 verbal assault on the cur-
rent Republican frontrunner touches on an issue dear to the philosophical 
42 Michael Marder
heart. The failed 2012 candidate called Trump “a phony, a fraud” as well 
as “a con man, a fake.” Since its inception in ancient Greece, philosophy 
too has been suspicious of an oratory that substituted a flowery or a fiery 
rhetoric for the things themselves. Plato’s Republic associated the political 
sphere as a whole with such empty and deceptively manipulative strat-
egies, while prescribing a universally valid method for leaving the cave 
of appearances with the assistance of the philosopher-king. But before 
identifying Romney with a modern-day (latter-day) Plato or Socrates, we 
ought to inquire: In the name of what truth is he condemning Trump? 
The critic overtly assumes that there are Republican politicians who 
are not fake, those authentically suffused with the bracing tenets of the 
“conservative movement.” Brushing aside Romney’s assault, Trump char-
acteristically turned the tables on him and reminded voters of how the 
former begged for his support as he was running against Barack Obama. 
Obviously, the accusation “you are a phony, a fraud” loses much of its 
bite if it comes from someone revealed to be a phony and a fraud in a field 
populated by similar phonies and frauds.
It is simply futile to chastise Trump from the standpoint of stale meta-
physical values, because he embodies a system, which has a long time 
ago outgrown and abandoned these same values. What does it mean 
to decry a candidate for the office of president as a “fake” in a country 
where a Hollywood actor was president (more precisely, enacted the role 
of president), for two consecutive terms? Does it make sense to bemoan 
this candidate’s ignorance less than eight years after the end of George 
W. Bush’s terms in office? Where is the logic of accusing him of vulgarity 
when the official pick of the Republican establishment in the presidential 
race hints at differences in penis sizes as momentous for the outcome of 
the contest?
The reason behind the fact that Trump is currently leading (in a dis-
mal field, to be sure) is not, as Linda Martín Alcoff has argued in The 
Philosophical Salon, that his own ignorance appeals to certain ignorant 
white voters. Or, at least, it is not the only reason. Rather, what Trump 
does most deftly, and what in my view accounts for much of his current 
success, is that he fully assumes the bankruptcy of the metaphysical ideals 
such as authenticity, essentiality, or firm principles, and acts accordingly. 
His rivals, in turn, are aware of the collapse of metaphysics but pretend 
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that it has not happened. In both cases, nothing supplants the outdated 
value system, except for self-serving private interests or megalomaniac 
aspirations.
Curtly put, the bygone values are supplanted by nothing—by the 
nothing, to which everything has been reduced. Whereas Ted Cruz & 
Co. stand for the consciousness of this nothingness, Trump represents 
its self-consciousness, and this gives him an unmistakable edge over his 
rivals. He knows how to use the pure nothing that he represents, even as 
the other presidential contenders pretend that there is something behind 
their nothing. And so, Trump comes across as much more authentic in his 
inauthenticity than the others, who are busy drawing, in Plato’s words, 
the “shadow paintings of virtue” all around themselves.
Perhaps, then, a deeper cause for the GOP establishment’s concern 
and dissatisfaction with Trump is that he puts a mirror before it, forcing 
it to face up to its disavowed reality and exacerbating its tendencies in 
the process. In order to dissimulate the unpleasant truth, the party has 
no other choice but to distance itself from the rogue candidate, who uses 
even this lack of official support for his bid to his advantage, as proof of 
his outsider status, his non-belonging in the world of “Beltway politics.” 
Any attack can be turned around to serve Trump’s purposes, especially 
if he is censured based on the precepts of metaphysics, which have long 
become those of “common sense.” Trump trumps metaphysics: herein 
lies the recipe to his success so far in the campaign. To oppose him bet-
ter, more effectively, we would need not to recycle bygone metaphysical 
slogans but to chart other paths towards what lies beyond metaphysics. 
Towards a multiplicity free of totalization, a proliferation of differences, 
and a sense of sharing that has dispensed with the very idea of property.
03.14.2016
B. Interrogating Europe
Homo Europaeus: Does European Culture Exist?
Julia Kristeva
European citizen, of French nationality, Bulgarian by birth and American 
by adoption, I am not insensitive to harsh critiques of Europe, but I also 
hear the desire for it and its culture. Despite facing financial crisis, the 
Greeks, Portuguese, Italians and even the French, do not question their 
European belonging; they “feel” European. But what does this senti-
ment mean? I believe European culture can provide the means to lead 
European nations to a Federal Europe. But this begs the question: which 
European culture?
In opposition to a certain cult of identity, European culture never 
ceases to unveil a paradox: there exists an identity—mine, ours, but it is 
infinitely constructible and de-constructible. To the question “Who am 
I?” the best European response is obviously not certitude but a love of 
the question mark. After having succumbed to identity-focused dogmas 
to the point of criminality, a European “we” is now emerging.
Though Europe resorted in the past to barbaric behavior (something 
to be remembered and analyzed incessantly), the fact that it has analyzed 
this behavior better than others perhaps allows it to bring to the world a 
conception and practice of identity as a questioning inquietude. It is pos-
sible to take on European heritage, rethinking it as an antidote to the ten-
sions of identity: ours and others. Without wanting to enumerate all the 
sources of this questioning identity, let us remember that ongoing inter-
rogation can turn to corrosive doubt and self-hate: a self-destruction that 
Europe is far from being spared. We often reduce this heritage of iden-
tity to a permissive “tolerance” of others. But tolerance is only the zero 
degree of questioning. When not reduced to simply “welcoming” others, 
it invites them to question themselves, to carry the culture of question-
ing and dialogue in encounters that problematize all participants. This 
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reciprocating questioning produces an endless lucidity that provides the 
sole condition for “living together.” Identity thus understood can move 
us toward a plural identity of the new European citizen.
Whether it be lasting or not, the national character can, like indi-
viduals, experience real depression. Europe is losing its image as a world 
power and its financial, political and existential crises are palpable. But 
this is also the case of European nations, including France, one of the 
most prominent, historically.
With a depressed patient, the psychoanalyst begins by shoring up 
her self-confidence in order to establish a relationship between the two 
protagonists of the cure in which spoken words become fecund again, 
allowing for a true critical analysis of the suffering. Similarly, a depressed 
nation requires an optimal image of itself before being able to take on, 
for example, industrial expansion or a better reception of immigrants. 
“Nations, like men, die of imperceptible impoliteness,” wrote Giraudoux. 
A poorly understood universalism and colonial guilt have led politicians 
and ideologues to behave with “imperceptible impoliteness,” often dis-
guised as cosmopolitism. They act with arrogant spite in regard to the 
nation. They worsen national depression to then infuse it with a maniacal 
exaltation that is both nationalistic and xenophobic.
European nations are waiting for Europe, and Europe needs national 
cultures that feel pride in themselves. A national cultural diversity is the 
only antidote to the evil of banality, this new version of the banality of evil.
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 clearly demarcated the difference 
between European culture and North American culture. It is a question 
of two conceptions of freedom played out by democracies. Different but 
complementary, these two versions are equally present in international 
institutions and principles both in Europe and North America.
By identifying “liberty” with “self-beginning,” Kant opens the way to 
an apologia of enterprising subjectivity, subordinated to the freedom of 
Reason (pure or practical) and a Cause (divine or moral). In this order 
of thought, favored by Protestantism, freedom appears as the liberty to 
adapt oneself to the logic of cause and effect or, to quote Hannah Arendt, 
as an adaptation or “calculation of the consequences,” to the logic of 
production, science, or the economy. To be free would be to have the 
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freedom to benefit to the best of one’s ability from cause-and-effect rela-
tions in order to adapt to the markets and their profits.
But there is another model of freedom, also of European stock. 
It appears in the Greek world, develops under the pre-Socratics and 
through Socratic dialogue. Without being subordinated to a cause, 
this fundamental freedom is deployed in the speaking being who pres-
ents and gives herself to herself and to others, and in this sense is liber-
ated. This freedom of the speaking being by and through the encounter 
between the One and the Other inscribes itself in an infinite question, 
before freedom gets roped down into a cause-and-effect relation. Poetry, 
desire and revolt are its privileged experiences, revealing the incommen-
surable (though shareable) singularity of each man and woman.
One can see the risks of this second model founded on the question-
ing attitude: ignoring economic reality, isolation in corporatist demands, 
limiting oneself to tolerance and fearing to question the demands and 
identity politics of new political and social actors, not standing up to 
global competition and reverting to archaic behavior and idleness. But 
one can also see the advantages of this model used by European cultures 
and which doesn’t culminate in a schema but in a taste for human life in 
its shareable singularity.
In this context, Europe is far from being homogenous and united. 
First of all, it’s imperative that “Old Europe” and France in particular, take 
the economic and existential difficulties of “New Europe” seriously. But 
it is also necessary to recognize cultural differences and most particularly 
religious differences, which are tearing at European countries from the 
inside and separating them. It is urgent to learn to respect differences bet-
ter (I’m thinking of the Orthodox and Muslim Europe, of the persistent 
malaise in the Balkans, of the distress in Greece over the financial crisis.)
Among the multiple causes of the current crisis is one that politicians 
overlook: it is the denial of what I call the pre-religious, pre-political 
“need to believe” inherent to speaking subjects and expressing itself as 
an “ideality illness” specific to the adolescent (be she native or of immi-
grant origin.)
Contrary to the curious, playful, pleasure-seeking child who wants 
to know where she comes from, the adolescent is less a researcher than 
a believer: she needs to believe in ideals to move beyond her parents, 
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separate from them and surpass herself (I’ve named the adolescent a trou-
badour, romantic, revolutionary, extremist, fundamentalist, third-world 
defender). But disappointment leans this malady of ideality towards 
destruction and self-destruction, by way of exaltation: drug abuse, 
anorexia, vandalism, attraction to fundamentalist dogmas. Idealism and 
nihilism—empty drunkenness and martyrdom rewarded by paradise—
walk hand-in-hand in this illness of adolescents, which explodes under 
certain conditions in the most susceptible among them. We see the cur-
rent manifestation of this in the media: in the cohabitation of Mafia traf-
ficking and the jihadist exaltation raging at our doors, in Africa and Syria.
If a “malady of ideality” is shaking up our youths and with it the world, 
can Europe possibly offer a remedy? What ideas can she offer? Any reli-
gious treatment of this malaise, anguish and revolt proves ineffective 
before the paradisiacal aspiration of this paradoxical, nihilistic belief held 
by the de-socialized, disintegrated teen.
Europe finds itself confronted by a historic challenge. Is it able to 
face this crisis of belief that the religious lid can no longer hold down? 
The terrible chaos of nihilism-fanaticism linked to the destruction of the 
capacity to think takes root in different parts of the world and touches the 
very foundation of the bond between humans. It’s the conception of the 
human forged at the Greek-Jewish-Christian crossroads, with its graft of 
Islam, this unsteady universality both singular and shareable, that seems 
threatened. Are we capable of mobilizing all our means—judicial, eco-
nomic, educational, therapeutic—to accompany with a fine-tuned ear, 
the necessary training, and generosity the malady of ideality that disen-
franchised adolescents, even in Europe, express so dramatically?
At the crossroads of Christianity (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox), 
Judaism and Islam, Europe is called to establish pathways between 
the three monotheisms, beginning with meetings and reciprocat-
ing interpretations, but also with elucidations and transvaluations 
inspired by the Human Sciences. A bastion of secularism for two cen-
turies, Europe is the place par excellence to elucidate a need to believe, 
which the Enlightenment, in its rush to combat obscurantism, greatly 
underestimated.
Countering the two monsters—the political lockdown by the econ-
omy and the threat of ecological destruction—the European cultural 
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space can offer an audacious response. And perhaps the sole response 
that takes the complexity of the human condition seriously, including the 
lessons of its history and the risks to its freedom.
05.11.2015
From Outside: A Philosophy for Europe, Part I
Roberto Esposito
Interviewed by Diego Ferrante and Marco Piasenter
Translated by Antonio Cerella
Diego Ferrante and Marco Piasenter: Your recent book From Outside: A 
Philosophy for Europe (a translation of Da Fuori. Una filosofia per l’Europa, 
forthcoming with Polity Press) seems to be located at the intersection 
of two axes: on the one hand, it looks at European philosophies; on the 
other hand, it explores the idea of a philosophy for Europe. The point of 
intersection between these two vectors could be the following question: 
what role should philosophy play in the current debate on Europe?
Roberto Esposito: If you think about it, in the most dramatic moments 
of its history Europe has always turned to philosophy and, in turn, phi-
losophy has interrogated itself about the destiny of Europe as some-
thing that touches its very essence. Why? Which bond holds inseparably 
together philosophy and Europe? A preliminary answer to this question 
concerns the European—especially Greek—birth of philosophy. While 
it was nourished by other traditions of thought, the European conno-
tation marked philosophy indelibly. Even the line of thought that has 
assumed the name of “analytic philosophy,” curiously opposed by some 
to “continental philosophy,” was born in our continent and only subse-
quently, fleeing Nazism, emigrated elsewhere. But there is something 
more, something that pertains to the philosophical character of the very 
constitution of Europe. Not possessing definite geographical boundaries, 
at least in the East—its distinction from Asia is problematic, consider-
ing that two large countries, Russia and Turkey, stretch between the two 
continents—Europe, from the beginning, has defined itself from the per-
spective of the constitutive specificity of its philosophical principles: the 
freedom of the Greek cities as opposed to the Asian despotic regimes. 
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Although these principles were often contradicted and reversed into their 
opposite, the idea of Europe is inseparable from them.
The fact is that philosophy has been a decisive source of inspiration 
in all the great crises that Europe has faced. It has been so in the time 
that preceded the fall of the Roman Empire, when Augustine of Hippo 
delineated the features of a new spiritual civilization; in the age of reli-
gious wars, when Descartes and Hobbes established the principles of 
modern science and politics; and at the turn of the French Revolution, 
interpreted by Kant and Hegel as an event destined to change the his-
tory of the world. Finally, it has been so in the deeply philosophical clash 
between totalitarianism and democracy. If all this is true, why not imag-
ine, even in the crisis that we are currently experiencing, that philosophy 
can offer Europe, if not a solution to the current crisis, at least a new way 
of seeing things, a different direction to take? Of course philosophy is 
not able to impose its own choices on politics, let alone on the economy. 
Nonetheless, it can help to identify the role of Europe in the global world 
and the principles that should inform its conduct.
DF & MP: Your book proposes a genealogical analysis of the history of 
European philosophy in the late twentieth century, identifying three geo-
philosophical articulations that develop between them a complex twine 
of overlays, hegemonic conflicts and cross-references: German critical 
theory, French post-structuralism, and Italian thought. Each of these 
theoretical paradigms has reached full development and dissemination 
through a passage to the outside, a hybridization with what is other than 
itself. At the same time, however, the crucial distinction between these 
different ‘philosophical streams’ depends precisely on the relationship 
they have established with the outside. How does the thematization of 
the outside vary? And what do its different assumptions entail for the 
philosophical relevance of these three theoretical horizons?
RE: In the book, the “outside” is understood in its geographical conno-
tation—the Northwest Passage to America—but also in a disciplinary 
sense, alluding to what does not strictly belong to philosophical self-
reflection but to other languages, like those of politics, sociology, and 
anthropology. Moreover, it can be argued that thought itself always origi-
nates from the outside, as Averroes had already realized, for he describes 
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the “possible intellect” as a “separate” and “impersonal competence.” If we 
think about it, all great discoveries and paradigm shifts are always stimu-
lated by an external event. In what I have called “German Philosophy”—
referring to the Frankfurt School, which emigrated to America with the 
advent of Nazism—the philosophical “outside” is essentially represented 
by the “social,” but also, especially for Adorno, by art. In his Negative 
Dialectics—perhaps the last great philosophical work of the 20th cen-
tury—Adorno refers to the non-conceptual element internal to the con-
cept, thus creating a rigorously ‘negative’ theory of thought. Regarding 
“French Theory”—which also passed through America, where it has 
had its consecration—we should distinguish between a Heideggerian 
line of thinking represented by Derrida, and a Nietzschean one, which 
can be traced back to Foucault and Deleuze. For Derrida, the “outside” is 
essentially writing, which he dialectically opposes to the word, the logos. 
Foucault, however, holds a more radical idea of the “outside,” meaning 
by this notion, on the one hand, the sphere of power, of the real power 
relations inherent in every discourse and, on the other, the dimension 
of biological life, as opposed to spiritual interiority, over which humans 
never have full mastery. As for Italian philosophy—whose origin dates 
back to Machiavelli—the “outside” is essentially the dimension of the 
political, thought of as something external to the State. In short, from all 
points of view and despite all the differences just mentioned, the “out-
side” constitutes the horizon of meaning and the vital energy of our prac-
tice and thought.
DF & MP: The book can be seen as a continuation of your recent work 
Living Thought. The Origins and Actuality of Italian Philosophy (Stanford 
University Press), devoted to Italian philosophy. In the reconstruction 
of its different stages, what appears to distinguish Italian thought—
from Machiavelli to Vico, from Leopardi and Gramsci up to its most 
recent developments—is the theme of conflict, the relationship that this 
thought establishes between origin and actuality, thus offering a more 
adequate articulation of ontology and politics. How does Italian thought 
articulate this relationship?
RE: In effect, From Outside forms a sort of diptych with Living Thought. 
While the latter is devoted to Italian philosophy, From Outside is focused 
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on European philosophy, with the exception of the English tradition, 
which has long been oriented toward the Atlantic axis. From Outside also 
discusses “Italian theory,” or rather “Italian thought,” by placing it in a dif-
ferential relationship with German and French thought. The theme of 
conflict, in its various meanings, constantly returns in Italian philosophy, 
from Machiavelli to Gramsci, up to Operaismo [Workerism] in the 60s. 
The fundamental idea that underlies our tradition is that political order 
does not eliminate conflict, as Hobbes believed, but is indeed entirely 
crossed by it. It is an idea that is also found in German authors, such as 
Nietzsche, and French ones, like Foucault. But we can say that the dialec-
tic of order and conflict—their co-belonging—is a distinguishing trait of 
Italian thought.
The relation between origin and actuality, although connected to the 
dialectic of order and conflict, is a different matter. It is has to do with 
the conception of history as perpetual crisis, rather than progressive 
development. The origin of this conception lies in Vico’s work, as can 
be deduced from the idea underlying his New Science (Scienza Nuova), 
based precisely on a continuous alternation of recurring cycles (“corsi” 
and “ricorsi”). But even Machiavelli believed that when a political organi-
zation loses contact with its origin, it declines and risks implosion. After 
all, if actuality could coincide fully with itself, if it were not inhabited by 
an element irreducible to it, it would ultimately remain blind to itself. 
It would lack a critical counterpoint through which to deconstruct its 
perspective. In the most recent Italian philosophy, categories and terms 
derived from the archaic tradition, both Greek and Latin, such as sacertas, 
imperium, communitas, have played a significant role in the international 
debate. Indeed, the notion of ‘contemporaneity’ is to be understood not 
merely as the age that follows the modern one, but rather, as the co-pres-
ence, in every age, of different and conflicting times—something that, 
if radically thought, ends up calling into question the very paradigm of 
“epoch,” the entire epochal economy.
07.11.2016
From Outside: A Philosophy for Europe, Part II
Roberto Esposito
Interviewed by Diego Ferrante and Marco Piasenter
Translated by Antonio Cerella
Diego Ferrante and Marco Piasenter: ‘Biopolitics’ is a recurring term 
in your work and in your latest book, From Outside. A Philosophy for 
Europe. In it, the European crisis is not only conceptualized as a purely 
economic or politico-institutional, but also as a bio-political one, since 
it affects the very life of Europeans. In particular, the increase in migra-
tory flows and terrorist attacks represent two paradigmatic figures of the 
crisis on the continent. These phenomena reveal an overlap between 
inside and outside, thus challenging the nexus, which has been taken 
for granted, between population, territory, and processes of identifica-
tion. If we look at the legal responses to these crises put in place by the 
EU and its member states, what emerges is the reactive nature of norms 
and their casuistic logic. More specifically, regarding the measures to 
prevent and combat terrorism, intervention has been characterized by a 
widening of the thresholds of protection and punishment. How it is pos-
sible to “disable the apparatuses of negative immunization, and to enable 
new spaces of the common,” as you put it in your article, published in 
Angelaki, “Community, Immunity, Biopolitics”? How do you conceive 
these spaces, this dimension of the common? And how would it be pos-
sible to prevent a deactivation of the apparatuses of control from turning 
into a form of isolation?
Roberto Esposito: The thesis presented in the book is that the current 
crisis affecting the whole world, and especially Europe, is not just eco-
nomic or politico-institutional, but also more dramatically bio-politi-
cal, since it involves and endangers the biological life of large numbers 
of human beings. In fact, the effects of the economic crisis have already 
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begun to manifest their thanatopolitical implications to the extent that 
they have pushed entire populations to the brink of starvation, as was 
particularly evident in Greece and in the other weakest links of the EU. 
Moreover, the escalation of Islamic terrorism, on the one hand, and the 
uncontrollable rise of migration, on the other—in turn caused largely by 
wars for which the responsibility of Western countries is undeniable—
have radically intensified the bio-thanatopolitical character of the crisis. 
For the first time, the European population is subjected to a pressure that 
will change profoundly its characteristics, and our ruling classes are not 
able to deal with the situation, not even to perceive its import. Nowadays, 
in dealing with immigration, they have to face a decisive biopolitical deci-
sion: the extreme choice between keeping alive or abandoning to death a 
growing number of human beings.
As a matter of fact, European countries have mostly adopted an 
immunitarian strategy, designed to strengthen or build barriers capable 
of containing the migratory influx that is often, even intentionally, con-
fused with the risk of terrorism. Certainly, the existence of the EU’s exter-
nal borders is not only inevitable, but also somehow essential—other-
wise the Union would no longer exist. Indeed, the opening of its internal 
borders, established by the Schengen Agreement, which is today called 
into question, is only possible if the external borders are monitored. But 
it is completely unrealistic to believe that this would be enough to handle 
the question of immigration, especially if a number of policies adequate 
to the importance and extent of the problem are not put in place.
DF & MP: Your trilogy—Communitas, Immunitas, Bíos—redefines the 
issue of inclusion/exclusion in light of the immunization paradigm. 
To simplify a little, you identify three possible ways of understanding 
the relationship between inside/outside. On the one hand, there is a 
dynamics of hyper-immunization activated by the raising of barriers and 
the intensification of identity politics. On the other hand, a complete 
absence of immunization spurred by the abolition of all borders and the 
subsequent loss of identity. Both possibilities are considered politically 
unacceptable because they cause the annihilation of the body politic 
(in the first case identity is so self-enclosed that it ends up smothering 
itself; in the second case it is so open that it ends up dissolving itself). 
Finally, the third option proposes a form of immunization by means of 
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‘contamination’, which both enriches and strengthens identities. This 
logic of inclusion/exclusion seems to be a bio-logic, as it anchors its 
ontology in the functioning of the immune system. If German critical 
theory and French post-structuralism were characterized by a progres-
sive politicization of biology, showing the historico-political character 
of any definition of the human being, what relation does Italian thought 
establish between politics and biological life? How would it be possible 
to avoid both a politicization of biology and a biologization of politics?
RE: As a matter of fact, this is precisely the twofold risk to which Europe, 
but generally any political and even biological organism, is exposed. The 
first risk is that of an autoimmune disease—i.e., a process of immuniza-
tion so strong that it affects the very organism that produced it, eventually 
ending up by destroying itself. What I mean is that an excess of security 
apparatuses may constitute a danger in itself, as has often happened in 
European history. But also the opposite attitude is self-contradictory. The 
complete abolition of borders, instead of strengthening differences, ends 
up dissolving them in a total homogenization. Only if taken together, can 
identity and difference be productive. Drawing on biological dynamics, 
in my book Immunitas I have indicated a path toward a different interpre-
tation of the category of immunization. In this regard, the decisive refer-
ence is to the phenomenon of pregnancy. As is well known, the female 
immune system not only does not reject a foreign element (the fetus, 
which takes on genetic foreignness from the father) but it also protects 
and develops the embryo, even though the DNA of the fetus is partly 
different from her own. If it were possible to apply the same logic—the 
logic of life—to international relations, things would be much better.
The twofold process of the politicization of biology and the biologiza-
tion of politics is the outcome of the bio-political dynamics set in motion 
at the beginning of the twentieth century. On the one hand, it represents 
a necessity determined by a number of historical, even cultural factors 
—e.g., the development of the discipline of biology. On the other hand, 
if left to its own devices, it constitutes a danger. This process, which can-
not be avoided, as Nietzsche knew well, should instead be kept under 
control, since it can easily take thanatopolitical forms, as happened in 
the most disastrous manner during the Nazi era. In the mid-70s, Michel 
Foucault was the first to grasp in its full extent both the affirmative and 
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negative sides of this phenomenon. Italian philosophers have worked on 
the Foucauldian paradigm, developing it in a different direction. Some 
have insisted on the positive character of the relationship between poli-
tics and biological life, while others have emphasized its negative aspects. 
Personally, I have tried to articulate the biopolitical paradigm in respect 
to that of immunization, reaching the conclusions that I mentioned ear-
lier. If the processes of the politicization of biology—such as biotechno-
logical practices aimed at controlling and managing births and deaths—
and the biologization of politics cannot be stopped, they should at least 
be governed.
DF & MP: In the final part of the book From Outside, you discuss the 
widespread criticism that the EU lacks legitimacy and suffers from a pro-
found democratic deficit. Contrary to what is imagined by those who 
expected the spread of supranational forms of identification, we are wit-
nessing a strengthening of national and regional identities: the success of 
Eurosceptic or anti-European parties and positions slows down the pro-
cess of constituting a European political subject. The results of the Brexit 
referendum or the threat by Austria to close its borders with Italy are 
just recent examples. The EU seems to lack a project that favors a strong 
identification among its citizens. In your book, you explicitly refer to the 
notion of ‘European people’. What are the philosophical and historical 
conditions that may lead to the emergence of this political subject? How 
does democracy fit in with the picture so far presented?
RE: The ‘identity syndromes’ and the construction of exclusionary bar-
riers, like the results of the Brexit referendum and Austrian nationalism, 
are the pathological reactions triggered by the dynamics of globaliza-
tion. Indeed, they are a form of rejection of the ‘global contamination.’ 
They are very similar to the autoimmune disease of which we spoke ear-
lier. Naturally, these phenomena not only delay the process of European 
unification, but jeopardize it, disrupting the integration that has already 
taken place. And this makes the constitution of a European people all but 
impossible. Unlike many European countries—such as France, Germany, 
Italy and many others, whose peoples were formed in parallel with the 
process of nation-building on the basis of common ideas, languages, and 
challenges—Europe does not have only one people. Furthermore, the 
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peoples of the various European nations have furiously fought each other 
until the middle of the last century. In a Europe dominated by the worst 
nationalist instincts, how could a European people possibly have been 
born? Of course, as Habermas has argued, the people does not need to be 
a traditional Volk. It could also constitute itself voluntarily, on the basis 
of common values and interests, as Europe has tried to do at the end of 
World War II. But this would require a series of objective and cultural 
bonds, such as a single language or a common media network, which is 
exactly what is missing.
How can we get to the bottom of this difficult situation? The decision 
to prioritize economy, which led to the adoption of the single currency 
in most EU countries, turned out to be both insufficient and counter-
productive, to the extent that it is creating more problems than it solves. 
The process is now irreversible. For, historically, all U-turns are harbin-
gers of more problems to come. But the negative consequences of finan-
cial integration not supported by a political unity are there for all to see. 
The only way that seems to me to be open is the political construction 
of a European people. However, this presupposes a harsh confrontation 
between two ideas of Europe that run across individual nations, which 
are themselves divided by too many different living conditions to be uni-
fied a priori. In this regard, in the book, I refer to the need for a social con-
flict that restores political strength to the European constituting process. 
After all, as Hegel pointed out, conflict, if kept within the limits of politi-
cal confrontation and struggle, has always had a constituent function.
07.18.2016
C. The Art of Theory
A Bit on Theory
Gayatri Spivak
“Is Theory Critical?” was a question recently put to some of us publicly. 
I myself interpreted this question institutionally and practically: how can 
we ask for continued funding when the humanities have been trivialized 
and self-trivialized, with something called “theory” at its extreme edge? I 
quote a sentence from the muscular letter I wrote to the Vice-Chancellor 
of the University of Toronto: “This kind of training will never generate 
income for the university directly. Think of it as epistemological and ethi-
cal healthcare for the society at large.”
Otherwise, it is hard for me to answer any question that pre-asks 
“What is theory?” I have to rewrite it as “What is it to theorize?” In that 
mode, I have responded to the Anthropocene—an item included in the 
original question—by reading the synthetic a priori as rape. This argu-
ment will not appeal to responders. Here’s a last paragraph from pub-
lished prose: “Why try to conserve something symptomatically seen as 
civilized, when the society we live in proves its decrepitude by gated jour-
nalism, gated publishing, protected by high walls? Absolutely forget, even 
the lesson that the literary-ethical suspension in the space of the other 
is to de-humanize, if humanization from the animal is by way of rape in 
general, unless we want to mooch over being-human in the face of the 
Anthropocene.”
Globalization was yet another item. I gave back potential funder 
prose, where the dirty word “theory” lingers under “deep language learn-
ing”: a global student is one who senses that nation-states are diverse, 
with history, literature, and philosophical traditions (inclusive of the 
Law) that can be accessed through deep language learning; that the 
sciences, though diverse in their beginnings, came to be consolidated 
in a single trajectory that becomes pluri-dimensional in the world of 
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technology; and that today there is a global simultaneity where these two 
kinds of diversity can be digitally accessed. The global student comes 
with an expectation to be introduced into the methodology for accessing 
this multi-layered reality. As the student matures, s/he gets a rough sense 
that the Schools of Business and Medicine can make use of digital global-
ity in a more direct way, but the preparation outlined above can enhance 
this use: primary healthcare and chronic disease relief for the Medical 
School, for example, and real corporate socio-cultural responsibility for 
the Business School.
To me, neoliberalism and neo-capitalism are closely linked on a 
chain of displacements. It is “the ‘rule of law’ that arises because barriers 
between national capital and global capital are removed, and the state, 
run to manage the global economy, rather than specifically to look after its 
citizens, attempts to enhance teaching and learning by producing toolkits 
that also limit teaching and learning.” There, I believe we acknowledge 
complicity, being folded together, and proceed from this into remember-
ing the importance of elementary school teaching. 
For me it is the lessons learnt from over fifty years of institutional 
teaching at Columbia and at reputable universities in the United States 
but also in the lowest sector of the electorate in India, my country of citi-
zenship, landless illiterates, so-called untouchables, people who do not 
know the word that is used by the upwardly class mobile movement, a 
Sanskrit classical language word—Dalit—which is used outside to rec-
ognize such groups. Judging from these two ends, my lesson is: learn to 
learn how to teach this specific group. I should like to think that I am 
what in theoretical language would be called the dangerous supplement,1 
showing that the toolkits and templates produced by knowledge manage-
ment are incomplete, that they must be exceeded by learning the specific 
mind-set of a group, opening up homogenizing statistics.  There is no 
computer that can catch the contingent as such.  One of the problems 
with toolkits is that they make teaching “easier.”  Far away from radical 
solidarity tourism, teachers of language, as well as the teachers of litera-
ture from whom they are hierarchically separated, no longer confront the 
challenge of the unexpected.
Here are bits written for Occupy Wall Street and for Vincennes-St. 
Denis. Wall Street first: “Without the general nurturing of the will to 
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justice among the people, no just society can survive. The Occupy Wall 
Street movement must attend to education—primary through post-ter-
tiary—at the same time as it attends to the uncoupling of the specifically 
capitalist globalization and the nation-state. This is an almost impossible 
task to remember, especially when there are such complex and urgent 
immediate tasks lined up!” And here’s Vincennes: “I’m now speaking in 
the same tone in which, in 1968, we spoke about revolution in the uni-
versity—except we did not then know that change in elite universities 
alone will not do the trick. Therefore, now, wherever I go, I repeat the 
same message. That education has to become holistic, that humanities 
education especially must not keep compartmentalized primary, second-
ary, tertiary, post-tertiary and beyond. That is almost impossible in the 
Western world.”
In conclusion: The first part of my answer to the question: “Is Theory 
Critical?” is institutional. The second part is bits of work. I am not able 
to answer the question: “Is theory…?” My effort shows to me, yet once 
again, that theorizing connects to teaching reading, in the broadest sense. 
Is this “critical”? You tell me. For me, critique remains, vulgarized, a limit 
to philosophizing. All this is turned around if you consider the tremen-
dous diversity of classed and raced gender-plurality. Try it.
06.15.2015
Notes
1. The phrase is from Rousseau, rewritten in the early work of Jacques Derrida Of 
Grammatology, tr. Spivak, Baltimore: Hopkins Univ. Press, 2016, pp. 153-178).
The Dance of Hermeneutics
Luis Garagalza
The word hermeneutics alludes to a way of doing, or of saying, philo-sophy 
as a search for, rather than the possession of, wisdom. It has to do with a 
sophia (wisdom) that always escapes from us, slips between our fingers, 
and so does not exclude not-knowing, generating a docta ignorantia con-
scious of the limits of our reason, awareness, and language.
As hermeneutists, we are thus in the company of Socrates, Nicholas 
of Cusa, Montaigne, and the humanists of the Renaissance, among many 
others, who have reveled in the knowing of not-knowing. For us, their 
legacy takes the shape of a reflection on interpretation. Hermeneutics 
presents itself, in effect, as an effort to rethink philosophy after a series 
of failures, from Plato to Husserlian phenomenology, under the assump-
tion that failure is a constitutive element of human existence, rather 
than something accidental and secondary. That is why hermeneutics 
renounces the point of departure in reality, being, or God—characteris-
tic of the Greco-Christian antiquity—as much as in the subject or the 
human being, whom modernity believes to be in a position to guide the 
course of history and to control nature through science and technology.
Hermeneutics proposes to begin with the problem of interpretation. 
It asks what happens when we interpret, realizing that the human is, in 
fact, an animal that interprets, a weak and clumsy animal that, given its 
biological deficiencies, needs to interpret its environment and even itself 
in order to survive. By interpreting, human beings generate cultures, that 
is to say, myths, languages, the arts, techniques, and sciences, at the same 
time that they interpret themselves. Interpretation is the mode of being 
of the human being, an animal that lives off its interpretations and that 
survives—though we do not know for how much longer—in its interpre-
tations. The human adaptation to our environment consists in culturally 
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interpreting it, converting it into a “world,” which the Greeks optimis-
tically named cosmos and which remains associated with order and har-
mony, even if many times in history—indeed, the majority of times—it 
has rather resembled worldlessness.
Hence, reality is not something closed off in itself, absolute, finished 
and definitive, independent of human construction. Instead, it is contin-
gent upon our hermeneutical gestures, just as the latter depend on real-
ity. According to this thesis, reality has an open and dynamic character, 
which is relational or, better yet, co-relational. The reality and its inter-
preter enter into a relation and dance together: more or less together, as 
the case may be. The scientific dancer dances alone, keeping his distance; 
the mytho-poetic dancer seeks more contact, proximity, fusion. Still, this 
is a special kind of dance, because, in the course of dancing, the danc-
ers are transformed. More than that, we might say, together with Eckhart 
Tolle, that reality and life are the dancers, and we are the dance that 
interprets them.
What matters, in any event, is the relation that we keep or, more 
precisely, that keeps us. Hence, another central thesis of hermeneutics, 
inherited from phenomenology: the relation is primary, preceding and 
founding both the subject and the object, both the human and the world. 
In this manner, docta ignorantia is concretized in the becoming-conscious 
of our interpretations, in the acknowledgement of interpretation as inter-
pretation. Assuming that our relation to the real is a relation of interpreta-
tion implies the recognition of a limit, the acceptance of a failure in the 
intention to capture reality without either touching or staining it, to cap-
ture it as it is. We thus renounce Truth, spelled with capital “T.” Here, 
according to Nietzsche, art plays a pedagogic role, insofar as it teaches 
us to deal with fictions knowing that they are fictional, to play with rep-
resentations while renouncing the immutable and objective Truth of the 
metaphysical tradition. (We would do well to recall as an illustration of 
this point the painting titled This Is Not a Pipe by Magritte.)
And yet, the recognition of a limit does not signify an impasse. The 
consciousness of a limit, whereby we become aware that our interpreta-
tions are but interpretations, leads rather to an opening, in which herme-
neutical endeavors appear in the plural. Those who know that they are 
interpreting know that other interpretations are possible and that a great 
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deal escapes from their hermeneutical grasp. In other words, they know 
that, although interpretations make possible the event of meaning, not 
one of them exhausts this event.
Once hermeneutics puts our interpretations, symbols, theories 
and models within their proper limits, it prevents us from conflating 
them with reality itself and from rendering them dogmatic. This move 
does not spell out a total annihilation of truth, but only a transgres-
sion of literal meaning and of the rationalizations that have “dried it up.” 
Hermeneutics, in turn, enlivens meaning once again, understanding it as 
a series of anthropological propositions and, thereby, liberating its sym-
bolic dimension.
Interpretation is, in keeping with Gadamer’s suggestion, a conversa-
tion. If it is to exceed a mere interrogation, a conversation needs to be 
an adventure, which, despite having a beginning, does not predetermine 
where and how it will take us. Such an adventuresome conversation is a 
dance that keeps transforming us, even as it is itself transformed.
10.12.2015
Is Censorship Proof of Art’s Political Power?
Gabriel Rockhill
Crews of chisel-bearing operatives were hired to hammer out the auspi-
cious image of Lenin—symbolically gripping the hands of an African-
American and a Russian soldier and workers—from a mural prominently 
displayed on the main floor of the newly constructed Rockefeller Center 
in 1934. A similar scene repeated itself as recently as 2010, when the Los 
Angeles Museum of Contemporary Art commissioned an artist for a 
public mural, only to deface it before its completion. Depicting coffins 
of war covered by dollar bills instead of flags, Blu’s work—like Diego 
Rivera’s sympathetic images of communism—was judged to be inappro-
priate for the American public.
Although many have claimed that art has little or no real political 
force, what these examples appear to suggest is that the powers-that-be 
disagree. The very act of censorship implies, or so it would seem, that 
the censors resolutely believe in the political and social power of the 
arts. If they did not, why would they bother to police what people can 
see, hear and touch? Does not the very existence of censorship prove, in 
reverse so to speak, that art is a sociopolitical force to be reckoned with? 
In other words, if censorship exists, isn’t it because aesthetics is per-
ceived—at least by those in power—as a very real threat to the social and 
political order?
Raising these types of questions requires parting ways with a domi-
nant paradigm for thinking the politics of art, which consists in con-
centrating solely on the motivations of artists and the potential impact 
of their work. Interpreters often draw up balance sheets weighing the 
objectives imbued in an artwork (or the politics supposedly inherent in 
the aesthetic artifact itself) against its ultimate consequences. Such an 
approach lends itself to bivalent assessments of success or failure, thereby 
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allowing one to reach the conclusion that a particular form of political art 
is preferable.
The issue of censorship invites us to take a different angle. Instead 
of relying on a product-centered approach and a linear, instrumentalist 
logic of means and ends, it encourages us to examine the complexities of 
aesthetic production as part of a larger force field. Art is never made in a 
vacuum, and aesthetic immaculate conception is as mythological as other 
such forms. Creation always takes place through a process of negotiating 
various constraints and limitations. “We do what we can,” the filmmaker 
Jean-Luc Godard was fond of claiming, “not what we want.”
Censorship is a particularly palpable restriction that can draw atten-
tion to the other limits operative in aesthetic production. It can function 
at the level of preproduction to impinge upon what is actually allowed 
to be created or persist as a work of art. It has the power of making non-
art—meaning that which is not permitted to attain the status of art—by 
prohibiting, destroying or excluding certain creations.
Non-art is an important site of politics. It reveals, to begin with, the 
political orientation of the establishment, which seeks to control not only 
what is produced, but also what circulates and is received by the general 
populace. All three of these dimensions are essential to understanding 
the social politicity of aesthetic practices, meaning the diverse political 
aspects of their inscription in an expansive social force field of creation, 
distribution and interpretation.
If non-art is a nodal point of political and social struggle, it is also 
because of what we might call the censorship short-circuit. Explicit prohibi-
tions often serve to paradoxically guarantee the renown and prominence 
of whatever is banned. Not unlike the erotic attraction of the forbidden 
fruit, which was so incisively analyzed by Georges Bataille, proscription 
runs the risk of both heightening curiosity and fostering fascination. The 
fame of the infamous can, in certain instances, bring flocks to the for-
bidden. The sensation around the public display of Gustave Courbet’s 
L’Origine du monde (1866), since being bequeathed by Jacques Lacan’s 
estate to the Musée d’Orsay, is a case in point. This highly realistic close-
up of a reclining vulva, which Lacan and his wife Sylvia Bataille had 
obfuscated behind a sliding wooden door painted by André Masson, was 
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rarely seen in public and knew a shadowy existence prior to 1995. It has 
since been notoriously censored by Facebook.
If the politics of censorship can at least partially backfire by draw-
ing greater attention to whatever is explicitly suppressed—such as 
in the removal of David Wojnarowicz’s “A Fire in My Belly” from the 
Smithsonian’s National Portrait Gallery in 2010, or even the fatwa issued 
against Salman Rushdie—this is not necessarily the case for other types 
of repression. Soft or indirect censorship is a form of discrete coercion 
that uses discouragement—often of extreme sorts—rather than prohibi-
tion, surely in order to avoid censorship short circuits. Self-suppression 
is another type, which occurs through acts of conscious or unconscious 
deference to the sensibilities of authorities. Over time it can evolve into 
an impalpable bowdlerization that passes itself off as common sense. 
Corporate-censorship-by-drowning is a particularly insidious and wide-
spread form because it is, strictly speaking, a censorship without cen-
sors. A ‘market-based solution’ to the paradoxes of overt prohibition, it 
embraces so-called free expression and free speech as long as these take 
place within the confines of a high-volume and high-speed entertain-
ment industry that is completely dominated by corporate monoculture. 
Its mantra is: ‘create whatever you want, and we will drown it in a sea of 
profuse and prominent mediocrity!’
Rivera’s original mural, of which only dust and a few stolen pho-
tographs remain, was presciently and verbosely entitled Man at the 
Crossroads Looking with Hope and High Vision to the Choosing of a New and 
Better Future. Rockefeller resolved this crossroads by choosing corporate 
power over anti-fascist art, paradoxically contributing to the prominence 
of Rivera’s message and work, which was immediately exalted in E.B. 
White’s trenchant poem “I Paint What I See.” The titan of the Mexican 
Mural Movement derided the spawn of Standard Oil in a radio interview 
by asking the following rhetorical question, regarding an imaginary sce-
nario in which an American millionaire purchased Michelangelo’s most 
well-known work: “Would that millionaire have the right to destroy 
the Sistine Chapel?” The choice of examples could not have been more 
germane since Michelangelo’s work was famously censored by propo-
nents of the Catholic faith, who insisted on having loincloths added to 
this celestial cornucopia of burgeoning concupiscence, brimming with 
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genitalia and buttocks. Rivera, who later remade his mural in the Palacio 
de Bellas Artes in Mexico City, surely knew that art is always produced in 
an intricate force field and that censorship is the malevolent recognition 
that aesthetics can be a dangerous social and political threat.
06.06.2016
Come Back Aesthetics
Doris Sommer
Who needs the Humanities today? Everyone does. Otherwise we give up 
all hope for freedom, social justice, and general human development in 
the tradition of enlightened modernity. Modernity hasn’t failed, Jürgen 
Habermas wrote, to nudge us beyond pessimism years ago; the problem 
is that we haven’t achieved it yet. One fundamental reason for the delay 
has been the demotion of judgment as a core faculty of human under-
standing. Judgment never gained the ground that Immanuel Kant hoped 
to win away from imperious reason in his Third Critique; and it hardly 
interrupts today’s personal and collective practices. Getting and spend-
ing, surviving, defending, spin out of control to the rhythm of narrow 
reason, an apparently logical necessity.
To pause for judgment, beyond reason, would be to regain a measure 
of our humanity, a freedom from the gridlock of mathematical thinking. 
The Humanities stage that pause; they train the faculty of judgment by 
pausing to consider works of art, and human creativity in general. It is 
the faculty that everyone needs in order to stop and to take stock of what 
one is doing. This is one fundamental motivation for studying culture 
through the Humanities.
Today more than ever, language, literature, and related fields of cultural 
constructions strain against the predictable, compact, self-perpetuating 
and sometimes defensive notion of culture that still informs the social 
sciences. For humanists as well as artists, culture has an almost opposite 
value from compactness. It means the interruption of shared practices; 
and it excites the kind of disconcerting delight that Kant appreciated as 
the stimulus for free judgment and for candid unscripted conversations. 
Those disinterested and delightful moments can lead to inter-subjective 
agreements, to common sense. This faculty for pausing in order to reflect 
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is basic to all disciplines. But the best training ground for judgment is the 
carefree area of aesthetics. The reason Kant gives in his Third Critique is 
simple: deciding if something is beautiful responds to an intense experi-
ence without obeying any established principles. Therefore, the decision 
is free from prejudice. Aesthetic judgment is an exercise in unbiased eval-
uation, a knack that science and civics need as much as art does. So, inter-
preting art can train us to support urgently needed change. This is not 
a deviation from humanistic attention to the mechanisms of art produc-
tion and reception. It is a corollary and a homecoming to civic education.
Asking who needs the Humanities has seemed too long like a rhetori-
cal question. When university administrators ask it, they announce bud-
get cuts and re-structuring. To be fair, students ask it as well, as do their 
parents concerned about their children’s professional futures, including 
enough solvency to pay off staggering college debt. Voting with their feet, 
students go elsewhere; enrollments in literature and other Humanities 
courses continue to fall in departments that survive administrative rav-
ages without disappearing altogether.
Hurt and apparently helpless, we humanists look on, as our field 
erodes ever nearer to our footing. More petulant than compelling, our 
defenses have not bothered to argue a case, as if the motives for studying 
the Humanities were self-evident and only philistines would ask about 
them. The very lessons we teach students are lost on us. We don’t deign 
to back up claims, nor remember that the first rule of rhetoric is to know 
one’s public. We disdain the public by dismissing its skepticism. And yet, 
as trainers of judgment, as a vanguard of acknowledging new sensibilities 
in ways that may mitigate some levels of culture-coded violence, human-
ists could re-claim our central importance for human development.
All of us would do well to consider art’s ripple effects, from produc-
ing pleasure to triggering innovation. And recognizing art’s work in the 
world makes us all cultural agents: those who make, comment, buy, sell, 
reflect, allocate, decorate, vote, don’t vote, or otherwise lead social, cul-
turally constructed, lives. But humanist pedagogy can fulfill a special 
mission by keeping aesthetics in focus, lingering with students over the 
charmed moments of freely felt delight that enable fresh perceptions 
and foster new agreements. More apparently practical people rush past 
pleasure as if it were a temptation to derail reason. We are haunted, it 
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seems, by a Weberian superstition about enjoyment being close to sin 
and a deterrent to development. But we could learn a countervailing les-
son from aesthetic philosophers. Kant knew that sociability and politics 
begin with delight; and Schiller knew that the passion for art-making, 
alternating between taking risks and making judgments, was the antidote 
for the kind of earnest reason that had brought the French Revolution to 
bloody excess.
Judgment, trained on pleasure, can perhaps save us. Humanists should 
say so when anyone asks.
04.20.2015
D. Environmental Emergency
Loving the Earth Enough
Kelly Oliver
What does it mean to love the earth, this rich network of relationality 
that sustains earthlings, as our shared home? In Darwinian terms, love is 
the social instinct that drives all sentient beings towards tenderness, com-
passion and cooperation. Darwin imagines the evolution of tenderness 
and “sympathy,” which become “virtues” that are passed on, initially by a 
few, until they spread and eventually become “incorporated” into life as 
we know it. Sympathy not only gives rise to compassion and cooperation, 
but also to empathy and play. In other words, social bonds are formed 
through various manifestations of love as the dynamic force of life.
Zoologists and primatologists have confirmed that play is impor-
tant in establishing empathy and social bonding in many animal species, 
including humans. For example, recently, psychologist Alison Gopnik 
proposed that “humans’ extended period of imaginative play, along with 
the traits it develops, has helped select for the big brain and rich neu-
ral networks that characterize Homo sapiens.” And neuroscientist Paul 
MacLean argues that play is essential in the evolution of empathy in 
the human species. Moreover, he links play to the formation of a sense 
of social responsibility. There is increasing evidence that empathy and a 
sense of ethical responsibility for others within and across species is not 
only present in the so-called animal kingdom, but also is continuing to 
evolve in the human species.
Primatologist Frans de Waal’s pioneering work on the evolution of 
morality from, and within, our animal ancestors to humans makes evi-
dent that animals are empathic and have a sense of responsibility for oth-
ers, which can be seen as a proto-ethical, if not also an ethical, response. 
Studies of rats and monkeys indicate that they would rather go with-
out food themselves than witness pain inflicted on others. Sharing and 
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grooming behavior in animals also indicates a sense of gratitude and reci-
procity that could be interpreted as proto-ethical behaviors.
It is becoming clear that our moral sense or conscience has evolved 
from animal sociability, and that any animal that develops a certain level 
of intellectual ability will develop moral sensibility. Perhaps, we can 
learn from nature and from animals about empathy and sharing, lessons 
that can only help us cooperate in our increasingly globalized world. De 
Waal’s research suggests not only that empathy evolves within species, 
but also that empathy evolves between or across species. In this case, 
the biosphere is evolving to be more empathetic. Certainly, humans are 
becoming more empathic towards other animals.
Increasing concern for animals among human beings, especially in 
Europe and the United States, signals shifting attitudes towards not only 
our animal companions, but also other animals with whom we share 
the planet. In the last few decades, our attitudes towards animals have 
changed dramatically. Now, in Europe and the U.S., more people live 
with companion animals than do not; and many consider these as a part 
of their families. Laws protecting animals and promoting their rights are 
changing to reflect these changing attitudes, especially recent laws pro-
tecting primates in Spain and elsewhere. If this trend continues, within 
the next few decades we may live in a radically different world where ani-
mals are extended empathy, compassion and rights never before imag-
ined appropriate for their kind. Indeed, with technological advances in 
the production of proteins for human consumption, we may see the end 
of factory farming. And with continued recognition of the importance 
that companion animals play in our lives, and their positive impact on 
mental, emotional and physical health—that is to say our dependence on 
them—we may see mixed species households and families as the norm 
and no longer the stuff of science fiction. Indeed this fundamental change 
in our relationship to other animals, both particular animal species and 
animals in general, may be the most significant development of our era.
Interspecies sympathy and love may be evolving for the sake of the 
biosphere. The biodiversity upon which our biosphere depends may 
require interspecies cooperation and interspecies love. Given what 
human beings have done to destroy ourselves and to destroy the habi-
tats of various species and slaughter others, human attitudes towards our 
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earthly companions need to evolve if we are to learn to share the planet. 
Our changing attitudes towards other animals signal a new era of inter-
species relationships. The dramatic shift amongst many people in devel-
oped countries to consider companion animals as family, and to love and 
mourn them, is evidence of the evolution of sympathy and love.
Can interspecies cohabitation become the ground for ethical respon-
sibility to the earth and its inhabitants? To say that we are earthbound 
creatures is to say that we have a special bond to the earth. We belong to 
the earth, just as it belongs to us. Rather than ownership, this sense of 
belonging harkens back to a more archaic sense of the word that conjures 
love as longing and companionship. It is not just that we share physical 
space, or proximity, on the surface of the earth, but more significantly, 
we share a special bond to the earth as our only dwelling place, whether 
home or habitat. This singular bond of all living beings to the earth and to 
other earthlings directly and indirectly obligates us to the sustaining pos-
sibility by virtue of which we not only exist and survive, but also live and 
thrive. Through our relationships with others, human and nonhuman, 
organic and inorganic, our earthly cohabitation is imbued with meaning. 
Even if we do not share a world, we do share the earth.
Hannah Arendt said, “Education is the point at which we decide 
whether we love the world enough to assume responsibility for it.” Echoing 
this sentiment, we might ask, what would it mean to love the earth 
enough to assume responsibility for it?
06.08.2015
Technologies of Global Warming
Susanna Lindberg
The city of Paris, the host of the Conference of Parties (COP21) whose 
objective is to slow down global warming, is quite a good illustration of 
the theme of the meeting. It is a wonderful, witty, elegant city that can 
prove its modernity by hiring out community bikes (vélib’) and even elec-
tric citycars (autolib’). Still, like all big cities, Paris is entirely enveloped in 
a permanent curtain of pollution and noise that the drivers of ecological 
vehicles are not strong enough to disperse. The image of a nice electric 
city-car fumbling about in a cloud of pollution is also a good image of the 
role of technology in global warming, which is—so it seems to me—an 
unprecedented technological fact.
Of course, global warming was first discovered and studied as a natu-
ral phenomenon, which consists in changes of the global climate system 
because of the increase of CO2 and other greenhouse gases in the atmo-
sphere. This has led to an increase in global temperature, which, in turn, 
is responsible for the melting of glaciers and for rising sea levels, flooding 
and even the future submersion of certain areas (Kiribati, Bangladesh, 
Louisiana wetlands), causing changes in many ecosystems and the 
extinction of countless species. Besides, the temperature rise also trig-
gers extreme weather phenomena, soil impoverishment, and so on. Even 
social changes—like increasing poverty, which instigates new migrations 
and still more violence at the frontiers of the rich areas of the world (EU, 
USA)—can be examined as a consequence of natural phenomena.
Global warming is a natural reaction to human technological and 
industrial activity, and seeing that it would not happen without this activ-
ity, it can also be analyzed as a technological fact. Because technology 
studies belong to human sciences, rather than to natural sciences, they 
help to analyze the role of human beings in more detail than simply as 
78 Susanna Lindberg
a geological or chemical factor among others. Moreover, the examina-
tion of global warming as a technological fact provides a healthy chal-
lenge to technology studies as well, which are normally more at home 
among entirely human-made machines and virtual realities. Indeed, 
global warming appears as a unique technological fact that depicts, in an 
unprecedented way, the essence of technology as techno-nature.
But why precisely “techno-nature”? This term evokes the present situ-
ation, in which human activity has become like a natural force. On the 
one hand, truly wild and unspoiled nature does not exist anymore: all 
regions of “nature” are marked by human activity (think of modern agri-
culture, of plastic floating in the oceans, of industrial fallouts on polar 
glaciers, of chemical additives in our own bodies). On the other hand, 
this does not mean that the human control of nature has increased. In 
the middle of the 20th century, techno-industrial activity appeared as our 
domination over nature through technologies perceived as extensions of 
human intelligence and will. Today one realizes that this activity is not as 
conscious and controlled as it was thought; rather, it has in many respects 
gotten out of hand, and produced a reality of its own. Technology is not 
only mixed with nature: it has become not only our “second nature” 
but, quite like nature, it is the situation in which we find ourselves and in 
which, ignoring the whole picture, we try to orient ourselves. Our tech-
nological reality has become a domain in which we are but that we do not 
really know.
This is why understanding global warming as a technological fact 
allows us to interpret technology in a wholly new manner. Different from 
the Enlightenment view, contemporary technology cannot be under-
stood primarily as a tool, or as an instrument, that is to say, as an exten-
sion of human intentions. It should rather be regarded as a technological 
world or as the fundamental articulation of a historical situation. Bernard 
Stiegler considers technique as such to be a fundamental structure of 
a world in terms of a pharmakon: on the one hand, it enables human 
thought and action but, on the other hand, it induces thoughtlessness 
and irresponsibility.
Global warming makes it obvious that technology and nature are inex-
tricably mixed. But the same could also be said of technology in general, 
especially of information and biotechnologies that are often depicted as 
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an intimate part of our (not yet “posthuman”) “nature.” Contemporary 
technology consists in multiple networks, or maybe rhizomes, of diverse 
technologies that grow where they can and interact where they have to, 
mixing and mingling like vegetation in a jungle. Yet, the whole of tech-
nological reality is not a single organization and does not have an over-
all plan. There is no superior instance that understands and controls the 
totality. (I suspect that even economy is not such an instance anymore, 
if even stocks can now be exchanged by mindless algorithms rather than 
by human minds). Becoming less unitary, technology also appears less 
totalitarian and alienating, and we generally welcome its help in organiz-
ing our lives through close biological and social mediations.
Thick like a jungle, opaque like our own flesh, techno-nature is onto-
logically (like) phusis, the ancient Greek word for “nature.” Quoting 
Heraclitus, German philosopher Martin Heidegger said of phusis that 
it “loves” us and “hides” from us; analogically one can say that contem-
porary techno-nature “loves us” when it gives itself as the ground of our 
knowledge and action, but also that it “hides” from us, because we cannot 
see the ground of this ground. The why and the how of our own techno-
nature withdraw from us. We therefore need to give up the belief in the 
separate domains of technology and nature, and understand them in 
terms of mutual co-constitution. As French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy 
writes in Equivalence of Catastrophes, techno-nature consists in a count-
less multiplicity of natural, technological, scientific, social, and other sin-
gularities, that are equivalent in their power of constituting the world and 
that are nonetheless incomparable. Everything can act on everything, but 
without having been built and planned to work as a system. There’s no 
totality, no providence, just events that invent futures and leave histories.
Now, if the ground of techno-nature is a depth out of which anything 
can emerge, what about its surface that should support knowledge and 
action? It is good to invent solutions that can make life better, but the 
entire techno-nature is not a problem that could be solved. The little city-
car in Paris is a good invention that makes life better and works against the 
climatic catastrophe but not even joint efforts of all the city-cars of Paris 
can dissipate the smog over the city. A similar fate weighs on the contem-
porary projects of “geoengineering,” like capturing CO2 or the projection 
of protective particles into the atmosphere: their feasibility and utility are 
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uncertain, while it is certain that they are costly and energy-consuming 
processes that encourage the use of fossil fuels. Such inventions may be 
handy on a small scale, but they are not enough to avert global warming. 
Even in electric city-cars and in CO2-geoengineering, the old dream of 
using and controlling nature through technology lives on and continues 
to shape the horizon of our epoch.
11.30.2015
Is the Anthropocene Upon Us?
Patrícia Vieira
We are told that we now live in the Anthropocene, a new geological 
age marked by human beings’ lasting influence on planet earth. In fact, 
the Anthropocene has become somewhat of a buzzword not only in 
scientific circles but also in social sciences and the humanities. We can 
now attend conferences on “Rethinking Race in the Anthropocene” 
or “Anthropocene Feminism” and read volumes and articles on The 
Task of Philosophy in the Anthropocene, Architecture in the Anthropocene, 
Anthropocene Fictions or “Anthropology at the Time of the Anthropocene” 
to name but a few. Both The Economist and Huffington Post have wel-
comed us to the Anthropocene and the New York Times has even tried to 
teach us how to die in this novel epoch.
But is all this talk of the Anthropocene much ado about nothing? As 
far as science goes, we will have to wait and see. The recent history of 
the term goes back to atmospheric chemist and Nobel Prize winner Paul 
Crutzen, who co-wrote an article with Eugene Stoermer in 2000 argu-
ing that, due to our extensive impact on the planet, the current geological 
period should be called the “Anthropocene,” the age of humans.
Curzen and Stoermer’s idea caught on to the extent that the 
International Commission on Stratigraphy (ICS) has formed an 
Anthropocene Working Group. On the table is the possibility that the 
Holocene, the geological epoch that started at the close of the last ice 
age approximately 11,700 years ago, has given way to the Anthropocene. 
There is debate as to when the new period is supposed to have begun: 
some argue for the expansion of agriculture some 5,000 years ago as a 
starting date, others for the arrival of Europeans on the American con-
tinent, others for the onset of the Industrial Revolution in the 18th cen-
tury, and others still for the inauguration of the atomic age in 1945. The 
82 Patrícia Vieira
Group presented its initial recommendations in 2016, after which any 
proposal needs to be approved by the ICS and the International Union of 
Geological Sciences. It will probably still be a while before we know for 
sure whether we are really living in the Anthropocene.
Ponderous as any verdict on geological time necessarily is, the scien-
tific decision to call ours the age of the Anthropocene does not seal the 
fate of the term. Even if this designation were, in the end, rejected by the 
ICS, the expression would most likely continue to be used informally not 
only in academia but also in the media. It looks like the Anthropocene is 
here to stay, whether stratigraphers like it or not. But should the rest of us 
laypeople rejoice in our ingress into this brand new geological era?
At first glance, we seem to have little choice but to accept that the 
Anthropocene is upon us. Global warming and the impending disappear-
ance of several island-nations, the rampant pollution of the atmosphere 
that leaves cities like Beijing or Paris in the dark when smog is at its worst, 
the contamination of waterways by noxious chemicals poisoning all 
organisms around them, the acidification of the oceans and the concomi-
tant death of marine life, and the staggering rate of species extinction in 
the last few decades are but a few of the most conspicuous side-effects 
of humanity’s activities on earth. We know of no precedent to such a 
human-driven hecatomb.
The term Anthropocene brings the disaster-zone that much of our 
planet has become into a much-needed sharper focus. The shock-effect 
of realizing that human beings are altering the geological make-up of the 
earth may jolt the general public out of its habitual complacency. It could 
serve as a wake-up call to those of us who, while abstractly concerned 
with environmental issues, are primarily focused on our energy-wasteful, 
fossil-fuel-driven everyday lives.
“Anthropocene” thus has a performative function: its strategic useful-
ness as a rallying-point for the environmental movement and as a call to 
action for politicians and regular citizens goes beyond strictly scientific 
concerns. It is a battle cry for environmental justice, not only for humans 
but also for all non-human living beings, who are paying the price 
for our folly.
Still, deep-seated tensions lurk under the blanket-term 
“Anthropocene.” For one, placing the blame on “anthropos,” on humans 
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as a species, hides profound asymmetries in the history and geopoli-
tics of Homo sapiens. A fisherman living off his catch on a Mozambican 
island or a subsistence farmer in Sri Lanka are certainly not as guilty of 
ushering humankind into the Anthropocene as the average American or 
European. What is more, the world’s poor, deprived of many of the mate-
rial comforts achieved at nature’s expense, lack the means to mitigate the 
effects of global warming and pollution, therefore bearing the brunt of 
these scourges.
But the most serious problem with the Anthropocene is that it reaf-
firms humankind’s hubris. By singling ourselves out as the one mover 
and shaker who determines the fate of the entire planet, are we not falling 
into the fallacy of human exceptionalism that brought us to our current 
predicament in the first place? Is there not a certain perverse pride in our 
quasi-divine ability to shape the earth? In other words, is the use of the 
term Anthropocene, to a certain extent, not a case of relishing our power, 
even if it can cause us some misfortunes? After all—so some arguments 
go—if we are smart enough to almost destroy the planet, we will also be 
sufficiently clever to save it.
The other side of this hubris-laden defiance is the fatalism that some-
times accompanies the thought of the Anthropocene. Perhaps, some say, 
our impact on the world is already too significant to be reversed. And 
maybe humans cannot do otherwise but bring destruction upon our-
selves and other inhabitants of the earth. By using this expression, are 
we not resigning to the status quo and accepting that there is nothing 
each of us can do against such a powerful geological force as the entire 
human species?
Whether we strategically adopt the term Anthropocene or shun it for 
endorsing the very larger-than-life view of humanity at the root of the 
environmental crisis, we would do well to soberly ponder upon our short 
life on the planet. The earth thrived without us for millions of years and 
there is no reason to believe that it will not continue to do so once we are 
gone. Is the Anthropocene the legacy we wish to leave behind? Do we 
really want to live in a human-crafted geological era? Perhaps, instead of 
dwelling on thoughts of the Anthropocene, we should strive to leave it 
behind, once and for all.
05.04.2015
The Meaning of “Clean Energy”
Michael Marder
As the global conference on climate change is taking place in Paris, it is 
time to contemplate the meaning of “clean energy.” In the West, the word 
energy is marked with the force of deadly negativity. It is assumed, for 
instance, that energy must be extracted, with the greatest degree of vio-
lence, by destroying whatever or whoever temporarily contains it. More 
often than not, it is procured by burning its “source,” in the first instance, 
plants and parts of plants whether they have been chopped down yester-
day or have been dead for millions of years, the timescale sufficient for 
them to be transformed into coal or oil.
Without giving it much thought, one supposes that the only way to 
obtain energy, be it for external heating or for giving the body enough of 
that other heat (namely, “caloric intake”) necessary for life, is by destroy-
ing the integrity of something or someone else. Life itself becomes the 
privilege of the survivors, who celebrate their Pyrrhic victory on the ashes 
of past and present vegetation and other forms of life they commit to fire.
Seeing that, for Aristotle (who still maintains a strong hold on ener-
geia, a word that he introduced into the philosophical vocabulary), the 
prototype of matter is hylē, or wood, the violent extraction of energy 
paints a vivid image of the relation between matter and spirit prevalent 
in the West. A flaming spirit sets itself to work by destroying its other and 
triumphs over the wooden matter it incinerates. The price for the energy 
released in the process of combustion is the reduction of what is burnt 
to the ground. And, unfortunately, the madness of metaphysical spirit, 
which sets everything on its path aflame, tends to intensify.
It is not that plants are exempt from the general combustibility that, 
for Schelling, defined the very living of life. They release oxygen, and so 
provide the elemental conditions of possibility for the burning of fire. But 
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the vegetal mode of obtaining energy—especially that of the solar vari-
ety—is non-extractive and non-destructive; the plant receives its energy 
by tending, by extending itself toward the inaccessible other, with which 
it does not interfere. That is one of the most important vegetal lesson to 
be learned: how to energize oneself following the plants, without annihi-
lating the sources of our vitality.
In the meantime, energy extraction means tearing both living and 
dead things apart, penetrating their core, enucleating them. Energy pro-
duction is a fury of destruction. It does not relent until the atom is split, 
until it reaches the nucleus and divides the ostensibly indivisible. Nuclear 
power and the atomic energy it unbridles is the apotheosis of the con-
temporary energy paradigm. So is hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, that 
cracks the earth (particularly shale rocks) open by exerting high water 
pressure on them from below. Environmentally destructive and shock-
ingly shortsighted as these methods of energy production are, they are 
not surprising in light of the prevalent conception of energy that involves 
breaching and laying bare the depth of things (of the atom, of the 
earth…) and drawing power from this violent and violating exposure.
On the one hand, most approaches to energy presuppose substantial 
divergence between the inner and the outer, depth and surface. The very 
language of “storage” and “release” indicates that the energy of everything 
from galaxies to microbes, economic systems to psychic life, is contained 
(held inside and prevented from achieving its full actuality) before it is 
liberated with more or less force.
And the encompassing whole is, likewise, seen as a great container, 
from which no energy ever escapes; that is what, at bottom, the law of the 
conservation of energy means. Absent the dimension of interiority, one 
can no longer explain how things work, how they are put to work, acti-
vated, or withheld in potentiality. Energy differentials depend, above all, 
on the difference between the inside and the outside, on the speed and 
force with which their boundaries are traversed.
Plants, on the other hand, do not need to devastate the interiority of 
another being to procure their energy. They set to work the elements they 
neither control nor dominate nor appropriate. Besides water and the min-
erals they draw from the soil, they receive what they need from the sun, 
processing their solar sustenance on their maximally exposed surfaces, 
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the leaves. (Plants can, to be sure, deplete the soil, but this happens only 
with human inference, due to intensive agriculture and the spread of 
monocultures. By and large, vegetation returns to the earth much of what 
it takes in the processes of its decomposition).
Human reliance on solar energy would bespeak our willingness to 
learn from plants and to accept, mutatis mutandis, an essentially superfi-
cial mode of existence or, at the very least, to integrate it with the dimen-
sion of depth. Although current technical capabilities would sustain a 
nearly total reliance on renewable energy (solar, wind, hydro, etc.), they 
do not match the prevalent mindset toward the essence of energy, viewed 
as something destructive-extractive—something to be snatched from the 
interiority of things.
The focus of attention may, in fact, swing to “clean energy” and that is, 
in and of itself, laudable. But “cleanness” relates primarily to the effects of 
its utilization, not to the question of what energy is. That is why oil, coal, 
and, especially, natural gas companies can claim that they are making the 
transition to clean energy, without radically modifying the sources of fuel 
themselves, let alone how they are procured.
Be it labor or truth, we extract value from the core of the human and 
destroy the material “shell” in the process. On economic spreadsheets, we 
are accounted for as human resources, from which work can be extracted 
in a mode incompatible with Marx’s dream of human self-actualization 
through labor.
Our epistemologies, too, are consistent with the desire to reveal the 
inner core of reality, usually by shattering and discarding the outward 
“mere” appearances that occlude it. Thinking has assumed the shape of 
mental fracking. Unless we subscribe to the insights of phenomenology, 
we are quite dissatisfied with the surface of things, with how they present 
themselves to us in everyday life: with all their imperfections, incomple-
tions, shadowy spots, and stamps of finitude.
For us, superficial actuality, the actuality of the superficies, is never 
actual enough. As we strive to know what things really are, we break them 
down to atomic and subatomic, chemical and molecular levels. Why 
would the framework of energy production and extraction be different 
from that of the production and extraction of knowledge? The two would 
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have to change in tandem, if the human impact on the world, as well as on 
ourselves, is to be mitigated.
12.07.2015
Fracking and the Art of Subtext
Kara Thompson
Extractive industries condition and are conditioned by narrative struc-
tures. The constantly fluctuating demand and supply of “natural” 
resources begs for a certain kind of narrative energy. Whether striking 
gold or building a pipeline, narratives condition, validate, backdate: the 
turns of legality that justify settlement and the removal of Native/lndig-
enous peoples for the sake of gold, oil fields or pipelines; the narratives 
about hydraulic fracturing (fracking) that deny environmental impact 
and degradation or that deploy eminent domain law to allow oil and gas 
companies to seize control of “private” lands for the sake of the “public.”
Resource extraction also parallels and structures the ways we read lit-
erature. Those of us who teach literature frequently use terms like mine or 
dig deep to talk about acts of close reading, terms that are meant to teach 
students how to coax something from the text that may not reside on its 
surface. Perhaps we use the term fractured as a metaphor for a structure, 
or a reader’s encounter with a postmodern text. These are also terms that 
define and describe the procedures of blasting, coaxing, and drawing out 
natural gas from deep rock.
Compared to surface mining—including mountaintop removal, 
strip and open-pit mining—fracking is fairly concealed while the surface 
remains intact. The activity and energy have gone deep underground. In 
2015, Oklahoma experienced 907 magnitude 3+ earthquakes; in 2014, 
585; and in 2013, 109. The U.S. Geological Survey announced in 2013 
that such seismic events are not the result of “typical, random fluctua-
tions in natural seismicity rates” but instead likely caused by the disposal 
of fracking wastewater. Once the oil and natural gas are pumped out of 
the rock, the wastewater is extracted and re-injected into the ground 
at a different site; the injections increase pressure at natural fault lines 
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and cause earthquakes. The process is diffuse and subterranean—the 
effects perceptible in other, displaced forms, like earthquakes or flam-
mable tap water.
Fracking renders scale and affect ecological and geological. Unlike oil 
fields with their pumping derricks, mountaintops blasted off and stripped 
bare, or coal trains rumbling down the tracks, the blasting of rock occurs 
underground. Fracking obfuscates at the surface. Given its subterranean 
processes, that first goes deep—7000 feet below the earth’s surface—and 
then horizontally, land owners often don’t know their land is being mined 
for natural gas; nor are people always aware that their fields are being irri-
gated with fracking waste water, or that the water is being re-injected near 
their drinking source. Fracking traffics in subtext.
A narrative’s subtext is about desire, the unmentionable fantasy or 
obsession. The text gets most interesting when characters cannot neces-
sarily declare their needs and desires—perhaps they want too much of 
the wrong thing. From a craft perspective, subtext makes a good story. 
Charles Baxter puts it this way: “A certain kind of story does not depend 
so much on what the characters say they want as what they actually want 
but can’t own up to. This inability to be direct creates a subterranean 
chasm within the story, where genuine desires hide beneath the super-
ficial ones.” A character’s obsessions might turn manic, thereby creating 
what Baxter calls in The Art of Subtext a “congested subtext”—a “complex 
set of desires and fears that can’t be efficiently described, a pile-up of 
emotions that resists easy articulation.” Long after the story is over, the 
affective accumulation stays with the reader. Baxter’s metaphors could be 
associated with extraction, including fracking—the subterranean chasm 
that can become congested. As readers we blast these moments open and 
are left with the fragments.
While energy extraction has come to resemble subtext, I increas-
ingly direct my students to the text’s surface layer, to linger in description 
and observation, to remain utterly superficial and “simply” describe the 
poem, or a key scene in the story. But more often than not, they cannot 
resist excavating, mining for a theme or two that allows them to manage 
an interpretation. They’re utterly committed to the humanist principles 
of literature, that what makes a poem valid and worth reading is the 
extent to which it directs the reader beyond the textures of language and 
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surfaces of the page. That is, most students who take my literature courses 
are not interested in subtext or surface, but in what they often refer to as 
“theme” or “meaning”—how a poem might teach us to be better humans, 
or how a character is a symbol of Christ, or how a complex figure such as 
Dakota writer Zitkala-Ša (Gertrude Bonnin) “symbolizes” the tragic end 
of her “noble culture.” Not only do many of my settler students resist my 
insistence (and the evidence) that Dakota people and cultures live and 
thrive in the present tense, but some students also resist the time it takes 
to linger on the writer’s vivid language, her subtle descriptions of space. 
I’ve wondered whether my directing them to the surface makes way for 
shallow forms of critique, a literary politics that detaches itself from his-
torical context and political accumulation. I simply want them to see the 
surface, at least at first.
I’m trying to pry apart the deep paradox at play here: the culture that 
banks our energy futures on deep rock and subterranean extraction also 
gives us standardized testing in public schools that trains students to be 
excavators of “meaning.” At the very same time that humanities programs 
are asked to be more streamlined and branded, when we’re prompted 
to justify our existence numerically and many of our students assume 
that the study of literature must possess value (economic, quantifiable) 
to be worthy of their own time and energy, energy extraction becomes 
more elusive and imaginary. Meaning and theme offer a certain kind of 
extractive value, a portable and useful product that doesn’t touch subtext, 
what’s happening underneath the character’s surface actions. So too, the 
traumas of fracking occur so deep underground that we cannot imagine 
how, when, or where they occur—and it’s much easier not to try.
Pauline Matt, co-founder of Blackfeet Women Against Fracking, 
describes perfectly how fracking relies on subtext: the difference between 
what the “jolly” and complimentary man with papers at her door says 
and what he most desires, which is unrestricted access to her land, and to 
sacred sites in Blackfeet homelands, for subterranean drilling. But Matt 
and other Blackfeet people already know to read for that subtext: “I knew 
what he was up to right from the minute he walked through the door.”
In the last six years, theories of reading have emerged that prompt us 
to engage with literature horizontally, rather than vertically—I’m think-
ing here of Sharon Marcus and Stephen Best’s work on surface reading. 
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Then there are microsociological approaches that call for a turn to “thin 
description,” or modes of reading that orient our attention to the text’s 
surfaces, such as those advocated for by Heather Love. Reading practices, 
in other words, are increasingly oriented to the surface, while energy 
extraction only digs deeper. What does it mean for us to debate the mate-
rial depth of reading, the thick and thin of it all, in a moment of fracturing 
when charges of pressure are forced into the core of rocks, which are the 
material formations of deep time? Do we need to change the way we read 
when the earth quakes in Oklahoma and water catches fire?
I suggest that fracking makes way for a different kind of close reading. 
We might be persuaded both by its depth, and by its shallow imagination. 
The rock that releases fossil fuel cannot be reducible to its energy func-
tion. Rocks do not exist to be fractured, nor are they utterly destroyed 
by fracking. Rocks buy humans a little more time, but they also steal 
future time away. The rock is a form on my mind, but it exists before 
and outside of me too. Rocks are autonomous and noisy; I’m tuned into 
them now that I recognize how their congested subtexts shake the earth 
beneath my feet.
06.20.2016
E. Ethics and Responsibility
Are Ethicists an Obstacle to Progress?
Michael Hauskeller
When people who don’t know me ask me what I do, I tell them I’m a 
philosopher. When they ask me what I specialize in, I tell them that I am 
mostly, even though I’ve never been entirely comfortable with that label, 
an ethicist. This used to be a good thing, or at least not a bad one, but 
things are changing. People like me are now increasingly being described 
as, at best, a nuisance, and, at worst, a threat to human well-being and 
possibly even survival.
In this vein, Steven Pinker, the well-known psychologist and bestsell-
ing author, has recently (1 August 2015) published an opinion piece in 
the Boston Globe, entitled “The moral imperative for bioethics,” in which 
he chides ethicists for hindering the progress of our species. According to 
Pinker, biotechnology could do amazing things for us if we only stopped 
hampering research by raising flimsy ethical concerns about it, which is 
not helpful at all. Scientific and technological progress is already slow 
enough as it is, and given the “vast increases in life, health, and flour-
ishing” that biomedical research promises, every day we lose worrying 
about the ethics of the matter is one day too many. While biotechnologi-
cal research is urgently needed to rid us of all sorts of terrible diseases, 
what we most certainly do not need are professional worriers who call 
themselves ethicists, second-guessing every promising new development 
and thus stalling scientific and technological progress by throwing “nebu-
lous but sweeping principles such as ‘dignity’, ‘sacredness’, or ‘social jus-
tice’” in its way. A true ethicist, Pinker decrees, would realize that there is 
in fact only one valid moral imperative they should promote and follow, 
namely to “get out of the way.”
For Pinker and others like him, ethics is a luxury that we cannot 
afford. People are dying, people are suffering. The biotech industry is 
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attempting to do something about it, working very hard to succeed, while 
the “so-called ethicists” are attempting to prevent this from happening. 
Humanity is painfully pushing a rock up a hill, while all that ethicists are 
doing is help push it back down again. For Pinker it is as simple as that. 
Except, of course, it is not. Surprising as it may be, it is in fact not the pri-
mary goal of us ethicists to make life difficult for those who want nothing 
but make the world a better place. Ethics is not about issuing “red tape, 
moratoria, or threats of prosecution” (although ethical reflection may 
occasionally give rise to all that). Instead, ethics is about making sure that 
we know what we are doing and why we are doing it, that the path we are 
following is really the path we want to be following and that the place 
where this path is likely to lead us is really the place where we want to 
end up being.
We all, naturally, want things to be better than they are, if that is pos-
sible. We all want progress. But just as nothing is ever better as such, but 
only ever in certain respects, there is no such thing as progress as such, 
or in the abstract. We are not sitting in an evolutionary elevator that has 
only two directions: up and down. Instead, there are many different ways 
of going up and going forward, many different ways of going down and 
backwards, and many different ways of going sideways, or around in cir-
cles, or of moving without any clear direction at all. Moreover, the ways 
that lead upwards in some way may also lead downwards in some other 
way. Things are usually more complex than we would like, and for this 
very reason also more complex than we may care to acknowledge. In 
order to progress, to step forward, you need to have a goal, or at least have 
made up your mind about a direction. Spending a thought or two on the 
reasons for choosing that particular goal or direction before you start run-
ning doesn’t seem like such a bad idea. And that is all we are doing when 
we are engaging in ethical reflection. The one question that ethicists keep 
asking is whether the things we do or propose to do are actually good for 
us, all things considered. Would we really prefer that this question be no 
longer asked?
It is highly naïve to assume that all biomedical research will neces-
sarily benefit some of us, let alone humanity as a whole. What is power-
ful enough to save us is also powerful enough to harm us. To demand 
that such research not be regulated in any way because some of it might 
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eventually help us find a cure for Alzheimer’s and other diseases is like 
saying that politicians in government should be granted unlimited leg-
islative, judiciary and executive power and not be checked in any way 
because some politicians might actually use that power for the good of the 
people: we just need to trust that they know best and that they want only 
what is best for us. But why should we believe that?
I suppose most people would agree that granting such unlimited 
powers to politicians would be a singularly bad idea, and that, even if sci-
entists and biotech firms were generally smarter and more trustworthy 
than politicians, they are certainly not trustworthy enough that we could 
afford not putting any regulations and safeguards in place and thereby 
retaining some measure of control. Ethical reflection helps us determine 
the nature and extent of those necessary safeguards. Ideas such as human 
dignity, sacredness, and social justice may strike tough-minded empiri-
cists like Pinker as decidedly airy-fairy and not worth serious consider-
ation. But even though they are a bit airy-fairy, for many of us they do 
capture something that is both elusive and very real, a sense perhaps that 
living disease-free and surviving as long as possible is not all that matters, 
that sometimes more is at stake, that there are other dimensions of our 
life and experience that are important to us and for us, whatever they may 
be. Ethicists are the ones who try to figure out what those dimensions are 
and why they matter to us. They are not the professional doomsayers that 
some like to depict them as. Their role is more that of psychopomps who 
guide us from the present to the future, providing secure passage, making 
sure that we get there safe and sound.
09.28.2015
The Responsibility of Others
Daniel Innerarity
As people in Europe are seeking ways to deal with the fallout from the 
Greek crisis, a common theme emerges in the discourses of very diverse 
agents: others are to blame. No matter what happens, we end up repeat-
ing something similar to what was affirmed by a character from Goethe’s 
Torquato Tasso, who gave us the maxim that is probably the paradigm of 
all excuses: “whatever one is / other people are to blame.” This convic-
tion clarifies nothing, but provides a good deal of relief; its purpose is to 
reconfirm us as opposed to them. It explains in simple terms the tension 
between the global and the local, creates a comfortable contrast between 
states and markets, divides the world into heroes and villains, and pro-
vides the basic outline for the relationship between right- and left-wing 
forces. As we can see, these operations offer a very comfortable simplifi-
cation when the world has become difficult to understand because of its 
growing complexity.
Some people say that the fault lies with German hegemony and the 
harshness of the creditors. They are not mistaken, although if they mag-
nify these faults, they run the risk of forgetting the irresponsibility of the 
various Greek governments that falsified their public finances (with the 
assistance, of course, of some of those who are now part of the band of 
creditors), reneged on many of their commitments and failed to reform a 
state that was economically unsustainable even before the crisis.
Others blame the crisis on the clichéd irresponsibility of Southern 
countries, as if they did not know the disastrous end results of previous 
bailout plans, as well as the economic benefits that the single currency 
has afforded Northern European countries. In addition, if a member 
state needs assistance after suffering speculative attacks by market forces 
based on an arrangement for which it does not hold sole responsibility, it 
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makes no sense for the bailout to be compensated with drastic structural 
reforms in that member state alone. There are many things that should 
be reformed in Southern European countries, of course, but also in the 
incorrect design of the euro and its defective governance.
We are facing a typical case of recursive responsibility in which all crit-
icisms have an element of truth, but none of them reveal the full picture. 
The bad thing is that, with so many mutual accusations, people find many 
reasons to stop asking about their own ineptitude, the risks they generate 
with their decisions or their responsibility toward what we have in com-
mon. To the extent that allegations against others increase, self-reflection 
decreases. When the whole field is filled with conspiratorial explanations, 
there is no space for interrogation about one’s own responsibilities.
We will not get beyond these obstacles until we manage to see our 
decisions in the context in which they are adopted and that they influ-
ence, in ways that can sometimes be catastrophic. Governing involves 
making every one of the actors who intervene in the process of decision-
making aware of the disastrous possibilities that will ensue if they nar-
row-mindedly pursue their own interests and inviting them to protect 
themselves against those possibilities with some type of self-limitation. 
In the end, it is a question of decision-makers realizing that what they 
must fear is themselves, their unthinking behavior: that a society is not 
threatened as much by nuclear arms in the hands of the enemy as by its 
own nuclear power plants; less by the enemy’s biological weapons than by 
certain experiments by its own scientific community; not by the invasion 
of foreign soldiers as much as its own organized crime; not by the hunger 
and death caused by war as much as the disabilities and death caused by 
its own traffic accidents. That what prevents plural societies from freely 
deciding their destiny is not so much an external impediment—or not 
only that—as much as their own lack of internal agreement.
As Ulrich Beck noted, contemporary societies cannot attribute every-
thing that threatens them to external causes; they themselves produce 
what they do not desire. The question about one’s own responsibility 
tends to be glossed over when one finds oneself in the midst of systems 
whose complexity resides in the fact that there are neither clear and indis-
putable cause-and-effect relationships nor decisions without side effects. 
We need to reject the comfortable innocence of conceiving responsibility 
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as something that always falls upon others. This reflexive reversal of the 
gaze toward one’s own conditions is very similar to the personal matura-
tion that consists of replacing external accusations with internal reflec-
tion. In the same way that children learn not to interpret their conflicts as 
the whole world conspiring against them, complex democracies should 
be capable of discovering the ways in which they themselves produce 
their own catastrophes.
10.26.2015
In Praise of Suicide
Jeff Love
We seek freedom. Is this not the rallying cry of American democracy, 
endlessly repeated, endlessly intoned as its most durable credo? We seek 
freedom to do as we want without fear of reprisal or repression. Indeed, 
we crave freedom from all reprisal and repression. The society of infinitely 
expanding wants, the bulwark of consumer dreams—that is America. Be 
the person you want to be, create yourself! These are exhortations essen-
tial to American identity, and they are deeply ambiguous. Once thought 
to be the property of the progressive left, they belong now increasingly to 
the many ideological formations of the radical right.
The adoption by the radical right of these once progressive ideals, as 
well as the insinuation that only the radical right truly respects their con-
tent, brings to the fore their surprising malleability. But it also highlights 
the connection of freedom with unabashed self-interest, the notion that 
what matters when it comes to freedom is my freedom to do as I want. 
The famed American frontier myths come together with the myth of the 
self-made man as paeans to self-interest. Freedom is first and foremost 
the freedom to do as I see fit and to acquire enough property and power 
so that I cannot be gainsaid. Nothing speaks more eloquently of the 
decay of the communitarian ideal than the rise of this notion of freedom 
as the final fecund fruit of American democracy.
Perhaps such a rise was inevitable. The philosophical origins of this 
notion of freedom are a veritable exaltation of selfishness. If we take the 
thinking of Thomas Hobbes polemically as our foil, the point could not 
be clearer. For to raise the fear of violent death up to the level of found-
ing principle is to make self-interest the deciding element in a political 
community. The final irony of this exaltation of self-interest based on the 
fear of death is that communities exist only to serve or prohibit—they 
100 Jeff Love
exist only for my benefit, and to the extent they fail to meet my needs, to 
benefit me, they fail as communities. All are essentially alone, seeking to 
profit from the community at the expense of others, and this makes per-
fect sense given the founding principle of fear of death. We may live with 
others, but everyone dies alone.
There is, however, another, very different way of looking at this notion 
of freedom that rejects it as a most abject and humiliating form of ser-
vitude. According to this view, the supposed freedom of self-interest is 
based on a largely hidden servitude to the fear of death. What reigns 
supreme is not my wants as they come clear to me, but, above all, the 
imperative to self-preservation at any cost. All my wants come down to 
nothing more than an expression of the imperative to self-preservation, 
which is merely the “positive” way of describing the fear of death. Put 
more crudely, what I take for freedom is in reality a grotesque servitude 
to the body whose pleasures and fears dictate the course of my life.
While there are many precedents for this thinking ( Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau comes to mind), an unusual twentieth-century Russian philos-
opher, Alexandre Kojève (born Aleksandr Vladimirovich Kozhevnikov, 
1902-1968), puts it most sharply and radically. Kojève insists that gen-
uine freedom originates only in our resistance to the imperative of self-
preservation. The freest human act is the most radical act of rebellion 
against the imperative of self-preservation: suicide. Whereas the osten-
sibly free creation of modern consumer society may deride this propo-
sition as being manifestly absurd, the equation of freedom and suicide 
emerges as absurd only for those who accept the yoke of self-preserva-
tion. Kojève’s thinking makes a mockery of the assumption of freedom 
one might associate with buying power in consumer culture or the free-
dom “to do as one sees fit.” In both these cases, Kojève sees nothing but 
the slave chained to her desire for the prolongation of a comfortable life.
Does Kojève then counsel us to kill ourselves en masse? What sort of 
community can he possibly create out of this central claim about what 
constitutes freedom? The basis of Kojève’s thinking fits perfectly well with 
traditional attempts to create community not through the exaltation but 
rather the elimination of self-interest, as most purely exemplified by the 
imperative to self-preservation. The suicide he counsels may thus fit quite 
nicely with a rhetoric of conversion, whereby one lays down the primacy 
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of the preservation of oneself in favor of the creation of a new commu-
nal identity that transcends self-interest by transcending the interest in 
self-preservation. Kojève may be seen as a Christian philosopher in this 
sense. But he was manifestly not a Christian philosopher. Instead, he sup-
ported the notion of a community whose highest ideal is not service to a 
god but the overcoming of the imperative of self-preservation (and thus 
of the body) itself.
Kojève dares us to think a community in which the I is We and the 
We is I. The objections to this way of thinking are predictable. Is this not 
the drab dream of communism, that we all become the same insofar as 
none of us has her own identity? Is this the peace of eternal sleep or the 
night in which all cows are black? Both of these objections seem fair. But, 
again, they are based on the assumption that difference—and inequal-
ity—are to be preferred to a “bland” egalitarianism. Under this objection, 
of course, one finds a firm rejection of giving up the imperative to self-
preservation, which, for some reason, gives us such variety—such as the 
many crimes, wars and antagonistic differences of culture that have lent 
history its deliquescent brilliance.
Indeed, Kojève’s thought bids us to confront the alternatives: the 
violence inherent in retaining the imperative to self-preservation or the 
oppressive peace that arrives from our giving up that urge, to the extent 
we can. Kojève enjoins us to confront our underlying notions of free-
dom and, perhaps most powerfully, he forces us to consider what the 
most thoroughgoing freedom might entail, a freedom indistinguish-
able from the extirpation of desire. And who can imagine a life with that 
kind of freedom?
Fortunately, however, we need not imagine the other life, the one that 
emerges from the exaltation of self-interest: the wondrous pageant of 
human selfishness surrounds us every day.
04.11.2016
Is Existentialism a Post-Humanism?
Patrícia Vieira
It has now been 70 years, almost to the date (October 29, 1945), since 
Jean-Paul Sartre gave his famous talk “Existentialism is a Humanism,” 
published as a book a short time later. Speaking just a few months after 
the end of the Second World War, the French philosopher was concerned 
with ascertaining the meaning of human existence, the value and import 
of our choices and the weight of humanity’s responsibility for its actions. 
Seven decades after this talk, which came to popularize existentialism as 
one of the best-known philosophical currents of the twentieth century, 
with ramifications, for instance, in literature (theater, the novel…) and 
cinema, the time has come to re-evaluate its legacy.
Sartre, writing in the shadow of the atrocities of the war, peered into 
the significance of our relations to ourselves and to our fellow human 
beings. Now, at a time of widespread ecological destruction, we need to 
consider not only human interactions but also our behavior towards other 
living and non-living entities. The human propensity to look beyond the 
present moment into the future and the inevitability of social relations 
led Sartre to declare that “existentialism is a humanism.” But what about 
our exchanges with other creatures that share the planet with us? What is 
the role of these beings in existentialism? To put it more pointedly, Sartre 
established that “existentialism is a humanism;” the question we face 
today is to determine whether it can also be a posthumanism.
Sartre grounds his existentialism on the distinction between human 
subjects and mere objects. Objects are created according to a plan to ful-
fill a specific purpose—in Sartre’s example, a paper knife is designed by a 
craftsman to cut paper. During most of the history of Western thought, 
humans were considered to be special kinds of objects: they were objects 
created by a supreme artisan, God Himself. The notion of the human 
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devised by God is thus comparable to the concept of the paper knife in 
the mind of its manufacturer.
According to Sartre, 18th century-philosophers did away with the 
idea of God as the ultimate Being responsible for creation. However, they 
still held on to the belief that humans were the result of a pre-defined 
human nature, each individual—an instantiation of the universal con-
cept of humanity. Both in the theological paradigm and in the secular 
worldview of the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment periods, then, 
essence precedes existence: each person represents a certain configura-
tion of an essence that was given a priori.
The Copernican Revolution that Sartre is proposing, following the 
philosophy of Martin Heidegger, is that, in the case of human beings, exis-
tence precedes essence. This simple inversion entails a series of momentous 
consequences, foremost amongst which is the idea that human beings 
are, at each moment, responsible for their behavior, one that does not 
follow a pre-given pattern, or, in Sartre’s elegant expression, that humans 
are “condemned to be free.” Values and principles for action are not pre-
scribed by God or by human nature but need to be chosen at every turn 
of a person’s life, which renders each of us fully responsible for our deci-
sions that can no longer be blamed on external factors. Contrary to the 
paper knife, then, human beings are not created for this or that purpose 
or to act in a certain way. Thrown into an open-ended existence, our 
essence—who we really are—will be the sum total of all our actions and 
responses to the circumstances in which we find ourselves.
What is missing in Sartre’s depiction of humankind, as opposed to the 
realm of material objects? The obvious blind spot in his talk is the rest 
of the world, namely, those entities that are neither human-made objects 
built with a certain function in mind, like the paper-knife, nor humans 
themselves. What is the place of animals, plants, rivers, mountains and 
deserts in existentialism?
Surely, Sartre cannot claim that animals live only to fulfill a goal pre-
established by humans. Formerly considered to have been fashioned by 
God and, therefore, to have been created, just like humans, by a supreme 
artisan, where does the death of divinity leave these entities? In the 
absence of a theologically-inflected scala naturae—a ladder of nature 
that assigned each being a place in the world, with inanimate entities at 
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the bottom, followed by the different plants and animals and reaching, 
in its higher echelons, humans, angels and, finally God, the guarantor of 
the system’s cohesion and the one who defined every being’s telos and 
essence—other entities become just like humans, defined not by a pre-
existing essence but by their very lives.
Sartre’s conspicuous silence about humanity’s co-created beings, 
emancipated from the role assigned to them by their maker with the 
death of God, is tied to existentialism’s views on human freedom. If he 
were pressed on this issue, Sartre would probably defend humanity’s 
exceptionalism by pointing out that the non-human elements of creation 
cannot be responsible for their actions because they are not free. But 
in regarding humans as the only free entities, is existentialism not con-
demning the rest of the world to chains? Worse still, is human freedom 
not dependent upon the yoke of plants, animals and all other beings, put 
at the service of supposedly free human masters?
The question of humanism is, at its core, a question about the non-
human, about what distinguishes us from others. Humanism is therefore 
deeply implicated in what has come to be defined as the “environmental 
crisis.” It is pertinent to recall that the ancient Greek word from which 
our modern “crisis” derives, krísis, meant a separation, distinction or elec-
tion. The environmental crisis is rooted precisely in humanity’s separa-
tion from the rest of creation, in our conviction that we are inherently 
better than the rest.
Sartre’s existentialist humanism strove to liberate us from the shackles 
of essentialism and to show that humans are, at each moment, indepen-
dent beings responsible for their choices. The relevance of existential-
ism today hinges upon whether it can be not only a humanism but also a 
posthumanism.
“Posthumanism” should not be interpreted apocalyptically here, as 
what sequentially follows once humans have died out. Nor should it be 
regarded as hinting at the obsolescence of the human as we know it, to be 
replaced by better hybrids such as the half-human, half-machine cyborgs 
or the genetically modified humanoids of science fiction. I understand 
posthumanism as a moment within humanism that is a step beyond tradi-
tional strands of humanism and, at the same time, a revolution (a turning 
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back) of humanism, returning to a more lifelike conception of what being 
human means.
I would like to finish, then, with seven theses of existentialist posthu-
manism, one for each decade that has passed since Sartre’s talk:
1. Existentialist posthumanism is a recovery of our humanity, lost 
in abstract conceptions of human exceptionality.
2. Existentialist posthumanism moderates the notion of human 
freedom and autonomy and recognizes human heteronomy, that 
is, our dependence upon other entities on earth to provide for 
even the most basic of our needs, such as food and shelter.
3. Existentialist posthumanism is humble, rejecting a larger-than-
life view of the human as master of creation.
4. Existentialist posthumanism follows on the footsteps of tradi-
tional humanism in releasing all beings from essentialism and 
granting freedom not only to humans but also to non-humans 
beings; it recognizes each entity’s freedom to be according to its 
own mode of existence.
5. For existentialist posthumanism, the existence of all beings pre-
cedes their essence.
6.  For existentialist posthumanism, all beings have their 
own universe.
7. Existentialist humanism is a posthumanism.
11.02.2015
F.    Embodiments
Inside Out
Jean-Luc Nancy
Translated by Michael Marder
The body is nothing but the outside: skin exposed, a network of sentient 
receivers and transmitters. All outside and nothing like “me” that would 
be held inside that wrapping. There is no ghost in the machine, no dimen-
sionless point where “I” feel or feel myself feeling. The inside of the enve-
lope is yet another outside, developed (or de-enveloped) otherwise, full 
of folds, turns, convolutions, and adhesions. Full of invaginations, small 
heaps, and conglomerations.
It senses just because everything touches it throughout its continuous 
thickness. Everything is touched and mixed; everything slides into the 
silence of the organs that provide neither sights nor tastes nor smells nor 
sounds, but only touch, because the outside is so constant, so thick, so 
caught up in a compact and solidary mass that the interior body is with-
out organs. Being outside myself as this inside, prohibiting penetration 
(except by disemboweling or suffocating me), the outside is indefinitely 
wrapped, absorbed, sunk in its own magma, both fitting it so well and 
absolutely foreign to that which this magma fills, to that which it sustains 
and animates, to all this skin exposed with its orifices, mucosa, pores, and 
hair, all its contacts and communication, all the vibrations of the world, of 
matter and images, of timbers and resonances, all these gases and squirts, 
these air currents, these mirrors, these pieces of metal, these other skins, 
these words, these impressions, depressions, and expressions.
Everything the outside-within sustains with its buttresses, columns, 
cages, tubes, and membranes, however, also makes an impression on it. 
Such impressions are expressed in it, and nowhere else. The exposed out-
side has no other place than this inside to stick its sensations in, as well as 
its food, the air it breathes, the kisses, the knowledge it sucks in. It is there 
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that it feels and feels itself feeling: it is in the stomach, the intestines, 
heart palpitations, the filling of the lungs, not to mention the deaf infiltra-
tions channeling nerves in the muscles, the lymphatic vessels in the liver 
and in pancreatic islets. The skin feels under the skin, the eyes seeing in a 
frozen socket under the meninges.
But I have said too much, much too much, by saying these words that 
I have learned from another exterior, that of medicine, physiology, or 
anatomy, through which the vesicles, tendons, and peristalses receive a 
determinate, functional sense. As soon as these are presented to me, they 
signify something completely different from my body, whether inside or 
out: an apparatus, a piece of equipment plugged into a network of tubes 
or of chemical products, dissociated and desiccated by a scalpel or nee-
dles. It is always intriguing, distracting, or disturbing to see an echogra-
phy image of one’s arteries or of the coronary network, set in a contrast 
thanks to a special solution and projected onto a screen after a catheter 
has been introduced into a vein in the groin. But, in the end, this is a rep-
resentation similar to the results of a blood test or a spirometric measure-
ment that belongs to the complex of physiological representation, com-
putation, and instrumentation.
This complex has to do with something other than that which keeps 
itself underneath—sub-jectum, sup-positum, sub-stantia—and that, in this 
underneath, ingests along with the nutrients their tastes and, with them, 
the tastes of all the things, the shocks, the frictions, the bells and the 
trumpets, the moods and their pulsations, the air, spirit, warmth, tender-
ness, boredom, desire… That subject seems to be subjected to the other, 
namely, to the character who says “I”, and yet it is only a thin contact sheet, 
almost nothing, an interval between above and below, between these two 
outsides that make him believe that he can say “inside.”  But there also, on 
the inside, it relates to itself, it feels itself, it growls or it bothers, it tight-
ens or it relaxes. Here it makes rumbling sounds; there—the wheezing 
ones; and there it stands up in erections. At all times, at every opportu-
nity, the skin imprints on its reverse side (muscles, fibers, facial nerves) 
all the messages (images, foliage, clouds) signaling to me nothing more 
and nothing less than my presence in the world. But this presence, too, 
is exposed to my very entrails, to my very intestines that are, according 
to their name, the insides themselves, not so far from the most intimate, 
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not far at all from the Augustinian interior intimo meo and not far from the 
interfeces et urinam from the same book, very close indeed to the perfect 
god as a flaming excrement. That which comes out and that which enters, 
shit or thought, speech or saliva, excitation, excoriation: everything goes 
in pairs and keeps the one outside the other in a constant rustling and 
movement of the same ensemble in itself, completely outside of me. As 
for me, I remain an intimate null point of spirit nowhere to be found in 
this entanglement smeared with pulp, tissues, and fluids that, in their 
entirety, give place to the soul, which ought to be conceived as extended 
along the vessels and the teguments, knotted into the lymph nodes, and 
bathed in plasma.
There is no representation of the outside that is swarming within, 
except for these cuts on a cover glass, the imagery of magnetic resonance, 
or whatever issues from tomography scanners. Nonetheless, let us not 
rush to challenge anatomies, histologies, or physiologies. Their technical 
strangeness does not allow us to forget that this is still us. In some way, 
it must be the case that my eye is glassy, watery, iridescent and that my 
finger is bony, tendinous, ungulate. These things are not quite things, and 
anatomical models play the role of a secret mirror. How is it possible to 
ignore what the skin molded of orange-red, brown or blue rubber, or the 
skeleton made of pale plastic with 367 bones stitched in order, tell me 
something about myself or how they paint me to myself? How, therefore, 
to ignore to what point I am far away and to what strangely disquieting 
point I am unrecognizable?
04.04.2016
Do We Own Our Bodies?
Jeff Love and Michael Meng
Ownership is freedom. We may do what we want with what we have. 
We believe we own our bodies and may do with them as we will. But is 
that really so? Does this most intimate form of ownership really grant us 
freedom to do as we will? One has only to take a casual stroll through 
a hospital to be disabused of that notion—hospitals being little more 
than horrific prisons where the limits of our ownership, and by extension 
ownership itself, are all too easy to spot. In a hospital, in room after room 
equipped with elaborate arrays of equipment that can be joined to the 
body to keep it in some desired condition, one has to confront a most 
discomfiting reality: what seems most close and intimate to us is a disori-
enting stranger. The wondrous forms painted or sketched with consum-
mate mastery by a Leonardo or Michelangelo give way to the disturb-
ing drawings of Vesalius: the body opened up for all to see, a network of 
tubes and cables that is for some reason much more difficult to look at 
than those similar networks we find in a building or a car. Why is that so?
We might say that this difficulty is born of deception, the unpleasant 
encounter with the aspects of the body we would otherwise most wish 
to hide from ourselves. For all those tubes and lines of cable are fragile 
and may collapse at any time, possibilities that our regular perception of 
our own bodies is not likely to emphasize. Of course, we suffer regular 
breakdowns, and often rather embarrassing ones, that are embarrassing 
precisely because they reveal how little we own what we think we own. 
Our capacity to take hold of ourselves proves to be extraordinarily frag-
ile, and there is nothing more estranging, more fundamentally disori-
enting, perhaps, than a moment when one’s body gives out or reacts in 
such a way that one has no choice but to become aware of a singular fact: 
“we” (and why is this a “we”?) are strangers in our own body, which is 
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not our own, does not belong to us and cares little or nothing for what is 
important to us.
Who are we then? We could answer this question in many different 
ways. We may be mind, we may be body, we may be spirit or flesh, and so 
on. But, in each case, the contrast arises with the realization that the body 
is indeed a kind of stranger over which I have utterly no control. Here 
is the vaunted “mind/body” problem in its least abstract instantiation. 
While philosophers may discuss this problem in any number of differ-
ent venues, we each live it and nobody lives this problem more than the 
patient frozen in fear of the alien taking all she has away in the crepuscu-
lar twilight of pain, loneliness and desperate mendacity that is the lot of 
those whose bodies have decided to collapse.
The myth of ownership collapses along with the body. We are left to 
face the harsh reality encapsulated in Martin Heidegger’s extravagant 
phrase: “Death is Dasein’s ownmost possibility.” “Ownmost” is a curi-
ous translation of the German “eigenste,” an adjective whose root “eigen” 
denotes ownership, thus suggesting that what we own most (another 
impossible phrase) is the possibility to die. To put this slightly dif-
ferently, what we most truly own is death. Of course, this phrase must 
seem darkly ironic, and it is. For what sort of ownership can this be but 
ownership that obliterates the inveterate trace of hope secreted away in 
the notion of ownership itself? A trace intimating that I may be freed of 
death, that I may own “in perpetuity”, that, in other words, I do not have 
to face the humiliation of death, all my property, my house, my stocks, 
my cars, proving to be nothing more than an elaborate network of fences 
that protect me from a ghastly reality, which, having once emerged, will 
never let me go.
“I did everything correctly and still I must die!” This could be the 
motto of the main character in Lev Tolstoy’s harrowing novella, “The 
Death of Ivan Il’ich,” which Heidegger himself refers to in his discussion 
of death in Being and Time. Ivan Il’ich finds himself secure in what must 
be the bourgeois version of paradise: he is happily married, has a lucrative 
career and a lovely house—everything is perfect. But then what is hardly 
perfect introduces itself into his life, a small pain that becomes more and 
more severe, that becomes so severe that his entire life becomes nothing 
but pain, his thoughts scattered, his family distant, his world reduced to 
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nothing more than that. He has discovered his “ownmost” possibility of 
being. He has come to know himself and, rapidly, all the things he used to 
claim ownership of fade away in the face of this knowledge.
If ownership is a sordid illusion, a lie we tell ourselves to alleviate the 
terror of being stuck in a body that finally crushes us in its death throes, is 
it possible to face that ownmost possibility? If we come to see the illusion 
of salvation through ownership, what do we do? Is this revelation itself 
not already a form of death? Can we live without ownership?
06.13.2016
Philosophy as a Bloody Affair
Costica Bradatan
Suppose there is a manner of doing philosophy that, strictly speak-
ing, doesn’t involve writing and speech-making, lecturing and teach-
ing—indeed, a form of philosophizing that doesn’t even need language. 
Suppose, further, that this kind of philosophizing is all about perfor-
mance, bodily performance. Philosophers have exhausted all their usual 
approaches, and now have to put their bodies on the line. The situation 
doesn’t lack irony: an essentially logo-centric discipline finds itself one 
day in a state where words are useless and arguments futile; no matter 
how persuasive the philosophers, they will convince no one unless they 
decide to abandon lecturing and arguing and turn their own flesh into an 
argument. This is precisely the limit-situation on which I focus in my lat-
est book, Dying for Ideas: The Dangerous Lives of the Philosophers.
Socrates was among the first to learn, from personal experience, what 
the situation entails. His failure to make his fellow Athenians see the 
worth of his philosophical project, as evidenced especially by his trial and 
death sentence, must have persuaded him not only that there is a limit as 
to what language can do for philosophy, but also that the philosopher, if 
he is not to betray his vocation and himself, needs to take philosophiz-
ing beyond that limit. There is a point, Socrates must have realized as 
he listened to the death sentence the Athenian jury pronounced against 
him, where philosophy, if it is not to lose face, has to use something stron-
ger than words to do its job. And what is stronger than words, in such 
a situation, is the philosopher’s own death. By the means of his dying 
Dying for Ideas was researched while I was a Distinguished Guest Fellow at the Notre 
Dame Institute for Advanced Study. This essay draws on a research report originally 
published in the DNIAS Newsletter.
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body—and the public spectacle of his death—Socrates communicated 
to his audience beyond his mastery of the Greek language.
His intuition turned out to be right: by dying the way he did, Socrates 
accomplished something unique. He managed to solidify a meaningful 
link between his work and his biography. In the absence of a “philosophi-
cal death,” not only would Socrates’s life have lacked a defining feature, 
but his work, too, would have been incomplete. Indeed, without a body 
of written text, it is hard to imagine how his name would have survived in 
a discipline that, from inception, has been defined by writing.
The message Socrates was sending as he was drinking the hemlock is 
rather simple, but tremendously powerful: you need to embody your phi-
losophy. Primarily, philosophy is not an academic exercise but a matter 
of practice; it is not something you talk about but something you do. To 
philosophize is to cause a change in yourself, to act upon yourself as if 
you were some lump of raw material in need of a firm shape. Philosophy 
is not sheer production of knowledge; its function is not to inform but 
to form us. Its ultimate object is a project of self-realization, the philoso-
pher’s self-fashioning. The place where philosophy dwells, then, is not the 
academic text, nor the philosopher’s speech, but the philosopher’s body. 
Philosophy lives with us. Yet, it hardly dies with us.
Indeed, philosophy thrives when the philosopher chooses to die, as 
a matter of consistence, with his beliefs. Socrates’s death was only the 
beginning of a tremendously influential posterity, which, in the absence 
of any written work, is nothing short of miraculous. Hypatia, too, has 
been a very influential figure, even though nothing has come down to us 
from her. Giordano Bruno is rarely read today but is thought to be one 
of the greatest Italian philosophers of all time. What makes these figures 
“great,” I argue in Dying for Ideas, is the manner of their death. Not only 
does this particular type of death not annihilate its victims, but it makes 
them stronger.
These philosophers’ ways of life, their being perceived as “out of 
place” in society, the dramatic build-up that leads to their singling out, 
the distinct sense of “crisis” that pervades the communities in the midst 
of which they emerge, then their violent ending—all of these call for a 
Girardian reading of the event of their death. From René Girard’s perspec-
tive, they all bear “victimary signs.” Committed as they are to “straight 
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talking” (parrēsía), to leaving nothing unquestioned, these philosophers 
are usually incapable of establishing strong ties with others. They remain 
perpetual outsiders to their own communities; they don’t allow them-
selves to recognize and cultivate those strong bonds of complicity that 
keep society together. It is telling that these philosophers’ remarks often 
come across as “acidic”; no bonds can stand the corroding effect of their 
parrēsía. And in times of crises they become easy targets because their 
philosophy has made them fundamentally vulnerable.
Girard’s theory of the “scapegoat mechanism” explains not only why 
martyr-philosophers are killed, but also why they become so influen-
tial after their death: by dying the kind of death they die they are made 
“sacred.” They become “founding figures” because their annihilation was 
caused by what Girard calls a “founding murder.” Due to the powerful 
mix of guilt and shame that remains in the collective memory, the tradi-
tion processes these philosophers’ deaths along the lines of myth-mak-
ing. We end up elevating them to a mythical status and make them part of 
our mythic imagination.
This may explain why we tend to misinterpret what these philoso-
phers did or said or who they were while they were alive. We regard 
Socrates as the “founder” of Western philosophy. This is not entirely 
true, as there were other philosophers before him. Tellingly, we call them 
“pre-Socratics.” Hypatia is often seen as having founded the tradition of 
women in philosophy, even though there certainly were women philos-
ophers before her. She is also associated with the foundation of philo-
sophical feminism (at least two feminist journals bear her name), even 
though, since her work has not survived, it is difficult to tell exactly what 
was feminist about it. The death of these philosophers simply “blinds” us. 
Our reception of them is not strictly rational; it’s tinted by mythology.
The case of martyr-philosophers points to an important fact: the 
formation of intellectual and philosophical traditions is not governed 
by strictly rational patterns but sometimes by forms of mythic thinking 
and imagination. Typically, we tend to think that myth and reason are 
opposites and that one subverts the other. This may be a simplistic pic-
ture, though. Sometimes myth complements reason: myth-making and 
mythic imagination can bring to philosophy a level of depth and sophisti-
cation that reason alone cannot secure.
05.18.2015
Asceticism Reimagined
Daniel Kunitz
I don’t need to tell anyone reading this how technology, ease of move-
ment, and relative wealth have opened up myriad ways for us to spend 
or waste our time; or how readily we can feel ourselves adrift in oceanic 
abundance, buffeted by the possibilities swelling about us while goaded 
by commercial entities to indulge our every desire and whim. Less 
noticed, however, is the fact that, in the face of hyper-abundance, many of 
us are adopting programs of self-discipline that have evolved along with 
new conceptions of fitness and wellness.
Consider L., the founder and CEO of a successful start-up. With long 
work days and stacked responsibilities, she has nevertheless ordered her 
life around a set of strictures meant to boost her physical performance 
and overall well-being. She manages to work out six days a week, some-
times twice a day, which means that L. has given up the hours often 
reserved for carousing or binge-watching television. Beyond this, she 
also restricts the foods she allows herself to eat, so as to maximize her 
energy levels and recovery, both of which are also boosted by her precise 
sleep schedule. L. has even set aside specific days to rest physically and 
mentally—a self-imposed secular Sabbath, if you will. Although L. is at 
the avant-garde of today’s austerity practices, her example suggests the 
dizzying variety of types of self-denial that people get up to. Some leave 
off tracking their Instagram or Facebook feed while tanning at the park in 
favor of working through yoga postures, which has in turn driven them to 
abstain from processed foods and added sugars. Others carve away their 
morning television in order to meditate, and maybe in addition to that 
practice they’ve given up meat for vegetarianism. Some might be training 
for an obstacle race at the same hour that they used to devote to post-
work drinks, and they too sleep and eat in a manner that is calibrated for 
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athletic performance. There is a growing movement of people who regu-
larly fast, for other than religious reasons.
These are not the sackcloth-wearing, world-renouncing hermits 
we tend to associate with asceticism; they are people we know and live 
among. It seems to me they are fulfilling a wish, voiced over a century 
ago by Friedrich Nietzsche, when he wrote that he wanted to make 
asceticism “natural again.” Nietzsche believed religious—more specifi-
cally, Christian—asceticism, the mortification of the flesh with whips 
and gruel, is unnatural because it aims at abnegation of the self and, 
ultimately, the world. He looked instead to an older, Classical and pre-
Christian, model.
The word ascetic derives from the ancient Greek askesis, which means 
exercise or training. For the Greeks, the foundational model of askesis 
was inculcated in the gymnasion (from which we derive the word gym-
nasium), such as Plato’s Academy, where the training was athletic, intel-
lectual, and ethical. Throughout the Classical era, a number of forms of 
ascetic training developed. Perhaps the best-known of these technologies 
of the self, to borrow Michel Foucault’s term, is Stoic philosophy, which 
has enjoyed a not-so-quiet revival in recent years. (Articles on those 
adopting it have appeared in numerous outlets, from Forbes to The New 
York Times). Classical askesis was oriented toward self-mastery, to live in 
the world better. At the end of the Classical era, the first Christian monks 
took this notion of askesis—alluding to the centrality of physical exer-
cises by calling themselves “athletes for Christ”—and morphed it into an 
asceticism that sought to free the soul from the body. Self-mastery gave 
way to self-abnegation, physical training to a denigration of the physi-
cal, worldliness to otherworldliness. This is the form of asceticism that 
we in the West have been familiar with for nearly two millennia. (Eastern 
forms differ by not separating mind and body, but not so much that they 
don’t still seek spiritual purity through self-abnegation and disciplining 
the mind-body.)
To make asceticism natural again means embracing the world and the 
body; it means renouncing certain luxuries and indulgences in an affir-
mative mode—not because particular foods or ways of spending time 
are inherently evil but because we prefer, on ethical grounds, other foods 
and activities. “I abhor all those moralities which say: ‘Do not do this! 
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Renounce!…’ writes Nietzsche. “But I am well disposed toward those 
moralities which goad me to do something and do it again, from morn-
ing till evening, and then to dream of it at night… When one lives like 
that, one thing after another that simply does not belong to such a life 
drops off… What we do should determine what we forego; by doing we 
forego.” When, at a restaurant, my sister teasingly accuses me of having 
orthorexia for waving away the bread basket, she is not identifying in me 
some moral denunciation of wheat; she’s inadvertently registering my 
joyful anticipation of waking up the next morning feeling energized, my 
body recovered from the previous day’s exertions. Eschewing bread is a 
happy choice: if I want to load up on—relatively—empty carbs, I’ll eat a 
pint of ice cream.
However, embracing the world and its sweets also entails an implicit 
rejection of the old, Western division of mind and body. When we prac-
tice such disciplines as yoga and meditation in their contemporary forms, 
we are, like Walt Whitman, asking: “if the body were not the soul, what 
is the soul?”
But if the point is no longer spiritual purification, what is the appeal 
of such regimes? The Stoics, I think, gave the answer most pertinent to 
our lives today. “We ought not to make our exercises consist in means 
contrary to nature,” says Epictetus. Rather the goal of our self-mastering 
exercises is: “Neither to be disappointed in that which you desire, nor to 
fall into anything which you would avoid.” If ascetics today subject their 
minds and bodies to rigorous discipline, it is because these exercises pro-
vide both the means and the model for training our faculty of choice—
for helping us to know ourselves well enough to know what to desire and, 
most critically, how to spend our ever shrinking time. Having a set of 
practices that aid us in filtering out the noise of marketing, in navigating 
the maze of goods placed before us, and in saying yes or no to various 
leisure activities is like having a sharp knife that we can use to whittle our 
lives into an artfully deliberate shape.
10.24.2016
Part II 
Reflections
A. The End of Civilization
What Are We Talking About When 
We Talk About Zombies?
William Egginton
Legions of cultural critics are focusing the beam of Marxist-inflected 
critical theory on the mass-cultural phenomenon of zombies. And what 
a phenomenon they have become! Zombies—the rambling, post-apoc-
alyptic, multitudinous variety, as opposed to the voodoo-induced lon-
ers of Caribbean lore—have spread like a virulent contagion since their 
introduction in George Romero’s 1963 Night of the Living Dead, itself an 
adaptation of the novel from a decade earlier I Am Legend. Indeed, my 
own quick survey on the Google Ngram viewer shows a steep incline in 
English-language mentions starting in the year that seminal slasher was 
released, amounting to a more than one thousand percent increase in the 
appearance of zombies in print by 2008, the last year surveyed.
In light of this explosion in zombie cultural production, but also in 
critical examinations of those cultural artefacts, it behooves us both to 
ask what zombies mean in late capitalist society and what it can possibly 
mean for zombies to mean something.
Such interpretations entail the critical use of zombies in particular or 
monsters in general as a metaphor for representing some aspect, usually 
socio-political, of society, such as when Henry Giroux writes that “the 
metaphor [of the zombie] is particularly apt for drawing attention to the 
ways in which political culture and power in American society now work 
in the interests of bare survival, if not disposability, for the vast major-
ity of people.”
This piece is excerpted from the afterword to the volume Zombie Talk: Culture, 
History, Politics. Eds. David R. Castillo, David Schmid, David A. Reilly, and 
John Edgar Browning, London: Palgrave, 2016. All quotes in the article are 
from this book.
122 William Egginton
For David Schmid, writing in a forthcoming volume on zombies, 
while monsters in general and zombies in particular can be read meta-
phorically as reminders of the monstrous aspects of neoliberalism, the 
concomitant risk such readings carry with them is that the very same 
monsters, in the “excessive visibility” of the “subjective violence” that 
they commit and that is committed against them, can blind us to the very 
real “objective violence” of a neoliberal political economy whose devasta-
tion continues unabated.
Yet, while zombies commit subjective violence in excessively visible 
ways on our screens, critically informed attention to their role on those 
screens and the appeal they generate need not be distracted by that vis-
ibility from the hidden but almost universal violence that is, using T. S. 
Eliot’s term, their objective correlative. In other words, a reading attuned 
to such objective violence can give us clues as to how the undeniable 
appeal of zombies responds to an implicit knowledge on the part of the 
consumers of that hidden violence, and how the cloistered, suburban 
lives of late capitalist consumers rest uneasily over the shallow grave of 
abject multitudes. This is why the consumer class of the culture indus-
try, on the one hand, seeks to erase the suffering legions produced by an 
economy of extraction, while, on the other, greedily devouring their ava-
tars in fictional form.
In fact, it is exactly because zombies stand in such conflicted relation 
to the socio-historical reality they emerge from that they exert such a fas-
cination on their consumers. As David Castillo puts it, “zombie masses 
are us in more ways than one: they are our dark mirror image, our sweat 
shops, our garbage, our landfills, our pollution, the face of globalization, 
an infinitely reproducible and exportable product of the mass-culture 
industry, and also, paradoxically, a built-in site of contestation against this 
same phenomenon.”
This paradox is what lies at the heart of the cultural symptom, and 
what gives it its force. It represents the socio-historical reality at the 
same time as it articulates an unconscious knowledge and a concomitant 
desire. In this case that knowledge is that we are the agents of our own 
demise; like the slave Jacques Lacan spoke of bearing the order for his 
own execution tattooed to his scalp, our destruction is ensured by the 
very fulfillment of our functioning as autonomous consumers in a late 
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capitalist economy. Zombies literalize that image in their relentless and 
cannibalistic drive to consume the human survivors; at the same time, 
as Dave Reilly has argued, the cells of human survivors evince the desire 
imbricated with that knowledge, a desire for freedom and self-determi-
nation from the economic forces that situate us as the agents of our own 
destruction. For as producers proudly turn to new technologies (includ-
ing and even especially information technologies) to obviate the need for 
employees, those of us still employed happily purchase their products, 
thereby contributing to the very economy that, according to Martin 
Ford’s analysis in Rise of the Robots: Technology and the Threat of a Jobless 
Future, will inevitably drive us to obsolescence as well.
In some ways, then, the ultimate zombie movie of the twenty-first 
century was a pre-millennial release that technically had no zombies in 
it. Nevertheless, the fantasy scenario painted by the 1999 film The Matrix 
firmly encapsulates the paradoxes and appeal of our fascination with the 
undead. For can it not be said that we, the citizens of the early twenty-
first-century industrialized world, are like so many coppertop batteries, 
our brains plugged into a virtual world in which we live, play, and dream, 
while our bodies, that is, our economic livelihood, are kept on life-sup-
port to be drained dry in the service of that economy? Everything is con-
structed so that we avert our gaze from this reality. We become zombie 
consumers of media—zombies because we are animate without anima; 
we believe we are alive, real, autonomous, but in reality we are already 
dead, plugged into the relentless machine of capital hell-bent on our 
destruction.
07.06.2015
Gun Control or the End of Civilization
Jay M. Bernstein
Just the numbers are terrible. More Americans have been killed by a gun 
since 1970 than in all the wars America has fought since the American 
Revolution: roughly 1.5 million versus 1.4 million. On average 32,000 
individuals are killed by gun each year, and in 2015 there was on average 
one mass shooting (a shooting involving four or more persons) a day.
The National Rifle Association’s (NRA) relentless rejection of every 
gun control measure, including the proposal—supported by the vast 
majority of NRA members—of requiring background checks prior to the 
purchase of a gun, concerns more than the good of public safety versus 
the profits of the gun industry. At stake is whether America is about to 
break the great civilizational contract with its basic tenet that, in place of 
each individual judging and executing the law himself, we agree to hand 
over to the state a monopoly over the use of force. Whatever the failures 
of the modern state, and they abound, and whatever the excruciating fail-
ures of the American criminal justice system, the idea of the state pos-
sessing a monopoly over the use of force represents both the modern 
state’s moral core and its enduring civilizational achievement.
The notion of a state monopoly over the use of force had its initial 
outing in John Locke’s arguments for the state’s right to punish. For 
Locke, the major inconvenience of the state of nature was that each man 
was entitled to be judge, jury, and executioner in his own case. Hence, 
leaving the state of nature entailed handing over the right of punishment 
to a central government. One might argue that the state’s right to punish 
is weaker than the thesis that the state should have a monopoly over the 
use force. But what legitimate use of force might remain after the right to 
punish has been centralized?
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It is, oddly and surprisingly, in Hans Kelsen’s positivist legal philoso-
phy that we catch the fiercest defense of the state having a monopoly over 
the use of force. In his 1944 Peace Through Law, Kelsen states that it is “an 
essential characteristic of the law as a coercive order to establish a com-
munity monopoly of force” since without such a monopoly individuals 
would be entitled to use force based solely on their private judgment. He 
then goes on to state that the “modern state is the most perfect type of 
a social order establishing a community monopoly of force. Its perfec-
tion is due to the centralization of the employment of force… Within the 
state, pacification of inter-individual relations—that is, national peace—
is attained in the highest degree.” He completes this elaboration thus: 
“Except under certain extraordinary circumstances, such as revolution 
or civil war, the employment of force is eliminated from the relations 
between citizens and reserved for central agencies…that are authorized 
to use force as sanctions against illegal acts.”
Kelsen is aware that peace through law is both less than justice and 
not quite ideal: the long history of slavery, marital rape, domestic abuse, 
police interrogation methods, and brutal prison regimes all represent 
areas of tolerated violence against the person. Nonetheless, it is his claim 
that the very idea of a legal-state, a state under law, the absolute minimum 
conception of a modern state involves a monopoly over the legitimate use 
of force. Force, he argues, is either a delict, a wrong, or a sanction for a 
wrong; the idea of force being either delict or sanction must be exhaus-
tive if the threat of force is going to be removed for ordinary social inter-
actions. To give up on that idea is to give up on the notion of a legal 
order altogether, to relinquish the hope that we might secure mutual 
trust among the vast majority of law-abiding citizens by having reason-
able confidence that there is a system of protection against criminal activ-
ity and that when such activity occurs those responsible will be appre-
hended and punished, with each act of punishment involving a mix of 
retribution, deterrence, and collective expression.
Yet, tacitly in the NRA’s opposition to all proposals for gun control, 
tacitly in the suggestion that it is the right of every citizen to keep and 
bear arms, and explicitly in the statements of Republican candidates 
for presidency that the best solution to gun violence is for all citizens 
to be armed, this minimum conception of the modern state has come 
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under direct threat. I am unsure when, precisely, our national conversa-
tion about gun control shifted from a debate about the meaning of the 
Second Amendment to, in effect, a debate about whether or not we are 
committed to the civilizational contract prohibiting punitive self-help. 
But my sense is that the conversation has now shifted, that, through small 
concessions and failures of collective action, it has become about some-
thing more like the shape and limits of a self-policing society than one 
about the right of gun ownership in a society where there remains a state 
monopoly on the use of force.
Of course, there is more than a hint of anxiety about state monopoly 
over the use of force in the Second Amendment. But even the most vocif-
erous defense of that amendment understood it not as a challenge to the 
state monopoly over the use of force, but as a component of the right to 
self-defense. That wedge, the needs of self-defense, has become a wreck-
ing ball, and we should have seen it coming. If the NRA were serious 
about self-defense but not about abandoning the civilization contract, 
then there would be no reason for them to resist background checks, 
making combat weapons and high caliber arms illegal, or, clearly the most 
promising proposal around, the development of guns that require PIN 
numbers or fingerprint activation devices. That all these propositions are 
repudiated as a threat to gun ownership should alert us to what the stakes 
of the conversation now are.
I hope it is obvious that peace is a great civil good, and that a form 
of life in which peace is central to its self-conception involves the deep-
est respect for the freedom and bodily integrity of each and every citi-
zen. Whatever other goods are necessary for a worthwhile life and what-
ever other rights we require as citizens, we minimally require, in Kelsen’s 
words, “mutual conduct” in which all “refrain from forcibly depriving 
one another of life, health, freedom, or property.” Such is the condition 
of peace made possible by a state monopoly over force: “Law and force 
must not be understood as absolutely at variance with each other. Law 
is an organization of force.” To be committed to law in this sense is to be 
committed to a form of life. It is just this form of life that is under imma-
nent threat in America today.
03.07.2016
Is Ours a Post-Utopia World?
Patrícia Vieira
It is five hundred years since Thomas More published his book Utopia in 
Leuven, Belgium, under the patronage of his fellow humanist Erasmus. 
The text is a fictional account of an island nation more perfect than the 
conflict-ridden European countries of the time, rife with inequality 
and corruption. Utopian society practiced communal ownership and 
religious tolerance, came close to gender parity and strove to provide 
for the well-being of all its citizens. A word coined by More based upon 
Greek, the term utopia—meaning “no place” (ou-topos) or, in an alter-
native interpretation, “good place” (eu-topos)—came to signify an ide-
alized perfect community that does not exist in the present and whose 
coming into being is often projected into the future.
After enjoying great success and spawning a veritable avalanche of 
proposals for perfect societies in the centuries that followed, utopia has, 
of late, acquired something of a bad rap. Perhaps this had to do with the 
understanding of communism as the ultimate utopia. The creation of a 
classless society where all workers shared in the decision-making pro-
cess about and in the profits of their labor, therefore being able substan-
tially to reduce the amount of time spent in useless toil, seemed to be the 
culmination of centuries of utopian thought. But the results of actually 
existing communism disheartened many supports of utopianism. From 
Stalin’s purges to the massacres perpetrated by the Cambodian Khmer 
Rouge, historical communism fell short of its theoretical ideal.
Five hundred years after the creation of utopia, is it time to finally 
ditch the concept and get real?  Many thinkers believe so. In his omi-
nously titled volume  Black Mass. Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of 
Utopia  British philosopher John Gray, for instance, argues that utopias 
work as normative models used to justify violent acts perpetrated by 
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religious or political groups and concludes that they necessarily lead to 
totalitarian political regimes. French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy also 
distances himself from utopian thought in an interview published in my 
co-edited book Existential Utopia. For Nancy, utopia is, at best, a beauti-
ful albeit unreachable fantasy and, at worst, a distraction from our efforts 
to address real problems.
In literature, as in philosophy and political thought, utopia seems 
to have been replaced by much bleaker views on society. While the 
focus used to be on imagining a better community in a different place, 
at a future time, or both, the twentieth century witnessed the rise 
of dystopian narratives. From George Orwell’s  1984  (1949) to the 
popular  Hunger Games  trilogy (2008-10) by Suzanne Collins, from 
catastrophic climate change scenarios like the one described in J. G. 
Ballard’s  The Drought  (1965) to gender-relations nightmares such as 
Margaret Atwood’s  The Handmade’s Tale  (1985), dystopias are here to 
stay. To be sure, dystopian thought shares utopia’s goal of criticizing pres-
ent society. But while utopias show how the world can be improved by 
comparing it to a better one, dystopias draw attention to the ills of our 
time by exacerbating them, imagining what would happen if our worst 
fears came true.
It is worth pondering the reasons for our move into a post-utopian 
world. Utopia feeds upon what German thinker Ernst Bloch called the 
“principle of hope,” the idea that the current situation can improve thanks 
to human ingenuity. It is not by chance that the concept was born at the 
dawn of modernity. Utopian thought is tied to a linear understanding of 
time and to a belief in human-led progress towards an increasingly per-
fect polity, ideas that started to coalesce during the Renaissance. Unlike 
utopia, dystopia has abandoned the “principle of hope.” Remaining at 
the deconstructive, destructive level, it pointedly criticizes the problems 
of our time without offering alternative options or possible solutions. It 
is a fitting corollary, in the sphere of the imagination and of speculative 
thought, to a society on the verge of ecological disaster. If utopia signaled 
the belief in new beginnings, dystopia belongs in a world that sees itself 
as being not only at the end of history but at the end of all existence.
What are the political implications of abandoning the “principle 
of hope” and of embracing dystopia as our  official creed? Current 
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technocratic democracies are one possible instantiation of a politics of 
hopelessness. Economic imperatives determine political choices made 
by a managerial class of legislators. Instead of real decisions about the 
common good, a concept that, in and of itself, should be open to debate, 
politics is reduced to the administration of the status quo. We are told 
that our lives cannot be otherwise and political action is turned into a 
mere reaction to events—the 2008 economic crisis, climate change, and 
so on. The current “business as usual” model of politics prevalent in the 
European Union is an example of hopelessness turned into technoc-
racy, as was the political platform of Hillary Clinton in the US elections. 
Promising nothing but a continuation of the same, a glaring unwilling-
ness or inability to tackle current problems, both the European Union 
and Clinton were jolted out of complacency by the Brexit vote in the UK 
and by the victory of Donald Trump in the US.
The correlation between the Brexit and Trump phenomena has been 
pointed out by a variety of commentators. They represent an alterna-
tive instantiation of the politics of hopelessness that I would define as 
authoritarian reactionarism. Though arising from the same wellspring as 
technocracy, authoritarian reactionarism does not defend the status quo 
but advocates instead for its overhaul. Still, its seemingly radical political 
action—the UK leaving the EU; the US building a wall on its Southern 
border and preventing Muslims from entering the country, etc.—does 
not spell out real political change. Corporate interests will remain intact 
after Brexit, and the billionaire Donald Trump is clearly not interested in 
lifting destitute Americans out of poverty. Political action is in this case 
also a reaction, albeit not so much to current events, as in technocracy, 
but to hopelessness itself.
The rise of authoritarian figures within other democratic regimes 
around the world—Recep Erdoğan in Turkey, Rodrigo Duterte in the 
Philippines—is a political expression of the electorate’s hopelessness 
that leads it to turn to extreme figures and ideology when all else has 
failed. The enduring popularity of Vladimir Putin in his native Russia 
is,  mutatis mutandis, another expression of a hopeless political climate. 
As Russians so often acknowledge, Putin is bad but the alternative could 
be much worse.
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Straightjacketed between technocracy and authoritarian reactionar-
ism, between hopeless, reactive stasis and hopeless, reactionary change, 
we would do well to go back to More and his five hundred-year-old utopia. 
The communitarian society he described might bring back some hope to 
a world in dire need of the belief that a better future is still possible.
28.11.2016
The Politics of Hope and Fear
Hasana Sharp 
Emotions are contagious. Because everyone feels this, everyone knows 
this. When philosophers refer to humans as social animals, part of what 
they mean is that there is an irrepressible mimetic aspect to our psychic 
and physical existence (of course, as Aristotle observed, this is true of 
many animals). We cannot but imitate others, transmit feelings to others 
and undergo their feelings. This is how we learn, love, and grow. Whether 
we are affected by others, or whether we affect them escapes our control. 
This makes possible circuits of care and knowledge, as well as circuits of 
abuse and illusion.
This communicability of affect is often a cause for concern, however, 
especially in the domain of politics. We worry that people can be made to 
feel anything by a successful manipulator. Media are blamed for render-
ing “us” both increasingly afraid and increasingly inured to violence. It 
is not the case, however, that charismatic figures or the “media” simply 
implant the feelings they intend into masses of people. Artists, teachers, 
orators, commanders, and politicians aspire to move masses in certain 
ways, but the masses—that is, we—are only sometimes and unpredict-
ably responsive. Of course, seats of power and widely circulating repre-
sentations matter, but the general public is not the passive effect of them. 
Who and what gets uptake depends upon the incalculably diverse pas-
sions and actions of a vast multitude.
The current election prompts acute attention to the emotional 
medium of politics. Candidate Donald Trump stokes the fears of audi-
ence, such that  fear and xenophobia are now synonymous with official 
Republican party platform. In contrast,  Hillary Clinton heralds a mes-
sage of hope, elaborating Barack Obama’s branding of himself and the 
Democratic party as forces of steady progress and optimism. We are told 
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that the political “choice” is between fear and hope. But feeling is not 
something we select at a ballot box. Emotions are not objects in circula-
tion that we might pick up or put down. And, as Benedict de Spinoza 
(1632-1677) once remarked, “there is neither hope without fear, nor fear 
without hope.”
The political polarity of hope and fear is traditional. Spinoza is among 
the many political thinkers of the Renaissance and early modern period 
to reflect upon political emotions and government, as well as upon the 
government of political emotions. Like Hobbes and Machiavelli, he picks 
out fear as an especially salient collective feeling to which those in gov-
ernment must be acutely sensitive. Those engaged in the arts of govern-
ment—ideological as well as repressive—must be aware of how they 
galvanize fears, such as the fear of punishment. A state depends for its 
existence upon fear of its “sword.” States by necessity strive to move their 
own subjects toward obedience and other peoples toward alliance or sub-
mission. No party or candidate can govern without operationalizing fear.
Yet the fears at play in the government are not only those of its 
subjects. Governments exist only as long as subjects are, as Spinoza 
says, “attached” to them, admiring their constitution, laws, and lead-
ers. Governors must fear the dissolution of popular support. The vari-
ous institutions of government stoke and mobilize fears, but also feel 
and respond to their own fears. Thus, as we watch the election unfold, 
which is, in essence, a series of calls for popular support, we ought to be 
reminded not just of the power of aspirant leaders to shape our future, 
but of how our hopes and fears can be a source of leverage against gov-
ernment. So when increasingly many subjects fear law enforcement 
agents as executors of arbitrary violence, detention, and deprivation, the 
admiration for the law upon which the state depends is threatened. This 
fear can be a source of power. It should not simply be replaced with the 
hope, however audacious, that moderates will rise to power and restrain 
the repressive state apparatus. We should not assuage the government’s 
fears nor should we relax our fear of government agents.
This is not a call for fear. Nor is it in any way a defense of “the party 
of fear”—indeed, there is no one party of fear. It is an observation—or 
rather, a Spinoza-guided conviction—that political life is structured nec-
essarily by a complex dynamic of affective communication, in which fear 
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and hope play key roles. Let us discuss the dynamic of affective commu-
nication, while recognizing that we cannot hope to be freed from fear 
from above. So, at least as much as we talk about how our aspirant lead-
ers make us feel, we should be talking about how we want to make them 
feel. The question is not about choosing between hope or fear. And it is 
not only about what we ought to hope for or what we ought to fear. Let’s 
ask, while they’re paying attention and every day afterward, what kinds of 
hopes and fears we want to inspire in our governors.
29.08.2016
Algorithms of Taste
Daniel Innerarity
The cultural section of newspapers is one of the traditional bastions of 
criticism. It is here that books, music and theater plays are reviewed and 
judged. We are all aware that the Internet has changed the nature of news-
papers, and that the advent of the “digital realm” has had a major impact 
on the function of criticism as a cultural practice. For some time now, 
criticism has ceased to be something carried out by professional critics, 
and the plethora of forums, blogs, and other platforms all contribute to 
generating a dense murmur of ongoing assessment.
Whereas before we turned to Bloom, Pivot, or Reich-Ranicki for 
literary reviews, to Parker for an expert opinion on wine, the Michelin 
Guide for sage advice about fine dining, and official dictionaries for 
general information about our language and spelling, we now check 
what Tripadvisor has to say, read the recommendations of Spotfire and 
Amazon, and use automatic spell checkers in all our writing tasks. In the 
open, amorphous space of the web and social media, with a simple click 
of the “like button”, people pass vague, non-specific judgments backed up 
by no explanations or qualifiers.
On the Internet, nothing is safe from a rejoinder. Any news report 
or expert opinion is open to comments and criticism from anyone. Our 
tastes are no longer defined in the vertical space of authority, but in 
the midst of a Babel of voices in which the view of an expert is just one 
amongst many, supported or opposed by the opinions of other experts, 
connoisseurs, enthusiasts, and even simple users. In this transformed con-
text, the function of a “critic” as someone responsible for defining good 
taste, laying down canons, and deciding what is (and what is not) cultur-
ally valuable seems, at best, unnecessary, if not downright ridiculous.
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Thus, the hierarchy of the media begins to wobble, and the high 
priests (the critics) are in danger of falling from their pedestals. Expert 
knowledge is no longer something static that can only be found in one 
specific place, but rather something fluid, flowing through a wide range 
of diverse channels.
All this has given rise to a heated debate between two diametrically 
opposed groups: those who applaud the new online era, characterized by 
the democratization of criticism and taste; and those who lament the loss 
of individual sovereignty.
For the first group, democratization is the logical consequence of the 
fact that, thanks to the Internet, the general public has now recovered 
something that had been taken away from it and announced in the cul-
tural sections of newspapers as a kind of Official Gazette, laying down 
the laws of culture. We are no longer living in the golden age of criticism, 
when supreme authorities were the only bridge over the abyss that sepa-
rated high culture from the masses. Nowadays, anyone can pass judgment 
in matters of taste. Critics abounding on the web, as well as the possibil-
ity of being able to post a comment on a news article, have opened up an 
arena for debate and protest that, despite being oftentimes banal, have 
the effect of undermining the authority of the original written word. The 
emergence of the figure of an unqualified commentator has introduced 
an element of horizontality into a medium that was built on the basis 
of an eminently vertical structure. The public arena has become frag-
mented, broken up into taste-based communities, and there is no longer 
any authority capable of imposing one single canon to which everyone 
must adhere.
From the other side of the fence, negative views of this new era have 
given rise to a wide variety of arguments, ranging from those that com-
plain about banality to those that herald imminent doom and complex 
conspiracy theories. In our everyday lives, our judgments and tastes are 
formed by recommendations compiled by aggregation algorithms (“cus-
tomers who bought this, also… ”). Consumers are kings, and any sugges-
tions made to them are based on an attempt to guess their preferences. 
Is there any better example of sovereignty? And yet, can good taste be 
based solely on what we already like?
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Critics of the Internet include those who denounce a logic which, 
instead of broadening our horizons, simply confirms our prejudices, as 
well as those who espouse the apocalyptic visions of having discovered 
a sinister conspiracy that lurks behind this apparently amiable wooing of 
online customers. To my mind, what people who make both these argu-
ments fail to understand, is that the whole process is at the same time 
dialectical and ambivalent, as it opens the doors to future developments 
that may ensure greater freedom and more information.
They also seem to have forgotten the existence of filters, without 
which we could not possibly survive in an environment that is so densely 
saturated with information. We cannot hope to defend our online inde-
pendence unless we strive to understand the nature of these filters and 
learn to manage them. And what’s more, these filters can always be 
improved: they can be rendered more neutral or better able to specify 
our chosen selection criteria.
Can we conclude, then, that algorithm-based advice to users has 
rendered criticism in the traditional sense unnecessary? Surely not. For 
a start, because the proliferation of these procedures does not spell out 
the death of criticism. Quite the opposite, in fact: The critics have mul-
tiplied. There is now more criticism, not less, with all that this increase 
entails. The Internet has triggered a huge rise in criticism: People write 
hitherto unimaginable reams of reviews on all manner of things, cover-
ing an immense range of tastes and qualities in accordance with differ-
ent niches. In this quagmire of opinions, the media has indeed lost its old 
monopolistic position, or, in other words, its power to regulate access to 
the public discourse and set the terms, conditions, and main players of 
cultural debate.
The general public has taken a firm hold of the reins of its own sphere 
of attention. However, this context also offers criticism the chance to 
return to what it once was: a set of judgments issued by experts who do 
not limit themselves to merely recording or reproducing dominant tastes, 
but who rather take us out of our comfort zone with new, unexpected 
proposals. Experts who do not focus on any one particular reader or cus-
tomer, but, instead, strive to say something with a universal value. In this 
way, critics could free themselves of the shackles of having to tell users 
what, at heart, they already know.
03.16.2015
B. Rights and Wrongs
Why Human Rights Are So Often Unenforced?
Michael Gillespie 
Imagine you are walking through the woods with a hunting rifle and 
come upon a clearing where two terrorists with large swords are about to 
cut the heads off ten hostages. You realize your only chance to save them 
is to kill the two terrorists—what would you do?
Now imagine a similar scenario in which a birdwatcher with a camera 
runs up to you and says “Two hundred meters ahead of you, there are 
two terrorists with swords about to kill ten hostages, you need to save 
them.” What would you do then? In the first instance, almost everyone 
recognizes that they have a moral duty to save the innocent and can be 
convinced that they should kill the terrorists.
Most don’t want to do it, but they recognize that morally they have to 
do so. Once they admit their moral responsibility in the first case, they 
almost invariably accept their responsibility in the second case, even with 
the added two hundred meter walk. But once they do, it is difficult for 
them to deny their responsibility in a third and much more realistic case: 
“Right now somewhere in the world there are ten hostages about to be 
murdered by terrorists and you are obligated to save or at least try to save 
them.” At this point almost everyone becomes very reluctant to agree. 
They recognize their moral responsibility and yet don’t like the conclu-
sion that they have been led to. They feel that it is wrong but at the same 
time they have a great deal of trouble explaining why they are unwilling 
to do what their own moral sensibilities tell them they should do.
Why do they hesitate? It can’t just be the greater distance, since that 
would suggest that there is some measurable space within which we have 
moral responsibility. It also can’t be that we can’t save everyone in such 
situations, because that doesn’t prevent us from saving some of them. 
Moreover, acting collectively through our governments and NGOs we 
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can almost certainly save many. It also can’t be because we might be mak-
ing a mistake or might make things worse, since error is possible in every 
situation. In the original scenario, for example, the “terrorists” and “vic-
tims” might simply have been filming a movie. In that case you may have 
tragically killed two innocents but neither the law nor your own con-
science would tell you you had acted wrongly or immorally.
It also can’t be because the sovereign state in which this scenario takes 
place doesn’t want you there, since the “terrorists” may in fact be agents 
of that state itself. There is no moral difference between a terrorist state 
and individual terrorists. It also can’t be that it costs too much, since it 
is hard to imagine anyone seriously arguing that their big screen TV is 
worth more than a human life. What then is going on?
The liberal democratic order of the Western world is rooted in a 
notion of rights. These rights have corresponding duties, but these duties 
in the first instance are merely negative—I have a duty not to violate your 
rights and we enter into an agreement (explicit or implicit) to set up and 
enforce a system of rules to protect these rights. The group that is formed 
may be small or large but that agreement imposes a moral burden upon 
me to defend others’ rights. But not the rights of all others, only those 
within my group.
But what of the rights of those outside my group? What of the human 
rights of those in the rest of the world? I am certainly obligated not to 
violate their rights, but do I have an obligation to defend them from those 
who violate them? Here is where our moral reasoning begins to stumble 
and where we see the first glimmerings of the fundamental differences 
between the moral and the political. Christianity asserted that it was a 
sacred duty to love, protect, and care for one’s neighbor and this doctrine 
remains strong in the modern secular West.
Who are our neighbors? And how far does our neighborhood extend? 
Certainly to our immediate family, and most likely to our extended fam-
ily and friends. We at least feel some kinship in these situations. Perhaps 
to a somewhat lesser extent to our fellow believers or to other members 
of our ethnic group, although here many would raise questions. In large 
states, legally but almost certainly not affectively, to all of our fellow cit-
izens. But what about foreigners, resident aliens, or strangers? In these 
cases we are much less willing to provide positive assistance. They do 
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not feel like our neighbors and while we generally recognize their basic 
humanity and our duty not to violate their rights, we also generally are 
unwilling to come to their assistance, at least not unless it is in our inter-
est to do so.
The world, however, is shrinking. Globalization and particularly a 
globalized media make even the most distant places seem near, bringing 
the victims of violence into our living rooms on a daily (or even hourly) 
basis. They seem nearer to us in many respects than the ten victims in 
our second example. We are thus increasingly unwilling to say, “Thank 
God we do not live in such a place,” and increasingly more likely to say 
“Something must be done.” And given the globalization of our interests 
we are much more likely to do something, or to let our government do 
something. But the mixture of our motives, the conflict between our 
legitimate desire to fulfill our moral duty and the suspicion that our 
moral claims merely mask a rapacious self-interest is inevitable.
The notion of the universality of human rights is morally undeni-
able but the idea of defending such rights requires a step beyond mere 
non-interference that leaves us hopelessly entangled in questions of our 
own motivations and reemphasizes the enduring differences of morality 
and politics.
07.20.2015
On Privacing
Richard Polt
Was privacy—as an idea and a reality—only a brief interlude, available to 
a few prosperous, modern Westerners? They could afford rooms of their 
own where they might experience genuine solitude, solitude without 
the certainty that family, society, government, or God were looking over 
their shoulder. But now that we have invented an artificial God, seem-
ingly omnipresent and omniscient, such solitude is scarce. “A child born 
today,” warns Edward Snowden, “will grow up with no conception of 
privacy at all.” Coming generations will inhabit a world where (to quote 
Dave Eggers’s The Circle) “all that happens must be known.”
As I was researching the use of typewriters in the 21st century for my 
book The Typewriter Revolution, I learned that these humble devices are 
used by the Kremlin and MI6 to outwit the most sophisticated espionage 
techniques. No hacker can remotely access a typescript in a filing cabi-
net. Citizens, too, turn to typewriters when they want to communicate 
securely: although our government scans the exterior of every envelope, 
its contents remain relatively safe, and the typewritten letter you open 
from your friend has probably been read only by you and her.
Such quaint artifacts as postal letters have new significance in a time 
when free, instant, global, indelible publishing is available to us all—
when the default setting for our existence is public, so much so that the 
term “publishing” has begun to sound obsolete. What we need in a time 
of consummate publicity is privacing: deliberate steps to create pockets of 
privacy in our overexposed lives.
Privacing is more than simply ensuring that information won’t fall 
into the wrong hands. Obviously, we don’t want thieves to use our credit 
cards. We all have something to hide from someone. But by the same 
token, the self-styled forces of good can always promise to protect us 
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from those who would misuse our data. And if we don’t trust the forces of 
good—what’s wrong with us? What do we have to hide?
Even if we have nothing to be ashamed of, and even if those who store 
and analyze our data are just as secure and benevolent as they claim to 
be, we have lost something when we behave in a way that is open to such 
analysis. With the sense that our words and acts are under constant, auto-
matic surveillance, we tend, consciously or not, to polish our persona, to 
behave as we want others to see us behaving. Whether we want to be per-
ceived as harmless nobodies, as glamorous winners, or as fearless rebels, 
to be seen—and not to be—becomes our priority.
Privacing is not the protection of information, but the choice of being 
over seeming. It happens whenever we find occasions to have experiences 
that will be meaningful even if no one else ever learns of them, even if we 
tell no one about them, even if we take them with us to that place that so 
few secrets today survive long enough to reach: our grave.
Privacing can take the form of writing with a secure, nondigital tool, 
writing that need not be communicated to anyone. Privacing can consist 
in making music that is never recorded, sketching a scene and tearing up 
the sketch, or sinking into a novel that you read on that insensitive and 
oblivious old medium, paper. Privacing takes place when you explore an 
empty beach or a busy city without making any external record—noth-
ing that could be published at all—but only your memories.
In her wistful reflection on “the day of the postman,” Rebecca Solnit 
writes that our digitized lives inhabit “a shallow between two deep zones, 
a safe spot between the dangers of contact with ourselves, with others.” 
Ever exchanging images with our accumulating “friends,” we drift away 
from love and from self. Privacing not only reacquaints you with yourself 
but also opens doors to intimacy, should you choose to mail your letter 
or tell someone about your walk on the beach.
Privacing can even serve as a source of ideas that you choose to make 
public in a deliberate and thoughtful way, restoring significance to the 
word “publishing”—as when some of today’s typists “typecast” by post-
ing images of their typescripts online.
Playwright and filmmaker Patrick Wang describes the heart of privac-
ing on his typecast blog. Turning off his divisive devices —“expert divid-
ers, of our attention, our understandings, our lives”—Wang establishes 
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“digital quiet”: “But then in my mind, all things begin to flash and cry 
for attention. Enough abandoned memories to trip over, today’s pas-
sions beginning to smoke. It appears the housework of the soul has gone 
neglected. There is a chaos demanding a worthy opponent. There is feel-
ing looking for form. God, even without our devices, we were already in 
pieces. But with time and the spaciousness of solitude, we can pull our-
selves together.”
Who knows? We may even manage to keep the concept of privacy 
alive a bit longer.
12.14.2015
One Child: Do we Have a Right to More?
Sarah Conly
We need to talk about population. If you are like most people, you don’t 
want to. But the truth is that at present, given the danger of environmen-
tal disaster, we don’t have the right to have more than one child, and this 
is something that needs to be discussed. We’re not living sustainably 
with our present population of 7.3 billion, and the United Nations’ most 
recent estimate is that our numbers will reach 9.7 billion by 2050, and 
then a hard-to-imagine 11.2 billion by 2100. And this is when the global 
average for women is to have about two children. Yes, population would 
eventually stabilize, but if it becomes stable at an astronomically high 
number it will still be a disaster. This isn’t something we have a right to 
bring about.
Almost no one wants to interfere with people having children. A 
common reaction is to say it just isn’t a problem. Critics dismiss fears 
about overpopulation as “neo-Malthusian.” The idea is that since Thomas 
Malthus was wrong in 1798 when he wrote that population would soon 
outgrow food production, the current gloomy estimates about popula-
tion are also wrong.  However, we are obviously better at science than we 
were in 1798. Demographers at the U.N. aren’t a lot of mad-eyed tree-
huggers. They are scientists, whose job in life is to study fertility trends 
around the world. If they say 9.7 billion by 2050, they didn’t pull that fig-
ure out of a hat. Meanwhile, the International Panel on Climate Change, 
also a pretty reputable organization, has said that we need to cut back our 
emissions between 40 and 70% to keep global warming within 2° Celsius. 
That’s a lot. It’s going to be hard enough to do with the number of peo-
ple we have now, but almost unimaginable with 11.2 billion, or even the 
more modest 9.7 billion we’ll have by 2050—within the lifetime of many 
who are living today.
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So what should we do? This is the question I address in One Child: Do 
We Have a Right to More? (Oxford University Press, 2016.) Some have 
realized that rising population is a danger. The problem is that they have 
found themselves without a solution, because they believe that people 
have a right to have as many children as they want, and so there is nothing 
we can do. Instead of focusing on population, they concentrate on reduc-
ing consumption.
Reducing consumption is, of course, a good idea for those of us who 
can do it (which isn’t everyone. Cutting back just isn’t an option for the 
one third of the world who live in absolute poverty, and who direly need 
more stuff, not less.) All the evidence, though, is that we just won’t cut 
back. Since the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, with its relatively modest goal of 
reducing the emission of greenhouse gases by 5% relative to 1990 by 
2012, we have, as a planet, increased emissions significantly—in an age 
where we know the effects of consumption. Will we do better when we 
need to cut back at least 40%?
Having more than one child when we know that consumption won’t 
be significantly reduced is like throwing a match on a house soaked with 
gasoline. It’s not the match alone that does the damage, but if you know 
the gasoline is there, and then you throw the match, you have done some-
thing you don’t have a right to do.
At the same time, we have shown that we are willing to cut back on 
how many children we have. The fertility rate has, after all, fallen over the 
past decades, simply because many people prefer to have fewer children. 
What we need to do now is accelerate that process.
But again, won’t this violate rights?
No. The truth is that there is no reason to think we have a right to 
have more than one child. Sometimes we say we have a right to what we 
need for basic subsistence, which is why many people think that we have 
a right to food. Fair enough—but this doesn’t give us a right to more than 
one child, because of course we can live good lives with just one child. 
We do want the human race to continue, which gives us a reason to have 
children, and we have a basic interest in equal treatment, which would 
give each of us an equal right to have a child, but we certainly don’t need 
more than one child for that interest to be met.
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Other people will say that we have more general rights—rights to live 
our lives as we want. We have a right to live according to our own val-
ues, to make our own life plans. Again, fair enough. But this only goes so 
far. As Oliver Wendell Holmes said, my right to swing my fist ends at the 
other man’s nose. The right to live as you want doesn’t mean you can live 
in a way that does dire harm to others.  When the world wasn’t threat-
ened with catastrophic climate change, soil depletion, over-fishing, the 
extinction of species, and a growing shortage of fresh water, you could 
suit yourself when it came to deciding how many children to have. That’s 
not the world we’re in, though, and when circumstances change we need 
to change what we do.
Does this mean we must allow forced abortions and sterilizations? 
No. Those are assaults, and do violate rights. They are also completely 
unnecessary. All the evidence is that we can change the fertility rate with 
a combination of incentives and disincentives. We can educate. We can 
make contraception free and easy to get. We can reward having fewer 
children with tax breaks, or disincentivize having more with tax pen-
alties. These are likely to be successful measures, but one of the things 
we need to talk about is how best to discourage people from having too 
many children. To do that, though, we need to address the problem, and 
we need to start now.
02.15.2016
Social Media and the Lack of Consent
Kelly Oliver
Social media such as Facebook, Snapchat, and Tinder were invented as 
part of a culture that objectifies and denigrates girls and women. It is well 
known that the Facebook founder and Harvard graduate, now one of the 
richest men in the country, invented the social media site Facebook to 
post pictures of girls for his college buddies to rate and berate. Reportedly, 
Evan Spiegel, Stanford graduate and inventor of Snapchat, sent messages 
during his days in a fraternity referring to women as “bitches,” “sororis-
luts” to be “peed on,” and discussed getting girls drunk to have sex with 
them. And the founders of the wildly popular hook-up site Tinder were 
both involved in a sexual harassment suit involving their former Vice 
President of marketing, who claims she received harassing sexist mes-
sages calling her a “slut,” a “gold-digger,” and a “whore.”
Given the continued use of social media to target, harass, and humili-
ate young women, it is telling that these technologies were born out of 
sexist attitudes. In their inception, some of the most popular social media 
sites were designed to denigrate women. Of course, lots of social media 
sites, like other forms of traditional media, bank on pictures of attractive 
girls and women looking sexy or cute, along with pornographic images. 
Creepshot sites in particular are a telling example of a new phenomenon, 
namely, the valorization and popularization of lack of consent.
“Creepshots” are photographs of women’s bodies taken without 
their consent. Lack of consent is essential, as is outlined on websites 
that specialize in creepshots such as tumblr’s creepshooter, creepshots.
com, and metareddit’s creepshots, which insists photos must not be posed 
and should not be taken with the subject’s knowledge. Clearly, girls and 
women are seen as unsuspecting “targets,” prey to be “shot” and “cap-
tured” on film. Some creepshot videos end up on pornographic sites.
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Creepshots are explicitly valued because of the lack of consent on the 
part of the subjects. Indeed, insofar as they are unaware they are being 
photographed, subjects of creepshots cannot give consent… unless 
women moving through the world in their everyday activities wearing 
their everyday clothes (see yoga pants as a subcategory of creepshots) 
constitute consent, as if women were public property.
The same valorization of lack of consent can be seen on college cam-
puses, especially in fraternity culture where chants and signs endorsing 
sexual assault with unconscious women, and fraternity Facebook sites 
filled with pictures of unsuspecting naked or partially clothed women, 
have become commonplace. For example, in 2010 at Yale, fraternity 
brothers marched around the freshman dorms chanting, “No means yes, 
yes means anal.” In 2013, a fraternity at St. Mary’s University in Halifax 
welcome new students: “SMU boys, we like them young. Y is for your sis-
ter, O is for oh so tight, U is for underage, N is for no consent, G is for grab 
that ass,” and a fraternity was suspended from Texas Tech for flying a ban-
ner that read “No Means Yes.” That same year, another frat was suspended 
at Georgia Tech for distributing an email with the subject line “Luring 
your rapebait,” which ended, “I want to see everyone succeed at the next 
couple parties.” And, in 2014 at William and Mary, fraternity members 
sent around an email message, “never mind the extremities that surround 
it, the 99% of horrendously illogical bullshit that makes up the mod-
ern woman, consider only the 1%, the snatch.” Last year a fraternity at 
Virginia’s Old Dominion was sanctioned for posting sexist signs, includ-
ing “Drop off your freshman daughter here.” The list goes on and on.
These examples suggest an aggressive campaign on the part of some 
fraternities to insist “No” means “Yes,” and consent is not only irrelevant, 
but also undesired. In the St. Mary’s chant, lack of consent is openly val-
ued, “N is for no consent.” Actively seeking sex without consent, some-
times even admitting it is rape, is what they claim they want. Whatever 
their actual desires, these college men are saying that they want non-
consensual sex.
Fraternities around the country have been sanctioned for posting 
creepshot photographs of unconscious naked or semi-clothed women, 
some in embarrassing sexual positions. The women involved did not 
know or consent, and some of these photographs may be evidence of 
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sexual assault or nonconsensual sex, as well as illegal in their own right. 
Obviously, these fraternity boys think that pictures of naked women and 
their body parts, circulated to hundreds on Facebook, are fun and funny.
In the highly visible cases of Steubenville and Vanderbilt, along with 
the rapes, taking creepshot photographs of unconscious naked girls 
or women and distributing these were an important part of the sexual 
assaults. The boys and men smiled and clowned for the camera, joked 
and jeered for posterity, and took pleasure not only in sexually abusing 
their victims, but also in capturing it on film, and then sharing it with 
friends. Reportedly, in the Vanderbilt case, Corey Batey told Brandon 
Vandenburg to “get this on camera,” as he assaulted their unconscious 
victim. Serial rapists and sexual predators who seek out vulnerable girls, 
drug them, or prey on intoxicated girls, and then view their rapes as con-
quests, are increasingly photographing them as a new form of trophy.
While boys and men bragging about their sexual exploits is not new, 
posting “creepshot” pictures on social media is. While rape and debase-
ment of women are not new, the use of social media to do so is. The use of 
ubiquitous cellphone cameras to take creepshots of unsuspecting women 
makes it clear that contemporary mainstream youth culture values lack 
of consent. In other words, it is not just that some men will take pictures, 
or have sex, without a woman’s consent, but also that photographs and 
“sex” are valued more where there is no consent. Of course, this makes an 
unconscious woman the perfect subject for creepshots and sexual assault.
Candid camera, and humor in humiliating photos, has been around 
since photography itself, and so has the penetration of pornographic 
images into mainstream culture. If men and boys used to secretly share 
pictures of naked women, now they do so publicly. And whereas, in the 
past, pornographic images were produced for mass consumption but 
sold privately, even wrapped in brown paper, and only to adults, now the 
Internet is filled with selfie porn, sexting photos, and creepshots. Rapists 
hamming for the camera, and taking creepshots of unconscious girls, are 
part and parcel of the patriarchal pornutopia in the age of social media.
04.18.2016
Universities’ Bureaucratic Rule
Ágnes Heller
University has not always been the unwieldy bureaucratic machine that 
it is now. From the end of the eighteenth century onwards, European 
gymnasiums and universities were supposed to establish norms of social 
behavior, instill in students ethical concepts, as well as sound judgments 
of taste, and develop codes of honor for practicing one’s trade. On the 
one hand, they offered education in the art of living; in Berlin, the clos-
ing words Hegel uttered to his students in their last class on the history 
of philosophy were “I wish you to live a good life”. On the other hand, 
they became essential for the creation of a bourgeois and national iden-
tity, allied to good scientific training in the then developing nation states.
The task of the university was to form a new bourgeois elite that served 
simultaneously as a cultural elite. Ranks inherited at birth were replaced 
by social classes, and wealthy parents, even if uneducated, wanted their 
sons (and, later, daughters) to receive a good education. Whereas in 
the United States intellectuals did not enjoy great prestige, they did in 
Europe. Not all diplomas had the same worth, but political leadership 
required one, preferably issued by a respected faculty, such as Law.
As class societies were slowly transformed into mass societies, the 
old bourgeois forms of life crumbled, and the so-called civilizing process 
stopped or was even reversed. The task of universities in mass societies 
was no longer to prepare students for living a decent, good life.
Because of this social transformation, the mission of universities 
assumed a paradoxical form. The modern society is a functional soci-
ety, which means that the kind of education appropriate to it is one that 
allows students to establish their places in the social hierarchy by per-
forming a function. Thus, in our mass societies, institutions of higher 
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education, especially elite universities, teach the performance of the bet-
ter-paid functions.
Three tendencies characterize modern education, especially at the 
university level: first, the loss of academic authority; second, a spe-
cial school certificate as the entry ticket of most positions; and, third, 
bureaucratization.
First, liberalization. As a result of the 1968 student-movement, stu-
dents acquired the ability to participate in the life of their school. They 
can choose among schoolbooks, among subject matters; at universities, 
they can also choose their classes and their professors. The power of a 
professor depends more on his or her personal authority than before, and 
that authority depends on the professors’ teaching style and their ability 
to establish human relations with students.
This development, namely, the liberalization of universities and 
the greater power of students, which is desirable in and of itself, went 
together with some, in my mind, less desirable outcomes. Several new 
subject matters without significant academic worth were included in the 
curriculum, partly due to political correctness, partly due to the students’ 
wish to get a grade without mental effort, and finally due to the goal of 
some teachers to get an academic position at all.
The second tendency that gained momentum was to tie many occu-
pations and positions to a certificate from universities or, at least, to 
a high school certificate. Several occupations that were well practiced 
without degrees or certificates, cannot be practiced without them now, 
even if those certificates do not prove that their holders are more able to 
perform the task in question. Many young men and women, who do not 
need a diploma or certificate at all, must spend many years in schools, 
where they study something they could learn just by practicing the skill, 
or learn something they cannot use at all. They just need a piece of paper 
as a condition to be employed.
Finally, the last thirty or forty years witnessed an unprecedented 
growth of bureaucracy in the university system and in many institu-
tions of research. Peter Murphy showed statistically that, whereas in the 
1980s universities all around the globe spent 40 percent of their funds on 
bureaucracy, by now they spend 60 percent of all their funds on it. Thus, 
less than half of the funding remains for everything else, student stipends 
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and professor salaries included. From this, it follows that growing tuition 
fees are not spent on education, but on the upkeep of administration. The 
main task of professors is no longer to teach but to fill out hundreds of 
papers, to document all their actions and the actions of their students. I 
presume that in all universities at least ten, if not more, people are hired 
to create useless questionnaires, to collect answers from professors, to 
group them, and to give a report on them. Why? For no other reason 
than to keep bureaucracy growing and swallowing up all the rest.
What can be the reason behind this unreason? The total loss of trust 
in personal honesty. Everyone needs to be controlled many times over. At 
a mass university there are so many students that one cannot know them, 
nor talk to them. One can only “process” or register them. Moreover, it is 
presumed that students do not enroll in order to learn something, to hear 
something that interests them, but for the sole reason of getting a good 
job in order to earn considerable amounts of money. Since motivations 
cannot be controlled and tested except through a mind-reading machine, 
administration controls what can be controlled, namely the data. As if the 
data could tell anything about motives!
All this is not meant as an indictment against mass universities, much 
less as a defense of traditional universities. But what I strongly suggest, 
by way of reforming institutions of higher learning, is to get rid of half of 
the bureaucracy and to vest more trust into individuals. From the money 
at the university’s disposal much more should be spent on student grants 
and stipends. I suggest more freedom for students and young faculty to 
develop their best abilities, to pursue their potentials and talents. I would 
also suggest more concern for general culture, or for what can be termed 
“universalism”.
Surely, at a music school, a violin student must concentrate on learn-
ing how to play well; at a science faculty, a chemistry student must learn 
the principles of scientific inquiry, and so on and so forth. But the old 
recipe for higher education needs to accompany these projects. To 
understand history, to get a view on the state of the world in general, to 
become interested in fine arts… All those contribute to the students’ 
ability, to their readiness to play an active part as well-informed citizens 
and to participate in society as concerned and thinking individuals, not 
just as members of one or another pressure group.
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I do not know whether the tendency toward the bureaucratic rule of 
universities and of many research institutes can be reversed. I only rec-
ommend that it should be reversed. For, if it is not, the creativity of our 
cultures will get entirely lost, and so will upward mobility. Political activ-
ity will be limited to professional politicians. A new iron age will set in.
03.30.2015
The University and Us: A Question of Who We Are
Todd May
It will not be news to anyone who reads this column that the university 
is in crisis, which is felt particularly in the humanities, where the closing 
of departments and the larger question of what the discipline has to offer 
has become fodder for public discussion. This crisis is not solely a US 
phenomenon: last year over two dozen Japanese universities announced 
cuts or closings of humanities and social sciences departments. In the 
UK, universities are being severely restricted. Similar pressures are being 
felt at other academic institutions in Europe and elsewhere. And so, 
although my focus here is primarily on the US, we should bear in mind 
the larger context in which these reflections take place.
It would be short-sighted to account for the current crisis solely in 
terms of the post-2008 economic crunch. One should go further back, 
perhaps locating its origins in the withdrawal of public financial support 
for institutions of higher learning by the Reagan administration and the 
subsequent “corporatization” of university financial operations. In fact, 
one might argue in a more general vein that crises of universities are 
almost as old as the university itself. Think back to the 1960s and the stu-
dent revolts in favor of more “relevant” education, one of the products 
of which was the increase in programs in Women’s Studies and African-
American Studies. If one were in an ironic frame of mind, one might say 
that with the recent challenges to the university the question of relevance 
has returned, although in a very different guise.
The current crisis once again raises the question of the character and 
purpose of a university. In this case, it does so with particular acuteness 
for those areas of study without immediate, or at least immediately rec-
ognizable, vocational relevance. This includes not only the humanities 
but also some areas of science such as theoretical physics and advanced 
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mathematics. These are large questions. However, the dilemmas raised by 
the recent challenges to the university are of far greater scope than the 
university itself. What is at stake here is the issue of who we are, both as a 
people and as people.
The question of who we are  as a people  is about us as Americans. 
What is it to be an American? Does it include the embrace and repro-
duction of certain cultural forms? Are the writings of William Faulkner 
or William James or Walt Whitman or the paintings of Edward Hopper 
important elements of who we are? To ask this does not mean asking 
whether everyone has to be familiar with these writings in order to be a 
“real” American. It is to ask instead whether having these writings, paint-
ings, etc. circulating in one form or another, being discussed and kept 
alive, is an important aspect of American life, an aspect of what it is for 
us to be us. It is to ask whether our collective life remains recognizably 
American without them.
“Who are we  as people?” is like the previous question, only wider. 
What does it mean to be a human being in this day and age? Does the 
wider human culture include the work of Chinua Achebe, string theory 
in physics, Gödel’s theorem, Kant’s ethical theory? Again, at issue is not 
whether every human must be conversant with all of these things in 
order to be fully human. (If so, I would fail on at least two of the examples 
I’ve just offered.) It is a question of whether it matters that these contri-
butions be preserved in a systematic way and passed on to others. It is a 
question of whether it is important that they be sustained and available 
to following generations, not only as texts in an archive but as living lega-
cies for current engagement.
The university is, for better or worse, the primary institutional site at 
which these various cultural elements, both American and otherwise, are 
cultivated and passed on in a systematic way. It is the site that allows pro-
fessors to engage with these cultural elements and to introduce students 
to them. Is it a good life for those of us who are able to attain a permanent 
position at a university? For the most part, it is (although one aspect of 
the crisis is that fewer of us are able to attain permanency). Is this good 
life one that is often unavailable to those who cannot afford the years 
of education required to take part in it? Yes again, and more should be 
done to address this. The university is not a terribly efficient place, and 
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not always a terribly equitable one. But it is the place in which many of 
the cultural aspects of our collective life are engaged with, preserved, and 
passed along.
The current challenges to the university are challenges not simply to 
its equity or efficiency but to the character of who we are and what we 
value. They raise the question, and I mean it to be a question, of who we 
are. Should our collective life be determined by market values and our 
culture by what people are currently interested in or willing to pay for? 
Should these, in turn, become our values? I do not believe so, but that 
is not what I am arguing. I am arguing that we need to ask the question, 
forthrightly and without flinching.
These are indeed difficult economic times. For the university, difficult 
economic times are not merely of recent vintage. But for those of us who 
fund the university, the severity of the latest economic downturn presses 
upon us to order our priorities more rigorously than we otherwise might. 
We must recognize, however, that the changes we make to the university 
today are not momentary. We are defining the cultural legacy for our chil-
dren and our grandchildren. We must ask ourselves what is important 
enough that we ensure it is available to them. Are the cultural elements 
of much of current university life merely a legacy of the past, an anach-
ronism to be done away with in the name of a university that responds 
more closely to economic imperatives? Or are the aspects of the univer-
sity that are currently in jeopardy worth preserving? These are questions 
we must consider for the sake of those who are to come after us, because 
they cannot raise them themselves and because our answer cannot but 
answer it for them.
We are at a defining moment in our cultural history. I have my own 
view about the answers to these questions. But I am only one person, and 
a humanities professor at that. It seems to me that it would be a shame 
to lose the elements of our culture that I have called attention to here. 
But it would also be a shame, perhaps even a greater one, if we were to 
lose them without ever asking ourselves, straightforwardly and sincerely, 
whether indeed that is what we ought to do, and whether who we are 
without them is a people that we ought to be.
09.12.2016
C. The Politics of Sexuality
The Sexual Is Political
Slavoj Žižek
Segregated toilet doors are today at the center of a big legal and ideo-
logical struggle. On March 29, 2016, a group of 80 predominantly 
Silicon Valley-based business executives, headlined by Facebook CEO 
Mark Zuckerberg and Apple CEO Tim Cook, signed a letter to North 
Carolina Governor Pat McCrory denouncing a law that prohibits trans-
gender people from using public facilities intended for the opposite sex. 
“We are disappointed in your decision to sign this discriminatory legis-
lation into law,” the letter says. “The business community, by and large, 
has consistently communicated to lawmakers at every level that such laws 
are bad for our employees and bad for business.” So it is clear where big 
capital stands. Tim Cook can easily forget about hundreds of thousands 
of Foxconn workers in China assembling Apple products in slave con-
ditions; he made his big gesture of solidarity with the underprivileged, 
demanding the abolition of gender segregation… As is often the case, big 
business stands proudly united with politically correct theory.
So what is “transgenderism”? It occurs when an individual experiences 
discord between his/her biological sex (and the corresponding gender, 
male or female, assigned to him/her by society at birth) and his/her sub-
jective identity. As such, it does not concern only “men who feel and act like 
women” and vice versa but a complex structure of additional “genderqueer” 
positions which are outside the very binary opposition of masculine and femi-
nine: bigender, trigender, pangender, genderfluid, up to agender. The vision of 
social relations that sustains transgenderism is the so-called postgender-
ism: a social, political and cultural movement whose adherents advocate 
a voluntary abolition of gender, rendered possible by recent scientific 
progress in biotechnology and reproductive technologies. Their proposal 
not only concerns scientific possibility, but is also ethically grounded. 
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The premise of postgenderism is that the social, emotional and cognitive 
consequences of fixed gender roles are an obstacle to full human eman-
cipation. A society in which reproduction through sex is eliminated (or 
in which other versions will be possible: a woman can also “father” her 
child, etc.) will open unheard-of new possibilities of freedom, social and 
emotional experimenting. It will eliminate the crucial distinction that 
sustains all subsequent social hierarchies and exploitations.
One can argue that postgenderism is the truth of transgenderism. The 
universal fluidification of sexual identities unavoidably reaches its apo-
gee in the cancellation of sex as such. Recall Marx’s brilliant analysis of 
how, in the French revolution of 1848, the conservative-republican Party 
of Order functioned as the coalition of the two branches of royalism 
(orleanists and legitimists) in the “anonymous kingdom of the Republic.” 
The only way to be a royalist in general was to be a republican, and, in the 
same sense, the only way to be sexualized in general is to be asexual.
The first thing to note here is that transgenderism goes together with 
the general tendency in today’s predominant ideology to reject any par-
ticular “belonging” and to celebrate the “fluidification” of all forms of 
identity. Thinkers like Frederic Lordon have recently demonstrated the 
inconsistency of “cosmopolitan” anti-nationalist intellectuals who advo-
cate “liberation from a belonging” and in extremis tend to dismiss every 
search for roots and every attachment to a particular ethnic or cultural 
identity as an almost proto-Fascist stance. Lordon contrasts this hidden 
belonging of self-proclaimed rootless universalists with the nightmarish 
reality of refugees and illegal immigrants who, deprived of basic rights, 
desperately search for some kind of belonging (like a new citizenship). 
Lordon is quite right here: it is easy to see how the “cosmopolitan” intel-
lectual elites despising local people who cling to their roots belong to 
their own quite exclusive circles of rootless elites, how their cosmopoli-
tan rootlessness is the marker of a deep and strong belonging. This is 
why it is an utter obscenity to put together elite “nomads” flying around 
the world and refugees desperately searching for a safe place where they 
would belong—the same obscenity as that of putting together a dieting 
upper-class Western woman and a starving refugee woman.
Furthermore, we encounter here the old paradox: the more mar-
ginal and excluded one is, the more one is allowed to assert one’s ethnic 
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identity and exclusive way of life. This is how the politically correct land-
scape is structured. People far from the Western world are allowed to 
fully assert their particular ethnic identity without being proclaimed 
essentialist racist identitarians (native Americans, blacks…). The closer 
one gets to the notorious white heterosexual males, the more problem-
atic this assertion is: Asians are still OK; Italians and Irish—maybe; with 
Germans and Scandinavians it is already problematic… However, such 
a prohibition on asserting the particular identity of white men (as the 
model of oppression of others), although it presents itself as the admis-
sion of their guilt, nonetheless confers on them a central position. This 
very prohibition makes them into the universal-neutral medium, the 
place from which the truth about the others’ oppression is accessible. The 
imbalance weighs also in the opposite direction: impoverished European 
countries expect the developed West European ones to bear the full bur-
den of multicultural openness, while they can afford patriotism.
And a similar tension is present in transgenderism. Transgender sub-
jects who appear as transgressive, defying all prohibitions, simultane-
ously behave in a hyper-sensitive way insofar as they feel oppressed by 
enforced choice (“Why should I decide if I am man or woman?”) and 
need a place where they could recognize themselves. If they so proudly 
insist on their “trans-,” beyond all classification, why do they display such 
an urgent demand for a proper place? Why, when they find themselves in 
front of gendered toilets, don’t they act with heroic indifference—“I am 
transgendered, a bit of this and that, a man dressed as a woman, etc., so I 
can well choose whatever door I want!”? Furthermore, do “normal” het-
erosexuals not face a similar problem? Do they also not often find it dif-
ficult to recognize themselves in prescribed sexual identities? One could 
even say that “man” (or “woman”) is not a certain identity but more 
like a certain mode of avoiding an identity… And we can safely predict 
that new anti-discriminatory demands will emerge: why not marriages 
among multiple persons? What justifies the limitation to the binary form 
of marriage? Why not even a marriage with animals? After all we already 
know about the finesse of animal emotions. Is to exclude marriage with 
an animal not a clear case of “speciesism,” an unjust privileging of the 
human species?
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Insofar as the other great antagonism is that of classes, could we not 
also imagine a homologous critical rejection of the class binary? The 
“binary” class struggle and exploitation should also be supplemented by 
a “gay” position (exploitation among members of the ruling class itself, 
e.g., bankers and lawyers exploiting the “honest” productive capital-
ists), a “lesbian” position (beggars stealing from honest workers, etc.), 
a “bisexual” position (as a self-employed worker, I act as both capitalist 
and worker), an “asexual” one (I remain outside capitalist production), 
and so forth.
This deadlock of classification is clearly discernible in the need 
to expand the formula: the basic LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Transgender) becomes LGBTQIA (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, 
Questioning, Intersex, Asexual) or even LGBTQQIAAP (Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Questioning, Intersex, Asexual, Allies, 
Pansexual). To resolve the problem, one often simply adds a + which 
serves to include all other communities associated with the LGBT com-
munity, as in LGBT+. This, however, raises the question: is + just a stand-
in for missing positions like “and others,” or can one be directly a +? The 
properly dialectical answer is “yes,” because in a series there is always one 
exceptional element which clearly does not belong to it and thereby gives 
body to +. It can be “allies” (“honest” non-LGBT individuals), “asexuals” 
(negating the entire field of sexuality) or “questioning” (floating around, 
unable to adopt a determinate position). 
Consequently, there is only one solution to this deadlock, the one we 
find in another field of disposing waste, that of trash bins. Public trash 
bins are more and more differentiated today. There are special bins for 
paper, glass, metal cans, cardboard package, plastic, etc. Here, already, 
things sometimes get complicated. If I have to dispose of a paper bag or 
a notebook with a tiny plastic band, where does it belong? To paper or 
to plastic? No wonder that we often get detailed instruction on the bins, 
right beneath the general designation: PAPER—books, newspapers, etc., 
but NOT hardcover books or books with plasticized covers, etc. In such 
cases, proper waste disposal would have taken up to half an hour or more 
of detailed reading and tough decisions. To make things easier, we then 
get a supplementary trash bin for GENERAL WASTE where we throw 
everything that did not meet the specific criteria of other bins, as if, once 
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again, apart from paper trash, plastic trash, and so on, there is trash as 
such, universal trash.
Should we not do the same with toilets? Since no classification can sat-
isfy all identities, should we not add to the two usual gender slots (MEN, 
WOMEN) a door for GENERAL GENDER? Is this not the only way 
to inscribe into an order of symbolic differences its constitutive antago-
nism? Lacan already pointed out that the “formula” of the sexual relation-
ship as impossible/real is 1+1+a, i.e., the two sexes plus the “bone in the 
throat” that prevents its translation into a symbolic difference. This third 
element does not stand for what is excluded from the domain of differ-
ence; it stands, instead, for (the real of) difference as such.
The reason for this failure of every classification that tries to be 
exhaustive is not the empirical wealth of identities that defy classifica-
tion but, on the contrary, the persistence of sexual difference as real, as 
“impossible” (defying every categorization) and simultaneously unavoid-
able. The multiplicity of gender positions (male, female, gay, lesbian, 
bigender, transgender…) circulates around an antagonism that forever 
eludes it. Gays are male, lesbians female; transsexuals enforce a passage 
from one to another; cross-dressing combines the two; bigender floats 
between the two… Whichever way we turn, the two lurks beneath.
This brings us back to what one could call the primal scene of anxiety 
that defines transgenderism. I stand in front of standard bi-gender toilets 
with two doors, LADIES and GENTLEMEN, and I am caught up in anx-
iety, not recognizing myself in any of the two choices. Again, do “normal” 
heterosexuals not have a similar problem? Do they also not often find it 
difficult to recognize themselves in prescribed sexual identities? Which 
man has not caught himself in momentary doubt: “Do I really have the 
right to enter GENTLEMEN? Am I really a man?”
We can now see clearly what the anxiety of this confrontation really 
amounts to. Namely, it is the anxiety of (symbolic) castration. Whatever 
choice I make, I will lose something, and this something is NOT what 
the other sex has. Both sexes together do not form a whole since some-
thing is irretrievably lost in the very division of sexes. We can even say 
that, in making the choice, I assume the loss of what the other sex doesn’t 
have, i.e., I have to renounce the illusion that the Other has that X which 
would fill in my lack. And one can well guess that transgenderism is 
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ultimately an attempt to avoid (the anxiety of) castration: thanks to it, a 
flat space is created in which the multiple choices that I can make do not 
bear the mark of castration. As Alenka Zupančič expressed it in a piece of 
personal communication: “One is usually timid in asserting the existence 
of two genders, but when passing to the multitude this timidity disap-
pears, and their existence is firmly asserted. If sexual difference is con-
sidered in terms of gender, it is made—at least in principle—compatible 
with mechanisms of its full ontologization.”
Therein resides the crux of the matter. The LGBT trend is right in 
“deconstructing” the standard normative sexual opposition, in de-ontol-
ogizing it, in recognizing in it a contingent historical construct full of ten-
sions and inconsistencies. However, this trend reduces this tension to the 
fact that the plurality of sexual positions are forcefully narrowed down to 
the normative straightjacket of the binary opposition of masculine and 
feminine, with the idea that, if we get away from this straightjacket, we 
will get a full blossoming multiplicity of sexual positions (LGBT, etc.), 
each of them with its complete ontological consistency. It assumes that 
once we get rid of the binary straightjacket, I can fully recognize myself 
as gay, bisexual, or whatever. From the Lacanian standpoint, nonetheless, 
the antagonistic tension is irreducible, as it is constitutive of the sexual as 
such, and no amount of classificatory diversification and multiplication 
can save us from it.  
The same goes for class antagonism. The division introduced and 
sustained by the emancipatory (“class”) struggle is not between the two 
particular classes of the whole, but between the whole-in-its-parts and its 
remainder which, within the particulars, stands for the universal, for the 
whole “as such,” opposed to its parts. Or, to put it in yet another way, one 
should bear in mind here the two aspects of the notion of remnant: the 
rest as what remains after the subtraction of all particular content (ele-
ments, specific parts of the whole), and the rest as the ultimate result of 
the subdivision of the whole into its parts, when, in the final act of sub-
division, we no longer get two particular parts or elements, two some-
things, but a something (the rest) and a nothing.
In Lacan’s precise sense of the term, the third element (the 
Kierkegaardian chimney sweeper) effectively stands for the phallic ele-
ment. How so? Insofar as it stands for pure difference: the officer, the 
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maid, and the chimney sweeper are the male, the female, plus their differ-
ence as such, as a particular contingent object. Again, why? Because not 
only is difference differential, but, in an antagonistic (non)relationship, 
it precedes the terms it differentiates. Not only is woman not-man and 
vice versa, but woman is what prevents man from being fully man and 
vice versa. It is like the difference between the Left and the Right in the 
political space: their difference is the difference in the very way difference 
is perceived. The whole political space appears differently structured if 
we look at it from the Left or from the Right; there is no third “objec-
tive” way (for a Leftist, the political divide cuts across the entire social 
body, while for a Rightist, society is a hierarchic whole disturbed by mar-
ginal intruders).
Difference “in itself ” is thus not symbolic-differential, but real-impos-
sible—something that eludes and resists the symbolic grasp. This differ-
ence is the universal as such, that is, the universal not as a neutral frame 
elevated above its two species, but as their constitutive antagonism. 
And the third element (the chimney sweeper, the Jew, object a) stands 
for difference as such, for the “pure” difference/antagonism which pre-
cedes the differentiated terms. If the division of the social body into two 
classes were complete, without the excessive element ( Jew, rabble…), 
there would have been no class struggle, just two clearly divided classes. 
This third element is not the mark of an empirical remainder that escapes 
class classification (the pure division of society into two classes), but the 
materialization of their antagonistic difference itself, insofar as this differ-
ence precedes the differentiated terms. In the space of anti-Semitism, the 
“Jew” stands for social antagonism as such: without the Jewish intruder, 
the two classes would live in harmony… Thus, we can observe how the 
third intruding element is evental: it is not just another positive entity, 
but it stands for what is forever unsettling the harmony of the two, open-
ing it up to an incessant process of re-accommodation.
A supreme example of this third element, objet a, which supplements 
the couple, is provided by a weird incident that occurred in Kemalist 
Turkey in 1926. Part of the Kemalist modernization was to enforce new 
“European” models for women, for how they should dress, talk and act, 
in order to get rid of the oppressive Oriental traditions. As is well known, 
there indeed was a Hat Law prescribing how men and women, at least 
The Sexual Is Political 165
in big cities, should cover their heads. Then, “in Erzurum in 1926 there 
was a woman among the people who were executed under the pretext 
of ‘opposing the Hat Law.’ She was a very tall (almost 2 m.) and very 
masculine-looking woman who peddled shawls for a living (hence her 
name ‘Şalcı Bacı’ [Shawl Sister]). Reporter Nimet Arzık described her 
as, ‘two meters tall, with a sooty face and snakelike thin dreadlocks […] 
and with manlike steps.’ Of course as a woman she was not supposed to 
wear the fedora, so she could not have been ‘guilty’ of anything, but prob-
ably in their haste the gendarmes mistook her for a man and hurried her 
to the scaffold. Şalcı Bacı was the first woman to be executed by hang-
ing in Turkish history. She was definitely not ‘normal’ since the descrip-
tion by Arzık does not fit in any framework of feminine normalcy at that 
particular time, and she probably belonged to the old tradition of toler-
ated and culturally included ‘special people’ with some kind of genetic 
‘disorder.’ The coerced and hasty transition to ‘modernity,’ however, did 
not allow for such an inclusion to exist, and therefore she had to be elimi-
nated, crossed out of the equation. ‘Would a woman wear a hat that she 
be hanged?’ were the last words she was reported to have muttered on 
the way to the scaffold. Apart from making no sense at all, these words 
represented a semantic void and only indicated that this was definitely a 
scene from the Real, subverting the rules of semiotics: she was first emas-
culated (in its primary etymological sense of ‘making masculine’), so that 
she could be ‘emasculated.’”1
How are we to interpret this weird and ridiculously excessive act of 
killing? The obvious reading would have been a Butlerian one: through 
her provocative trans-sexual appearance and acting, Şalcı Bacı rendered 
visible the contingent character of sexual difference, of how it is symboli-
cally constructed. In this way, she was a threat to normatively established 
sexual identities… My reading is slightly (or not so slightly) different. 
Rather than undermine sexual difference, Şalcı Bacı stood for this differ-
ence as such, in all its traumatic Real, irreducible to any clear symbolic 
opposition. Her disturbing appearance transforms clear symbolic dif-
ference into the impossible-Real of antagonism. So, again, in the same 
way as class struggle is not just “complicated” when other classes that 
do not enter the clear division of the ruling class and the oppressed class 
appear (this excess is, on the contrary, the very element which makes 
166 Slavoj Žižek
class antagonism real and not just a symbolic opposition), the formula 
of sexual antagonism is not M/F (the clear opposition between male and 
female) but MF+, where + stands for the excessive element which trans-
forms the symbolic opposition into the Real of antagonism.
This brings us back to our topic, the big opposition that is emerg-
ing today between, on the one hand, the violent imposition of a fixed 
symbolic form of sexual difference as the basic gesture of counteract-
ing social disintegration and, on the other hand, the total transgender 
“fluidification” of gender, the dispersal of sexual difference into mul-
tiple configurations. While, in one part of the world, abortion and gay 
marriages are endorsed as a clear sign of moral progress, in other parts, 
homophobia and anti-abortion campaigns are exploding. In June 2016, 
Al-Jazeera reported that a 22-year-old Dutch woman complained to the 
police that she had been raped after being drugged in an upmarket night-
club in Doha. And the result was that she was convicted of having illicit 
sex by a Qatari court and given a one-year suspended sentence. On the 
opposite end, what counts as harassment in the PC environs is also get-
ting extended. The following case comes to mind. A woman walked on 
a street with a bag in her hand, and a black man was walking 15 yards 
behind her. Becoming aware of it, the woman (unconsciously, automati-
cally?) tightened her grip on the bag, and the black man reported that he 
experienced the woman’s gesture as a case of racist harassment…
What goes on is also the result of neglecting the class and race dimen-
sion by the PC proponents of women’s and gay rights: “In ‘10 Hours of 
Walking in NYC as a Woman’ created by a video marketing company in 
2014, an actress dressed in jeans, black t-shirt, and tennis shoes walked 
through various Manhattan neighborhoods, recording the actions and 
comments of men she encountered with a hidden camera and micro-
phone. Throughout the walk the camera recorded over 100 instances 
coded as verbal harassment, ranging from friendly greetings to sexualized 
remarks about her body, including threats of rape. While the video was 
hailed as a document of street harassment and the fear of violence that 
are a daily part of women’s lives, it ignored race and class. The largest pro-
portion of the men presented in the video belonged to minority commu-
nities, and, in a number of instances, the men commenting on the actress 
were standing against buildings, resting on fire hydrants, or sitting on 
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folding chairs on the sidewalk, postures used to characterize lower class 
and unemployed men, or, as a reader commented on it: ‘The video was 
meant to generate outrage… and it used crypto-racism to do it.’”2
The great mistake in dealing with this opposition is to search for a 
proper measure between two extremes. What one should do instead is 
to bring out what both extremes share: the fantasy of a peaceful world 
where the agonistic tension of sexual difference disappears, either in a 
clear and stable hierarchic distinction of sexes or in the happy fluidity of 
a desexualized universe. And it is not difficult to discern in this fantasy of 
a peaceful world the fantasy of a society without social antagonisms, in 
short, without class struggle.
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A Reply to my Critics
Slavoj Žižek
Lately I am getting used to attacks that not only render my position in a 
totally wrong way but also practice slander pure and simple, so that, at 
this level, any minimally rational debate becomes meaningless. Among 
many examples, suffice it to mention Hamid Dabashi, who begins his 
book Can Non-Europeans Think? with: “‘Fuck you, Walter Mignolo!’ 
With those grandiloquent words and the gesture they must have occa-
sioned and accompanied, the distinguished and renowned European 
philosopher Slavoj Žižek begins his response to a piece that Walter 
Mignolo wrote…”1 No wonder that no reference is given, since I never 
uttered the phrase “Fuck you, Walter Mignolo!”. In a public talk in which 
I responded to Mignolo’s attack on me, I did use the words “fuck you,” 
but they did not refer to Mignolo: his name was not mentioned in con-
junction with them; they were a general exclamation addressed (if at any-
one) at my public. From here, it is just one step to elevating my excla-
mation into “Slavoj Žižek’s famous ‘Fuck you, Walter Mignolo’,” as Dan 
Glazerbrook did.2
Back to Dabashi’s book. On page 8, the comedy reaches its peak: a 
long quoted passage is attributed to me (it follows “Žižek claims:”), and 
after the quote the text goes on: “This is all fine and dandy—for Žižek. 
He can make any claim he wishes. All power to him. But the point is…” 
There is just one tiny problem: the passage quoted and attributed to me 
and then mocked as an example of my European racism and of my mis-
reading of Fanon is from Fanon himself (again, no reference is given in 
Dabashi’s book—the quoted passage is from Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, 
White Masks, New York: Grove Press 2008, p. 201-206.)
So, I thought we had reached the lowest point, although in a more 
recent contribution to Al-Jazeera, Dabashi puts me into the same line 
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with Breivik, the Norwegian racist mass murderer.3 But the reactions 
to my “The Sexual Is Political” demonstrate that one can go even lower. 
Browsing through numerous tweets and email blogs, I searched in vain 
for a minimum of argumentation. The attackers mostly just make fun of a 
position, which is simply not mine.
Here is a relatively decent example: “I know that this is difficult to 
understand, mostly because it draws from his big Daddy the contempt-
ible Lacan. Really though, all Žižek is saying is that opposition to trans-
gender people represents an anxiety which in his theory occurs because 
of sexual difference; i.e. transgender people disrupt the binaries we con-
struct in order to place ourselves into discrete genders. What Žižek tries 
to say, he’s not a very good writer in English at least, is that the antago-
nism will exist even if we completely accept LGBT people as members of 
our community because they always exist as a threat to the binary. I don’t 
think that Žižek ultimately thinks social antagonism against LGBT peo-
ple is something we can move beyond as long as the binary system exist. 
This is why he cites the story of Şalcı Bacı, to Žižek she represented an 
existential threat to people’s identities. In a sense you can say it is a right-
wing concept, because it’s essentially saying that transgender people are 
indeed the threat to society they’re portrayed to be. The question would 
be, does Žižek approve of threats to society as the revolutionary he sup-
poses himself to be?”4
I have to admit that I couldn’t believe my eyes when I was reading 
these lines. Is it really so difficult to follow the thread of my argumen-
tation? First claim: “all Žižek is saying is that opposition to transgender 
people represents an anxiety which in his theory occurs because of sex-
ual difference; i.e. transgender people disrupt the binaries we construct 
in order to place ourselves into discrete genders…” No, I’m not saying 
that at all: I don’t talk about the anxiety experienced by heterosexuals 
when they confront transgender people. My starting point is the anxiety 
transgender people themselves experience when they confront a forced 
choice where they don’t recognize themselves in any of its exclusive 
terms (“man,” “woman”). And then I generalize this anxiety as a feature 
of every sexual identification. It is not transgender people who disrupt 
the heterosexual gender binaries; these binaries are always-already dis-
rupted by the antagonistic nature of sexual difference itself. This is the 
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basic distinction on which I repeatedly insist and which is ignored by my 
critics: in the human-symbolic universe, sexual difference/antagonism is 
not he same as the difference of gender roles. Transgender people are not 
traumatic for heterosexuals because they pose a threat to the established 
binary of gender roles but because they bring out the antagonistic ten-
sion which is constitutive of sexuality. Şalcı Bacı is not a threat to sexual 
difference; rather, she is this difference as irreducible to the opposition of 
gender identities.
In short, transgender people are not simply marginals who disturb the 
hegemonic heterosexual gender norm; their message is universal, it con-
cerns us all, they bring out the anxiety that underlies every sexual iden-
tification, its constructed/unstable character. This, of course, does not 
entail a cheap generalization which would cut the edge of the suffering 
of transgender people (“we all have anxieties and suffer in some way”); 
it is in transgender people that anxiety and antagonism, which other-
wise remain mostly latent, break open. So, in the same way in which, for 
Marx, if one wants to understand the “normal” functioning of capitalism, 
one should take as a starting point economic crises, if one wants to ana-
lyze “normal” heterosexuality, one should begin with the anxieties that 
explode in transgender people.
This is why it makes no sense to talk about “social antagonism against 
LGBT people” (incidentally, a symptomatically clumsy and weird 
expression: “antagonism against”?). Antagonism (or, as Lacan put it, the 
fact that “there is no sexual relationship”) is at work in the very core of 
normative heterosexuality, and it is what the violent imposition of gen-
der norms endeavors to contain and obfuscate. It is here that my paral-
lel with the anti-Semitic figure of the Jew enters. The (anti-Semitic fig-
ure of the) “Jew” as the threat to the organic order of a society, as the 
element which brings into it from the outside corruption and decay, is a 
fetish whose function is to mask the fact that antagonism does not come 
from the outside but is immanent to every class society. Anti-Semitism 
“reifies” (embodies in a particular group of people) the inherent social 
antagonism: it treats “Jews” as the Thing which, from outside, intrudes 
into the social body and disturbs its balance. What happens in the pas-
sage from the position of class struggle to Fascist anti-Semitism is not 
just the replacement of one figure of the enemy (bourgeoisie, the ruling 
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class) with another ( Jews); the logic of the struggle is totally different. In 
class struggle, the classes themselves are caught in the antagonism inher-
ent to social structure, while the Jew is a foreign intruder who causes 
social antagonism, so that all we need in order to restore social harmony, 
according to Fascist anti-Semitism, is to annihilate Jews. This is the old 
standard Marxist thesis: when my critic writes about my line of thought 
“In a sense you can say it is a right-wing concept,” I would really like to 
know what precise sense he has in mind.
So, what is the anxiety I refer to about? For a brief moment, let me 
ignore my primitive critics and engage in a brief theoretical exercise. 
The underlying structure is here that of a failed interpellation (where 
“interpellation” refers to the basic ideological mechanism described by 
Louis Althusser). In the case of interpellation, Althusser’s own example 
contains more than his own theorization gets out of it. Althusser evokes 
an individual who, while carelessly walking down the street, is suddenly 
addressed by a policeman: “Hey, you there!” By answering the call—that 
is, by stopping and turning round towards the policeman—the indi-
vidual recognizes-constitutes himself as the subject of Power, of the big 
Other-Subject. Ideology “‘transforms’ the individuals into subjects (it 
transforms them all) by that very precise operation which I have called 
interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the 
most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: ‘Hey, you there!’.
Assuming that the theoretical scene I have imagined takes place 
in the street, the hailed individual will turn round. By this mere one-
hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion, he becomes a subject. 
Why? Because he has recognized that the hail was ‘really’ addressed to 
him, and that ‘it was really him who was hailed’ (and not someone else). 
Experience shows that the practical transmission of hailings is such that 
they hardly ever miss their man: verbal call or whistle, the one hailed 
always recognizes that it is really him who is being hailed. And yet it is 
a strange phenomenon, and one which cannot be explained solely by 
‘guilt feelings,’ despite the large numbers who ‘have something on their 
consciences.’
Naturally for the convenience and clarity of my little theoretical the-
atre I have had to present things in the form of a sequence, with a before 
and an after, and thus in the form of a temporal succession. There are 
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individuals walking along. Somewhere (usually behind them) the hail 
rings out: ‘Hey, you there!’ One individual (nine times out of ten it is the 
right one) turns round, believing/suspecting/knowing that it is for him, 
i.e. recognizing that ‘it really is he’ who is meant by the hailing. But in 
reality these things happen without any succession. The existence of ide-
ology and the hailing or interpellation of individuals as subjects are one 
and the same thing.”5
The first thing that strikes the eye in this passage is Althusser’s implicit 
reference to Lacan’s thesis on a letter that “always arrives at its destina-
tion”: the interpellative letter cannot miss its addressee since, on account 
of its “timeless” character, it is only the addressee’s recognition/accep-
tance that constitutes it as a letter. The crucial feature of the quoted pas-
sage, however, is the double denial at work in it: the denial of the expla-
nation of interpellative recognition by means of a “guilt feeling,” as well 
as the denial of the temporality of the process of interpellation (strictly 
speaking, individuals do not “become” subjects, they “always-already” 
are subjects).6 This double denial is to be read as a Freudian denial: 
what the “timeless” character of interpellation renders invisible is a kind 
of atemporal sequentiality that is far more complex than the “theoreti-
cal theatre” staged by Althusser on behalf of a suspicious alibi of “conve-
nience and clarity.” This “repressed” sequence concerns a “guilt feeling” 
of a purely formal, “non-pathological” (in the Kantian sense) nature, a 
guilt which, for that very reason, weighs most heavily upon those individ-
uals who “have nothing on their consciences.” To ask differently: In what, 
precisely, does the individual’s first reaction to the policeman’s “Hey, you 
there!” consist? In an inconsistent mixture of two elements: (1) why me? 
what does the policeman want from me? I’m innocent, I was just minding 
my own business and strolling around…; however, this perplexed pro-
testation of innocence is always accompanied by (2) an indeterminate 
Kafkaesque feeling of “abstract” guilt, a feeling that, in the eyes of Power, 
I am a priori terribly guilty of something, though it is not possible for me 
to know what precisely I am guilty of. And for that reason—since I don’t 
know what I am guilty of—I am even more guilty; or, more pointedly, it 
is in this very ignorance of mine that my true guilt consists.7
What we thus have here is the entire Lacanian structure of the subject 
split between innocence and abstract, indeterminate guilt, confronted 
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with a non-transparent call emanating from the Other (“Hey, you 
there!”), a call where it is not clear to the subject what the Other actually 
wants from him (“Che vuoi?”). In short, what we encounter here is inter-
pellation prior to identification. Prior to the recognition in the call of the 
Other by means of which the individual constitutes himself as “always-
already”-subject, we are obliged to acknowledge this “timeless” instant of 
the impasse, when innocence coincides with indeterminate guilt: the ide-
ological identification by means of which I assume a symbolic mandate 
and recognize myself as the subject of Power takes place only as an answer 
to this impasse. So what remains “unthought” in Althusser’s theory of 
interpellation is the fact that prior to ideological recognition we have an 
intermediate moment of obscene, impenetrable interpellation without 
identification, a kind of vanishing mediator that has to become invisible if 
the subject is to achieve symbolic identity, i.e., to accomplish the gesture 
of subjectivization. In short, the “unthought” of Althusser is that there is 
already an uncanny subject preceding the gesture of subjectivization.
And the same goes in a much stronger way for sexual interpellation. 
My identification as “man” or “woman” is always a secondary reaction to 
the “castrative” anxiety of what I am. One—traditional—way to avoid 
this anxiety is to impose a heterosexual norm, which specifies the role 
of each gender, and the other is to advocate the overcoming of sexuality 
as such (the postgender position). As for the relationship between trans-
gender and postgender, my point is simply that the universal fluidifica-
tion of sexual identities unavoidably reaches its apogee in the cancella-
tion of sex as such. In the same way as, for Marx, the only way to be a 
royalist in general is to be a republican, the only way to be sexualized in 
general is to be asexual. This ambiguity characterizes the conjunction of 
sexuality and freedom throughout the twentieth century: the more radi-
cal attempts to liberate sexuality get, the more they approximate their 
self-overcoming and turn into attempts to enact a liberation from sexual-
ity, or, as Aaron Schuster put it (in personal communication): “If part of 
the twentieth century’s revolutionary program to create a radically new 
social relation and a New Man was the liberation of sexuality, this aspira-
tion was marked by a fundamental ambiguity: Is it sexuality that is to be 
liberated, delivered from moral prejudices and legal prohibitions, so that 
the drives are allowed a more open and fluid expression, or is humanity 
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to be liberated from sexuality, finally freed from its obscure dependencies 
and tyrannical constraints? Will the revolution bring an efflorescence of 
libidinal energy or, seeing it as a dangerous distraction to the arduous 
task of building a new world, demand its suppression? In a word, is sexu-
ality the object of or the obstacle to emancipation?”
The oscillation between these two extremes is clearly discernible 
already in the first decade after the October Revolution, when feminist 
calls for the liberation of sexuality were soon supplemented by the gnos-
tic-cosmological calls for a New Man who would leave behind sexuality 
itself as the ultimate bourgeois trap. Today, with the rise of the “Internet 
of Things” and biogenetics, this perspective got a new boost. And, as a 
part of this new perspective, I predict that new demands for overcom-
ing old limitations will emerge. Among them there will be demands for 
legalizing multiple marriages (which already existed, not only as polyg-
amy but also as polyandry, especially in the Himalayan region), as well 
as demands for some kind of legalization of intense emotional ties with 
animals. I am not talking about sex with animals (although I remember 
from my youth, from the time of the late 1960s, the widespread tendency 
to practice sex with animals), even less about “bestiality,” but about a ten-
dency to recognize some animals (say, a faithful dog) as legitimate part-
ners. It’s not about “bestiality,” but about the “culturalization” of animals, 
their elevation to a legal partner.
To recapitulate, not only do I fully support the struggle of transgen-
der people against their legal segregation, but I am also deeply affected 
by their reports of their suffering, and I see them not as a marginal group, 
which should be “tolerated,” but as a group whose message is radically 
universal: it concerns us all; it tells the truth about all of us as sexual 
beings. I differ from the predominant opinion in two interconnected 
points that concern theory: (1) I see the anxiety apropos sexual identi-
ties as a universal feature of human sexuality, not just as a specific effect of 
sexual exclusions and segregations, which is why one should not expect it 
to disappear with the progress of sexual desegregation; (2) I draw a strict 
distinction between sexual difference (as the antagonism constitutive of 
human sexuality) and the binary (or plurality) of genders. Both these 
points are, of course, totally misread or ignored by my critics.
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Concerning my “class reductionism,” anyone minimally acquainted 
with my work knows that one of the problems I am dealing with is pre-
cisely how to bring the struggle of Third World people against neo-colo-
nial oppression and the struggle for sexual emancipation (women and 
gay rights) in the developed West together. Some Leftists claim that we 
should focus on the universal anti-capitalist struggle, allowing each eth-
nic or religious group to retain its particular culture or “way of life.” I see 
a problem in this easy solution: one cannot distinguish in a direct way 
the universal dimension of the emancipatory project and the identity of 
a particular way of life, so that while we are all together engaged in a uni-
versal struggle, we simultaneously fully respect the right of each group to 
its particular way of life. One should never forget that, to a subject who 
lives a particular way of life, all universals appear “colored” by this way of 
life. Each identity (way of life) comprises also a specific way to relate to 
other ways of life. So, when we posit as a guideline that each group should 
be left to enact its particular identity, to practice its own way of life, the 
problem immediately arises: where do customs that form my identity 
stop and where does injustice begin? Are woman’s rights just our custom, 
or is the struggle for women’s rights also universal (and part of the eman-
cipatory struggle, as it was in the entire Socialist tradition from Engels to 
Mao)? Is homophobia just a thing of a particular culture to be tolerated 
as a component of its identity? Should arranged marriages (which form 
the very core of the kinship structures of some societies) also be accepted 
as part of a particular identity? Etc.
This “mediation” of the universal with the particular (way of life) 
holds for all cultures, ours (Western) included, of course. The “univer-
sal” principles advocated by the West are also colored by the Western way 
of life, plus we should never forget the rise of religious-nationalist fun-
damentalism in countries like Poland, Hungary and Croatia. In the last 
decades, Poland was one of the few European definitive success stories. 
After the fall of Socialism, the per capita gross domestic product more 
than doubled, and, for the last couple of years, the moderate liberal-cen-
trist government of Donald Tusk ruled. And then, almost out of nowhere, 
without any great corruption scandals as in Hungary, the extreme Right 
took over, and there is now a widespread movement to prohibit abor-
tions even in the limit-cases of the mortal danger to the mother’s health, 
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rape, and deformities of the foetus. A whole series of problems emerge 
here: what if equality among humans is in tension with equality among 
cultures (insofar as some cultures neglect equality)?
The task is thus to bring the struggle into every particular way of life. 
Each particular “way of life” is antagonistic, full of inner tensions and 
inconsistencies, and the only way to proceed is to work for an alliance 
of struggles in different cultures. From here I would like to return to the 
project of the alliance between progressive middle classes and nomad 
proletarians: In terms of a concrete problematic, this means that the 
politico-economic struggle against global capitalism and the struggle for 
women’s rights, etc. have to be conceived as two moments of the same 
emancipatory struggle for equality.
These two aspects—the imposition of Western values such as univer-
sal human rights, and respect for different cultures independently of the 
horrors that can be part of these cultures—are the two sides of the same 
ideological mystification. A lot has been written about how the univer-
sality of universal human rights is twisted, how they secretly give prefer-
ence to Western cultural values and norms (the priority of the individual 
over his/her community, and so on). But we should add to this insight 
that the multiculturalist, anti-colonialist defence of the multiplicity of 
ways of life is also false: it covers up the antagonisms within each of these 
particular ways of life, justifying acts of brutality, sexism and racism as 
expressions of a particular culture that we have no right to judge by for-
eign Western values.
This aspect should in no way be dismissed as marginal. From Boko 
Haram and Mugabe to Putin, anti-colonialist critique of the West more 
and more appears as the rejection of Western “sexual” confusion and as 
the demand for returning to traditional sexual hierarchy. It is, of course, 
true that the immediate export of Western feminism and individual 
human rights can serve as a tool of ideological and economic neo-colo-
nialism. (We all remember how some American feminists supported the 
US intervention in Iraq as a way to liberate women there, while the result 
is exactly the opposite). But one should nonetheless absolutely reject to 
draw from this the conclusion that Western Leftists should make here 
a “strategic compromise,” silently tolerating “customs” of humiliating 
women and gays on behalf of the “greater” anti-imperialist struggle.
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The communist struggle for universal emancipation means a struggle 
which cuts into each particular identity, dividing it from within. When 
there is racism, when there is domination over women, it is always an 
integral part of a particular “way of life,” a barbarian integral underside 
of a particular culture. In the “developed” Western world, Communist 
struggle means a brutal and principled struggle against all ideological for-
mations which, even if they present themselves as “progressive,” serve as 
an obstacle to universal emancipation (liberal feminism, etc.). It means 
not only attacking our own racist and religious fundamentalisms, but also 
demonstrating how they arise out of the inconsistencies of the predomi-
nant liberalism. And in Muslim countries, Communist strategy should in 
no way be to endorse their traditional “way of life” which includes honor 
killings, etc.; it should not only collaborate with the forces in these coun-
tries which fight traditional patriarchy, but it should also make a crucial 
step forward and demonstrate how, far from serving as a point of resis-
tance against global capitalism, such traditional ideology is a direct tool 
of imperialist neocolonialism.
08.05.2016
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Gay Essentialism in a Eugenic Age
T. M. Murray
The search for a gay gene has intensified since the publication in the early 
90’s of the now famous research by Simon LeVay and Dean Hamer. Their 
findings were reconfirmed only last year with the release of a study from 
Dr. Alan Sanders, who analyzed the genes on 409 pairs of gay brothers 
and found they shared notable patterns in two regions of the human 
genome, on the X chromosome and chromosome 8.
Yet the importance and significance of a genetic explanation for 
human sexual orientation is hotly contested within LGBT academia, 
where a rift has opened between those who view the essentialist (“born 
that way”) thesis as a vindication of LGBT human rights and those who 
see it as both irrelevant and dangerous. In the latter camp is Julie Bindel, 
who claims that resting human rights “on the basis that we can’t help who 
we are is counter-productive.” She sees those who embrace the gay essen-
tialist thesis as attempting to vindicate homosexual behavior (which is 
a choice) on the grounds of biological difference, which would put gay 
rights on the same basis as anti-racist or feminist politics.
Many gay people are sympathetic to Bindel’s claim that homosexuality 
is not due to genes but to “a mix of opportunity, luck, chance, and, quite 
frankly, bravery.” But what Bindel means by “homosexuality” is homo-
sexual behavior, not the involuntary experience of homosexual attraction 
or desire, which can be expressed or repressed. Essentialists may agree 
with Bindel that homosexual conduct is a choice. The essentialist thesis is 
not determinism and does not require that homosexuals have no choice 
about their sexual expression. Indeed, Bindel is right to say that sexual 
behavior is down to a variety of factors and not simply reducible to bio-
logical sexual attraction. Perhaps not surprisingly, Dean Hamer expressly 
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rejected any sort of “gay gene determinism” after publishing his study on 
the gay gene back in 1993.
No one is claiming that all people who identify as lesbian or gay were 
born that way. For a variety of personal reasons, some people simply pre-
fer to share intimate partnership with someone of the same sex. Even if 
people are “born that way” this would not entail that they necessarily 
behave in exclusively homosexual ways. Some might even pretend to be 
straight for their entire lives. Nor is anyone claiming that being “born that 
way” is a necessary condition for granting full legal acceptance of homo-
sexuality. In a liberal democracy, bisexuals and people not born with a 
predisposition to same-sex attraction ought to be free to participate 
in homoerotic (or any) sexual behavior, so long as it is consenting and 
between adults.
However, the essentialist thesis still has significance for LGBT human 
rights because research into the biological causes of sexual orientation 
continues unabated. If private companies can profit from offering pro-
spective parents a eugenic “treatment” for homosexual orientation, we 
can be sure they will lobby hard for the liberty to do so. They are already 
laying the discursive groundwork for a eugenic age.
The traditional nexus between acknowledging that some people have 
no choice in being “born that way” and social tolerance of homosexual 
behavior has broken down. So Bindel is right that pinning one’s hopes for 
justice and equal rights on gay biology is a lost cause.
Back in 1992, only months after Simon LeVay published his “gay 
gene” theory, the Roman Catholic Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
Faith reiterated its position that the homosexual inclination must be seen 
as an “objective disorder.” From the 1990s onwards a variety of religious 
and social conservative bioethicists began publishing widely in support 
of interpreting homosexuality as a pathology and used pseudo-medical 
language with a view to the future when reprogenetics—the merging of 
reproductive and genetic technologies—or some similar treatment sce-
nario will be viable. These authors were frighteningly well placed to influ-
ence public policy.
Nowadays, instead of describing given aspects of natural “creation” as 
the very benchmark of God’s design and plan, Christian bioethicists such 
as Ronald Cole-Turner, Michael J. Reiss, Nigel M. de S. Cameron, Dr. 
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Roger Straughan and Ted Peters emphasize how biotechnology might 
facilitate human interventions into “fallen creation” in order to “restore” 
it to “its full glory.” They argue in support of treating homosexual orienta-
tion as a target for biomedical intervention.
Whether or not there is a biological substrate that determines pat-
terns of sexual attraction is a question of fact, not one of value. So, if it 
turns out that there is a “gay gene(s),” denying its existence in theory will 
not prevent big biotech firms from providing the means to eliminate it in 
fact. Therefore, forming an anti-eugenic lobby to advocate for laws that 
would prevent the misuse of biotech is preferable to treating gay biology 
as a chimera.
Liberal eugenicists are already arguing for unlimited and unregulated 
use of reprogenetics. They distinguish it from eugenics in that the latter 
implies state coercion with the presumption of benefit. The former would 
be voluntarily pursued by individual parents with the aim of improving 
their children according to their preferences. This is a form of privatized 
or free-market eugenics, so there is of course a financial incentive to pro-
mote its use.
Liberal eugenics leaves eugenic decisions to the market, driven by 
parental preferences and consumer demand. This seems to qualify as 
“liberal” because the state does not impose any single vision of “the good 
life” upon future generations of individuals subject to it. Rather, it leaves 
individuals the “moral space” within which to make value judgments 
for themselves (and for their offspring). Consequently, proponents like 
Nicholas Agar and Gregory Stock argue that the future direction of 
human nature will be determined not by a dictator with utopian plans 
for social engineering, but by parents and what they perceive to be in the 
best interests of their offspring. Though not a Christian invention, the lib-
eral eugenics movement provides an ideological Trojan horse by means 
of which Christian (or any) eugenics can get a legitimate foothold in a 
liberal democracy.
Against this view, it should be noted that allowing a patient’s “disease” 
status to be defined (and treated without his consent) not only fails to 
protect the individual from the tyranny of the majority; it legitimizes 
subjecting individuals to such a tyranny by new, more powerful, and irre-
vocable means. Unlike the indoctrinated child who can, if given adequate 
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alternatives, rebel against a controlling parent, the genetically modified 
child would simply not wish to rebel. Medicine will be enlisted to do the 
work that punishment and moral exhortation did in the past. But provid-
ing new, more efficient and permanent ways of expressing the majority’s 
intolerance for perceived “social ills” is anything but liberal.
Reducing the biological substrate for homosexual attraction (if one 
exists) will almost certainly reduce homosexual behavior. The purpose 
of the reprogenetic interventions will be to eliminate individuals’ volun-
tary homosexuality by eliminating their involuntary biological predispo-
sition for it. This will happen not by taking away the individual’s free will, 
but by biologically steering the direction in which it is most likely to be 
expressed. To deny this is to pretend that voluntary sexual acts are unre-
lated to involuntary sexual attraction.
05.23.2016
Feminine Monstrosity in the 2016 Presidential Campaign
Martha Patterson
In 1897, the popular humor magazine  Life  featured the William 
Walker cartoon “The Inauguration of the Future,” in which a portly, spec-
tacled, middle-aged mannish woman delivers her presidential acceptance 
speech. On the right appear similarly corpulent women in robes and mili-
tary attire, while on the left, cross-armed, gaunt, spectacled women sit in 
top hats. The only man on the podium holds a squalling baby.
Walker’s caricature typified for many the prevailing anxiety about 
women’s changing roles in American society in the late nineteenth cen-
tury. If allowed to enter political life, particularly as a suffragette, the 
New Woman risked becoming manly, browbeating, and neglectful of her 
proper role as mother and wife.
And yet at the same time that Life satirized the New Woman as politi-
cal activist, it also celebrated the statuesque white American girl by one 
of the most popular artists of his time, Charles Dana Gibson. With her 
abundant upswept hair, corseted waist, pert nose, and towering persona, 
Gibson’s iconographic “Gibson Girl” quickly became the de rigueur of 
American femininity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
that young women, regardless of race, ethnicity or class, often tried to 
emulate. Appearing on calendars, glove boxes, popular illustrated novels, 
decorative plates, and weekly magazines, the Gibson Girl affirmed wom-
en’s desire for greater freedom, but only as a personal, rather than politi-
cal, freedom. Her youthful beauty, then, sanctioned her greater athleti-
cism—swimming in the sea or exclaiming “Fore” to the world on the golf 
course; her greater autonomy in the marriage market—juggling prospec-
tive suitors unchaperoned; or, even, occasionally, her desire for higher 
education—wearing a cap and gown. Hers was a transgression that shop-
pers would want to buy.
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Indeed, while Gibson disavowed the presence of women in political 
settings, he extolled the American girl as the catalyst for a new consumer-
based economy and as a representative of the nation. As Columbia, 
she was an icon of American power and seeming invincibility during a 
period of U.S. imperial expansion. Gibson’s illustrations for Life featured 
the “joke” that the Gibson Girl was a trophy to be won, and as such, the 
money needed to sustain her shopping sprees should be indulged if they 
propelled the Gibson Man to work harder.
Both the mannish suffragette turned president and the Gibson Girl 
turned consumer became two sides of the New Woman coin: one a sym-
bol of derision, the other a symbol to emulate.
The pages of that early version of  Life  offer an important frame to 
understand the historic moment of Hillary Clinton as the first woman to 
become the nominee for president from a major political party. Initially, 
it appears, her presence seems to offer, at last, a definitive refutation of 
anti-New Woman arguments typified in Walker’s illustration. Neither fat, 
ugly, nor spectacled, Hilary has not reduced her husband to the role of 
nanny nor driven her female supporters to expressions of manliness.
On the one hand, Hillary’s candidacy initially seemed to have pro-
voked less of a misogynist backlash than her 2008 run. We aren’t watch-
ing  Saturday Night Live  skits about her cankles or reading that she 
eschewed an appearance in Vogue lest she would appear too feminine, a 
decline that prompted Anna Wintour to remark, “The notion that a con-
temporary woman must look mannish in order to be taken seriously as a 
seeker of power is frankly dismaying.”
And, in some ways, even though Hillary’s hawkish approach to for-
eign policy suggests a need to assert masculine toughness, she seems to 
have dodged Walker’s satire of maternal abandonment by being a mother 
and grandmother, which she noted in her presumptive Democratic nom-
ination acceptance speech. She has watched her weight, in a way that a 
male presidential candidate could forego. She declared herself a “bottle 
blonde” who wouldn’t “shrink from a fight”—thereby appearing younger 
but still tough enough to lead a nation.
And yet, a sexist backlash still frames Hillary’s candidacy, especially 
to the extent that arguments against her focus on how her behavior defies 
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that which is positively but subordinately feminine—namely that her 
overwhelming political ambition leads her to break the rules.
If Obama, as the first president to overcome the color barrier, is 
accused of being foreign-born and secretly Muslim—in effect, profit-
ing from the unpoliced borders of nation and religion—Hillary, as the 
first woman to break the barrier of sex, is accused, albeit indirectly, of 
being manly in her ambition and womanly both in her cowardice and 
deception. As man/woman she is inherently “crooked”—a term before 
this election season typically applied to men—in the very way that the 
corseted Gibson Girl is straight. Rather than smiling to please, she yells, 
presenting herself, in the words of Republican National Committee 
chairman, Reince Priebus, as “angry and defensive.” Pandora-like, she 
lies to mask the extent to which she is to blame for the world’s ills. In 
that hybrid of masculine ambition and feminine deception, she becomes, 
as we heard in the Republican Convention, monstrous, deceitful, crimi-
nal, murderous even. Her legacy, according to Trump in his acceptance 
speech, is “death, destruction and weakness.”
In the view of Trump’s supporters, Hillary is the candidate of trans-
gression, the crossing of gender, legal, national and economic borders, as 
Trump is the candidate of walls—traditional gender roles, tight border 
security, and high tariff barriers. He is clearly the patriarch; the chooser 
of desirable women, the father of five children. His authoritarian style, 
exemplified by his admiration for Vladimir Putin, is an extension of that 
patriarchal role. Commanding other nations to bow to his authority, he 
would order Mexico to pay for the construction of a border  wall  and 
would somehow  compel  other countries to  acquiesce  to trade agree-
ments more favorable to the United States.
Making American Great Again offers in Melania Trump a revival of 
the Gibson Girl, a figure more often seen than heard as beauty icon and 
trophy wife.
And yet, of course, the open/closed dichotomy is messy, just as the 
New Woman/Gibson Girl icon was. Trump has clearly benefitted from 
free trade and a globalized labor force; his wife is a first generation immi-
grant from Slovenia; his daughter Ivanka, more visible on the campaign 
than his wife, is an accomplished businesswoman.
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But the historical parallel does offer us an important reminder of the 
lenses that still color how we view this first female presidential nominee 
and the zeal of her antagonist’s followers, even as it points to the irony 
of Trump as the disciplined border-control, tough-on-terrorism and law-
and-order candidate. The quest for the Gibson Girl, as Columbia, was 
supposed to inspire a rigorous, but sedulous male counterpart in the 
clean shaven, prosperous, well-disposed Gibson Man. Trump’s impulsiv-
ity, petulance, and narcissism evoke long-held stereotypes of women as 
they suggest a body and mind governed by emotion rather than reason.
Changing who takes charge of the wailing baby and who assumes the 
office of the presidency is still, for many Americans, an uncomfortable 
upending of traditional mores, and raises an intriguing question. When 
Trump declared his candidacy in June of 2015, most Americans antici-
pated that Hillary Clinton would probably be the Democratic nominee. 
Had the Democratic frontrunner and eventual nominee been a white 
male, would the Republican nominee have been different? Perhaps not, 
but given the history of American New Woman iconography, it is no sur-
prise that her rival for the presidency offers Americans such a dramatic 
contrast, in gender politics as much as political vision.
09.26.2016
Rape Is Torture
Jay M. Bernstein
In an excruciating New York Times article, Rukmini Callimachi details in 
painful and exact terms the system of sex slavery of Yazidi women and 
girls that ISIS has set in place. Without any boundaries of sexual permis-
sibility apart from the prohibition against sex with pregnant women, 
ISIS warriors and followers pray to God before and after raping and sex-
ually destroying their Yazidi captives as if they were thereby fulfilling a 
deeply religious obligation. If we possess any sense that there are abso-
lute moral boundaries, ISIS’s practices of torture, slavery, and rape cross 
them, defiantly.
Let us look at those boundaries for a moment. After saying everyone 
has the “right to life, liberty and security of person,” there occurs the first 
substantive and specific article of the Universal Declaration  of  Human 
Rights: “No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave 
trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.” To enslave an individual is 
the systematic denial that they possess equal human dignity; enslaving 
is now the paradigm act of what it  means  to deny others equal human 
worth. To be a slave is either to be a mere thing, a tool, for the other; or 
a peculiar kind of ‘human-thing,’ a human that qua human has no worth 
in him or herself and exists solely for the benefit of the enslaver. In this 
respect, the link between enslaving and religious rape could not be more 
perspicuous: Yazidi religion is taken by ISIS to fall outside the pale of 
those religious practices suitable for humans, peoples of the Book, who 
are God’s creatures; slavery and sexual abuse is the use proper to the less 
than fully human.
Given the easy path from slavery to rape, and rape’s persistence as a 
fundamental form of degradation and dehumanization, one might have 
thought that the next article of the Declaration would mention rape. But 
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rape is not mentioned in the next article; instead one finds (Article 5): 
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment.” Despite much argument concerning 
women’s rights and equality, I know of no discussion of rape in the run-
up to the Declaration. A reasonable hypothesis for this lacuna is that the 
authors of the  Declaration  considered rape as one, explicit form of tor-
ture—an hypothesis that easily falls in place when we recall that, since 
ancient times, rape has been used as a form of torture, as if corporeal tor-
ture and rape were nothing other than the sexual division of torturous 
labor’s objects.
ISIS’s religious rape practices would be morally heinous and abomi-
nable even if they were not part of a system of slavery. Part of the awful-
ness of slavery is, precisely, its function as mechanism for licensing rape 
and torture, or, better, rape as torture. Rape is torture: it is this thought 
that has been missing from recent discussions of rape. Getting this 
idea into view is complicated because sex is complicated, and all things 
being considered, while we officially revile rape, we also—secretly, sotto 
voce,  unconsciously—consider it the dark side of sex, part of the dan-
ger of sex, the underside of sex’s threading together of pleasure and pain. 
Rape is none of these things, however; rape is torture.
Let me begin again. Sex is always complex and risky. In it we physically 
expose ourselves to the touch of another in ways we do not otherwise 
allow. And, at least at its heights, sex involves letting go of the preroga-
tives of will, control, and mastery in order to surrender to bodily involun-
tariness: we are overcome and undone, we quiver with delight. And sex is 
messy. Mixed in with all the excitement and joy, sexual life is laced with 
failure and unhappiness. There are all sorts of unhappy and bad sex: sex 
we regret from the first kiss, or halfway through (“This feels weird”), or 
the morning after, or years later (“Why did I sleep with him?”). There 
is also just bad sex, sex in which we feel we are being used, in bed with 
someone who is utterly self-absorbed, or who has no clue how to give 
sexual pleasure, or who is into stuff we find disgusting.
However messy sex is, rape is not a form of bad sex—say, very bad 
sex, terrible sex, the worst sex ever. Rape is not sex at all from the per-
spective of the victim, even as it exploits the victim’s powers for sexual 
pleasure. It is, rather, torture.
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Consider this: The torturer’s strategy and goal is to reduce his victim 
to his body. What is it for a human to be “reduced” to his body given that 
we are anyway bodily beings?
Human embodiment has a dual structure: we are the kinds of beings 
that both are our bodies and have our bodies. More precisely, the human 
body must be conceived as having both voluntary and involuntary 
dimensions. The involuntary body is the body that sweats, blushes, hic-
cups, excretes, menstruates, gets pregnant, lactates, feels pains and plea-
sures, the body that rages with anger and quakes with fear, the body that 
feels the touch of every object, and too the body that laughs hysterically 
and cries uncontrollably. The voluntary body, the body I  have, is the 
body that is a vehicle for action, the body that intends the world through 
action, the body that can be so absorbed in its doing that it disappears 
from focal consciousness, with only the object of the activity present: my 
fingers dashing over the keyboard as I simply play the sonata, only the 
sonata itself as the object of consciousness.
All human experience involves a coordination of the voluntary and 
involuntary body, where the correct or appropriate relation between the 
voluntary and involuntary body is set in place by social rules. Torture 
depends on working the difference between the involuntary and the vol-
untary body differently. In torture, the victim is reduced to her involun-
tary body, while the torturer effectively takes possession of all voluntari-
ness and agency; the torturer  has  the victim’s body. Hence the victim’s 
body is no longer hers; she is a being who can suffer and weep and cry 
out and sweat and excrete—but these involuntary happenings occur 
beyond any possibility of control.
If in torture I can no longer call my body “mine,” then torture dispos-
sesses me of my body. And it is just this that rape is about: a radical act 
of dispossession through violation. What torture accomplishes through 
pain, rape accomplishes through violation—penetration without con-
sent. Rape too is a medium of communication, typically between a man 
and a woman, in which the message is that bodily voluntariness belongs 
essentially to the man and bodily involuntariness belongs to the woman as 
what is proper to her. The work of rape is to make the difference between 
bodily voluntariness and bodily involuntariness into a sexual and moral 
fate: the man appropriating all voluntariness to himself as he deposits the 
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woman in bodily involuntariness. In insisting that his victim is only her 
involuntary body, he is insisting her body is  his. Not only does slavery 
license torturous rape, but rape enacts the fundamental act of possession 
that constitutes slavery. Rape cultures are slave cultures in waiting.
Rape is a weapon in the sexual wars, and is meant at such; rape remains 
patriarchy’s most brutal means and a standing assertion of its end. Legal 
reform is important but does not answer to the persistence of rape in a 
presumptively liberal culture in which it has no place. Until there is a per-
vasive and overwhelming culture of intolerance for rape, it will continue; 
until, say, fellow soldiers and fraternity members take full moral respon-
sibility for their communities—by not permitting rape to occur when it 
can be prevented, and turning in and testifying against rapists—rape will 
continue. The slave trade and rape practices of ISIS are indeed horrific; 
our condemnation of their barbarism would be more convincing if the 
implicit tolerance for rape in our own culture were not so pervasive.
02.01.2016
Rape on Campus: The Title IX Revolution
Kelly Oliver
Title IX legislation, associated primarily with equal opportunities for 
girls in high school and college athletics, has become a turning point in 
discussions of sexual assault. Until recently, the greatest impact of the 
1972 Title IX legislation had been to ensure girls and women had access 
to sports. Although introduced to stop discrimination in higher educa-
tion, Title IX became the hallmark of women’s athletics, to the point that 
today there is a women’s sporting clothing company named  Title Nine, 
and last year President Obama spoke about the importance of Title IX 
for girls in terms of his own experience coaching his daughters’ basket-
ball team and the confidence it gave them. Initially, Title IX was used to 
secure funding for girls and women’s sports, which had been lacking until 
required by this federal statute.
On April 4, 2011, The United States Department of Education sent 
a “Dear Colleagues Letter” to institutions of higher learning, shifting 
the focus from college athletics to educational environment, specifi-
cally naming sexual violence as prohibited by Title IX. The letter defines 
sexual violence as “physical sexual acts perpetrated against a person’s will 
or where a person is incapable of giving consent due to the victim’s use 
of drugs or alcohol,” including “sexual assault, sexual battery, and sexual 
coercion,” and makes colleges and universities responsible “to take imme-
diate and effective steps to end sexual harassment and sexual violence.”
Much of the recent attention paid to sexual assault as a Title IX viola-
tion is the result of a lawsuit filed against The University of North Carolina 
in 2013 by Annie Clark and Andrea Pino, two undergraduates raped dur-
ing their first weeks on campus. Both reported the attacks to the univer-
sity, but they claim their statements were ignored or belittled. These two 
courageous women have made headlines for their anti-rape activism after 
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they founded EROC (End Rape on Campus) to help other women file 
Title IX lawsuits against universities across the country. Their use of Title 
IX has changed the terms of discussions over sexual assault on campus. 
This strategy has forced even those who insist, “rapists cause rape” to 
rethink isolating perpetrators from the culture that protects them.
There are at least two profound philosophical implications to be drawn 
from this approach to sexual violence, signaling a major shift in how we 
view responsibility. First, educational institutions are held responsible 
for creating the environment allowing, if not fostering, sexual violence; 
or, conversely, and more to the point, they are held responsible for cre-
ating an ethos fostering women’s education, which is not possible when 
one out of four college women is sexually assaulted and gender-based 
violence is a constant threat. The new use of Title IX marks a dramatic 
change in the attribution of responsibility for sexual assault and rape. 
Rape survivors across the country are filing Title IX lawsuits against their 
colleges and universities for allowing serial rapists to remain on campus, 
making the environment unsafe for female students. This strategy targets 
the educational institutions that harbor rapists rather than the rapists 
themselves and therefore holds schools responsible for sexual assault on 
campus. Rather than excuse the problem with the argument that a few 
bad apples spoil the whole bunch, this approach looks to systematic poli-
cies of disavowal and denial, to a dearth of attention to the problem, and 
a lack of consequences for perpetrators, along with the ways in which 
fraternities and sports culture perpetuate rape myths that women want 
to be raped or that blame the victims. In a society that values individual 
over institutional responsibility, this is a turning point. How successful it 
will be is another matter. But, conceptually, it forces us to think about the 
culture that spawns serial rapists on campus, and protects perpetrators 
instead of survivors.
Second, the use of Title IX in cases of sexual assault on campus 
switches the focus away from individual victims to gender-based vio-
lence. Rather than single out women as random targets of assault, or, as it 
happens too often, blame them for their own attacks through suggestions 
that they were asking for it by wearing provocative clothes, behaving in 
certain ways, or drinking, the focus shifts to the environment in which 
women are under a constant threat of being sexually assaulted. Just as the 
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shift away from individual perpetrators forces us to concentrate on the 
culture or ethos that produces sexual assault and serial rapists on campus, 
the shift away from individual victims makes us focus on gender-based 
violence and the culture that targets women for sexual assault.
Title IX as a strategy to address sexual violence against college women 
heralds a watershed in the way we view responsibility. Anti-rape activism 
is on the vanguard of transferring the blame and responsibility from indi-
viduals to social systems and institutions. If ours is a rape culture, then 
the solution must also address the culture of sexual violence that perpet-
uates sexual assault and gender-based violence.
The irony is that, while anti-rape activists and survivors are using Title 
IX to force colleges and universities to address the problem of sexual vio-
lence on campus, this same piece of legislation is also being used to shut 
down discussions of rape on campus, the very kinds of dialogue neces-
sary to combat rape myths and rape culture. The risk is that educating 
about such violence itself becomes a “trigger” for past trauma as students 
demand safety not only from harmful deeds, but also from any talk of 
sexual assault. This makes Title IX a double-edged tool in addressing this 
issue. We could speculate that turning Title IX against those on cam-
pus who speak out against this serious problem is actually an attempt to 
combat this dramatic turn in thinking about responsibility and who—or 
what—is responsible for gender-based violence.
Title IX has gone from addressing funding and quantifiable differ-
ences between resources spent on men’s and women’s athletics and edu-
cational programs to dealing with the ethos of educational institutions 
in terms of whether or not they empower girls and women. This is a first 
step in moving from concerns with mere formal equality in education to 
social justice for women. At least, as long as we use Title IX to open up 
rather than shut down discussions of rape culture and the contributions 
of rape myths, sexism, and hostility towards women to the prevalence of 
sexual violence.
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D. Food Matters
Veganism without Animal Rights
Gary Francione and Anna Charlton
We are going to defend what may appear to be a controversial position: 
that our moral rejection of meat, dairy, eggs, and all other animal prod-
ucts as food is required according to our conventional morality concern-
ing animals. That is, if you reject the idea that animals are things that have 
no moral value whatsoever, you are morally committed to adopting a 
vegan diet. And you don’t even need to embrace a theory of animal rights.
Let’s start with a hypothetical: You encounter Fred, who enjoys 
imposing pain and suffering on animals. Fred keeps a number of animals 
in his basement and goes down regularly and causes them to suffer phys-
ical pain, fear, and distress, and he then kills them. Fred is otherwise a 
lovely person; his penchant for killing animals does not affect his dealings 
with other humans in any way. When asked about why he does this, Fred 
explains that he derives pleasure and amusement from these actions.
Would anyone not regard what Fred was doing as morally objection-
able and, indeed, as morally odious? Of course not. Would such a reac-
tion assume that the objector accepted the equality of humans and non-
humans? No. Even if we think that animals have a lesser moral value than 
humans do, we would still object to Fred’s fetish, as long as we believe 
that animals have some moral value.
Most people believe that animals have some moral value but that it 
is not objectionable per se to use and kill animals for human purposes 
as long as we do not impose unnecessary suffering on them. And neces-
sity must exclude suffering imposed for the reason of pleasure, amuse-
ment, or convenience. If imposing pain for pleasure, amusement, or con-
venience may be considered as necessary, then there is nothing that can 
be considered as unnecessary. If pleasure, amusement, or convenience 
can be considered as “necessary,” then the conventional wisdom about 
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animals is that we can use animals as long as we don’t impose unneces-
sary suffering, or gratuitous suffering. So in Fred’s case, conventional wis-
dom would say that Fred should not impose more harm than is neces-
sary for him to derive the pleasure and amusement he seeks. But no one 
would regard that as a plausible understanding of “necessity.”
This is precisely why most people object to blood sports such as fox 
hunting and bull fighting: they involve imposing suffering and death on 
animals for the purposes of pleasure and amusement.
So the question becomes: on what basis can we justifiably kill almost 
60 billion animals a year worldwide (not counting fish)? Under the 
best—the most “humane” of circumstances—the amount of suffering 
we impose on animals in the process of using them for food is staggering. 
If we believe that unnecessary suffering is wrong, how can we justify that 
level of suffering? Indeed, even if we made animal agriculture much more 
“humane” than it presently is, there will still be suffering, fear, distress, 
and death. And there is no morally coherent distinction between meat 
and other animal products, such as dairy and eggs. They all involve suffer-
ing, distress, and death.
Given that we have criticized Fred, what do we have to say in our 
defense if Fred points to his critics as hypocrites who consume animal 
products? Until recently, most people have believed that it was necessary 
to consume animal foods and that, without those foods, humans would 
shrivel up and die. Many people still believe that today.
This belief is not justifiable. We’ve known for centuries that humans 
can live without consuming any animal protein. To the extent that any-
one holds that belief today, it is a testament to the combined power of 
advertising and a corporate-controlled media reinforcing our desire for 
eating what we are used to and what tastes good to us in light of our 
past experience.
The view that we need animal foods for human nutrition is clearly and 
unequivocally false. It is now acknowledged by just about every respected 
professional organization, including the American Heart Association 
and the Mayo Clinic, as well as by governmental agencies all over the 
world, that a diet consisting only of plant foods can not only be perfectly 
healthy, but is almost certainly more healthy than a diet heavy in meat, 
dairy, and eggs. But whether a vegan diet is more healthy, it is certainly 
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not less healthy and animal foods cannot be considered necessary for 
human health. There is also broad consensus that animal agriculture is an 
ecological disaster.
So, in the end, what’s the best justification that we have for imposing 
suffering and death on many billions of animals?
Animal foods taste good.
We enjoy the taste of animal flesh and animal products.
We find eating animal foods to be convenient. It’s a habit.
How, then, is our consumption of animal products any different from 
Fred’s situation? It’s not. Palate pleasure is no different morally from any 
other sort of pleasure. 
The usual response at this point is to say that there is a moral differ-
ence between Fred and someone who goes to the store and buys animal 
products. There may be a psychological difference but there is no moral 
one—any more than there is a difference between someone who com-
mits a murder and someone who pays to have the murder committed. 
And there is no difference—psychological or moral—between Fred 
and a hunter.
So if we object to what Fred does, we are acting inconsistently if we 
don’t stop eating animal foods and go vegan at least in those cases where 
we are not starving to death on the proverbial desert island or lifeboat. In 
those situations, different considerations obtain. Indeed, there have been 
instances where humans have eaten other humans in those situations and 
we have regarded that conduct as immoral (and illegal) but as excusable 
under the circumstances.
Some argue that our consumption of animal foods is traditional and 
that many animal foods are culturally significant. If something is morally 
wrong, the fact that it is a tradition or culturally significant cannot res-
cue it. There is no more enduring a tradition than sexism and misogyny, 
aspects of which are accorded considerable social significance.
What about plants? This is the very first question that every vegan 
gets at a dinner party. Plants are alive; they are not sentient. They do not 
have the subjective experiences that the animals we consume as food do. 
They react to stimulation; they do not respond. They do not have inter-
ests; there is nothing that they want, desire, or prefer. And even if plants 
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were sentient, veganism would still be a moral imperative given that it 
takes many pounds of plants to produce one pound of flesh.
Please note that we have showed you that, unless you embrace the 
idea that animals are merely things that are outside the moral commu-
nity, you are committed to veganism. And we never even mentioned ani-
mal rights. That is because we don’t need that concept unless we are talk-
ing about situations in which there is a plausible claim of necessity and 
we need a rights analysis to understand and resolve the conflict. But 99% 
of our uses of animals, including our numerically most significant use of 
them for food, do not involve any sort of necessity or any real conflict 
between human and nonhuman interests. If animals matter morally at all, 
then, even without accepting a theory of animal rights, those uses of ani-
mals cannot be morally justified.
06.13.2015
Hunger
Claire Colebrook
One way we might think about the present is by way of an all too natu-
ral epidemic of hunger confusion. Here is what we are so often told by 
those experts who explain a series of disorders ranging from hunger in 
its literal sense, to broader problems of consumption (of information 
and resources, for instance): “we” evolved as hunter-gatherers with meta-
bolic and psychic systems that favored short-term high consumption 
that would serve us well should times get tough. The very brain that will 
later give us the right to say “we” and to consume other animals by way 
of industrial technology is what required and allowed us to develop an 
energy-rich diet. In order for “us” to evolve with big technology-creating 
brains, “we” had to develop a taste for fat.
Sadly, those same brains that have discerned this evolutionary geneal-
ogy are not so quick to adjust to the high availability of energy-rich foods. 
In short, we are suffering from an obesity epidemic precisely because the 
most natural thing in the world—hunger—is confused. One might say 
that this confusion is not accidental but essential: we developed undue 
hunger to feed our brains, with our brains then able to detect high-energy 
foods, and then able to develop technologies to produce those high-
energy foods. It is not only our bodies that are weighed down by the fat 
we consume and carry. Cognitive performance becomes sluggish when 
a high-fat diet is combined with the sedentariness that our big-brained 
techno-science made available: what does not kill us makes us weaker.
It is perhaps no wonder that a “paleo” diet has such a lure: if our 
brains cannot speed up and notice that they have altered the world and 
the speed of consumption, then we should act and eat as if we were still 
subjected to a world of simple scarcity. If our hunger is constitutively 
confused—oriented to high-consumption in a world overburdened with 
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consumables—then let’s create a private paleo world where we eat as if 
there were only the scarcest and simplest of foods. (And hasn’t the same 
thing happened to liberal ecological morality: whatever the complexities 
of the globe, act privately as if our world were otherwise—eat organic, 
recycle, drive a smaller car…).
The confusion of hunger is also, again according to those who know 
our species’ history better than we supposedly know ourselves, altering 
our relation to information. In a world of scarce resources, competitive-
ness and fear, it made sense that we would develop a capacity to consume 
multiple sources of information quickly.
But, then, with a long (colonizing) history of enabled leisure we 
allowed ourselves, as Katherine Hayles put it, the luxury of “deep atten-
tion” rather than “hyper-attention”. Because of all that hunting and gath-
ering that generated the big brain and, hence, generated technology, we 
could sit down and read Jane Austen, and start to think deeply about 
profound moral questions and the history of “man.” Our moral theory 
could liberate itself from mere survival and the minimal moralism of 
being decent only to those with whom we were adjacent; we could—as 
Henri Bergson argued—develop from a morality of mutual coopera-
tion towards a spiritual religion concerned with a completely virtual and 
futural humanity.
We might say that our spiritual hunger is constitutively and felicitously 
confused: we act towards others not only with a sense of self-interest, but 
with a broader concern for humanity to come. Unfortunately, as with the 
hunger for food that developed to the point of gluttony, the hunger for 
information and cognition has—as Bernard Stiegler tells us in States of 
Shock—developed to the point of stupidity. We are now falling back into 
the hyper-attention from which deep cognition evolved. This may help us 
with video games and day trading, but it is perhaps the worst skill of all if 
we are to think the complex temporalities of climate change.
And so, before we even consider the temporal complexity of the prob-
lem of climate change, we might note this: what we have come to think 
of and esteem as “the human”—man as a political animal with a sense of 
himself as a being oriented towards the care of others—is already under 
the pressure of its own constitutive hunger. The “original” desire for com-
plexity and technology has positively been folded back into desire and 
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allowed the human organism to over-consume the world’s resources and 
then over-consume the resources of those it does not deem to be suffi-
ciently human.
“Man” is an effect of hunger confusion; when “he” finds that the 
planet he so successfully mastered and rendered consumable is starving, 
his thought is not of rethinking the dialectic of hunger but of going on 
a diet. If we manage consumption now, we might develop a little more, 
and then live a little longer—sustain, survive, adapt, mitigate, but do not 
rethink the trajectory of this thinking animal.
Rather, then, than argue that we should de-confuse hunger—have 
us all return to a simpler, frugal, paleo or eco-friendly appetite—I would 
suggest that we embrace hyper-confusion. Rather than say that “we” 
evolved but that our hunter-gatherer and simple narrative brains cannot 
cope with the moral and resource-complex worlds that “we” generated, 
we might think of refusing that simple confusion of economy. Rather 
than say that we have been too clever for our own good and that we have 
developed techno-science without thinking enough about what it took 
from the planet and stole from most humans other than those who think 
of themselves as the “we” of humanity—let us shift that confusion of 
hunger out of the temporal narrative.
It is not the case that there was ever a “we” that embarked upon a jour-
ney of complexity, riven by a time lag (between a body that is over-fed 
and a brain that is stuck in a too simple past). That split is always among 
some who think of themselves as the “we” (the “we” who unfortunately 
destroyed the planet and who now declare “us” to be anthropocene 
humans) and some who have no hunger for any future “we.”
Let us imagine this at its simplest: there are those whom the “we” 
consume—not only animals, but future and present humans not blessed 
with the burden of cognizing the wonder and blessedness of the species. 
Do we think the various species on the red list have even the simplest 
hunger for the future? Or are most modes of life living on with the most 
confused of hungers, a hunger that is constantly thwarted and not even 
granted the luxurious temporality of thinking of a future that is tragically 
bereft of life as we know it. Perhaps, then, the “we” who are so hungry 
for a future—the “we” that dreams of geo-engineering, colonizing other 
planets, averting existential risks and enhancing the species—perhaps 
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this “we” should thwart its hunger for the future and think of desires not 
tied to the rational self-interests of this wondrous history of brain-heavy 
man? That hunger might be radically con-fused: conjoined and fused 
with a life not its own, a life that does not appear as a personal surviving 
life of one of “us.”
11.09.2015
Feeding Cars and Junking People
Robert Albritton
Today, we are experiencing a global food crisis. Close to one billion peo-
ple have to cope with hunger, and many more have to deal not only with 
the malnutrition that stems from lack of food, but also from the one that 
derives from eating too much junk food. This latter form of malnutrition 
is promoted to a large extent by food corporations that have discovered 
the human love of sweets, a love that is close to an addiction for many 
people. As a result, now 2.1 billion people world-wide are overweight 
and according to The Lancet, a leading medical journal, this represents an 
“obesity time bomb” that endangers the future health of people around 
the globe, and also threatens to bankrupt most healthcare systems.
In Let Them Eat Junk: How Capitalism Creates Hunger and Obesity, I 
explore many dimensions of a set of global food problems that are reach-
ing crisis proportions. For example, it is now common for commentators 
to refer to a “global obesity epidemic.” While this awareness is a good 
thing, I wish more attention were paid to the “global hunger epidemic,” 
even though many people take this as simply the way things have always 
been. But should we really accept that the underlying cause of one-third 
of all child deaths under five is malnutrition, and that, according to esti-
mates by the World Food Program, 16,000 children around the world die 
each day from hunger-related conditions? Even in rich America over 45 
million people live in poverty. Further, 20 percent of all American house-
holds are dependent on food stamps, including 22 million children; 
yet Congress cut the food stamp program by 7 percent in 2014. It did 
this despite the shocking growth of poverty that caused US households 
dependent on food stamps to increase by 52 percent in the past 5 years.
Hunger and obesity on a global scale are very large problems to ana-
lyze within a short article. Hence, I will narrow it down to one topic: US 
Feeding Cars and Junking People 203
corn production and distribution. The US produces 40 percent of the 
world’s corn harvest, placing it far ahead of other countries, but it only 
exports about 15 percent (exports to Mexico of US subsidized corn have 
devastated Mexican corn farmers). Though corn can be a healthy food, 
in the US very little is consumed directly as a part of human nutrition, 
for over 40 percent is converted into ethanol in order to feed cars, while 
36 percent is used as feed for livestock—it takes 425 gallons of water 
to produce 4 oz. of beef—which in turn becomes meat for human con-
sumption, and much of the rest (other than exports) is converted into 
high fructose corn syrup (HFCS), the main sweetener of most junk food 
and a major contributor to ill health: diabetes, heart attacks, obesity, fatty 
liver disease, etc. On average American children get 20 percent of their 
calories from HFCS.
HFCS is the sweetener of choice in most junk foods, and this results 
in its being the number one source of calories in the American diet. It is 
cheaper than sugar derived from sugar cane or sugar beets, largely because 
the US government subsidizes corn (starting in 2015 farmers must 
choose between price protection or quantity protection) and has placed 
import duties on other sources of sugar. The average American consumes 
41.5 lbs of HFCS per year. Dr. Lobstein of The World Obesity Federation 
has argued that the food industry has particularly targeted children, 
because eating habits are established early and continue throughout life. 
Children now eat more than they did three decades ago, “translating to 
roughly $20 billion in additional business for the food industry.”
Having discovered long ago that most humans have a “sweet tooth,” 
the food industry now adds HFCS to most processed foods (74 percent 
of packaged foods). Research published over a year ago in the journal 
JAMA Internal Medicine argues that people who consume 25 percent or 
more of their daily calories from added sugar nearly triple their likeli-
hood of dying from heart disease. Further, it has been known for years 
that the high intake of added sugar can be a causal factor in cancer, diabe-
tes, fatty liver disease and many other chronic diseases. On the one hand, 
the US government gives large subsidies to the corn industry, while, on 
the other, the USDA (US Department of Agriculture) claims that health-
ier diets would save $75 billion a year in medical expenses, which now 
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include 16 million Americans with heart disease, 25.8 million with dia-
betes, and 31 percent with fatty liver disease.
The production of HFCS typically uses about 5 percent of the total US 
corn crop, and, as already pointed out, 40 percent goes to ethanol. 90 per-
cent of the corn crop is genetically modified to be immune to herbicides, 
the active ingredient of which is “glyphosate.” This is highly problematic 
given that even the conservative WHO (World Health Organization) has 
stated that it is probably a carcinogen. Furthermore, weeds have in time 
built a resistance to glyphosate, so that more and more has to be used to 
kill what are becoming superweeds. Finally, as more people get exposed 
to more glyphosate, they manifest a variety of diseases. For example, in 
Argentina, in places where glyphosate is widely used, birth defects have 
gone up fourfold. A recent study by an MIT scientist claims that in com-
bination with other chemicals, glyphosate is a causal factor in autism 
spectrum disease, and that at current rates 50 percent of Americans will 
be autistic by 2030.
According to existing legislation, the US is planning a four-fold 
increase in corn biofuel by 2022, and all of this corn will be GM. US 
subsidies for food and farming over the next ten years come to nearly 
$1 trillion. In 2012, 283 million lbs of glyphosate (mostly produced by 
Monsanto as “Round Up”) were dumped on American corn fields, and 
this will steadily increase with the greater acreage of biofuel corn and with 
the growing resistance of weeds to this herbicide. Further, as more and 
more acreage is converted to highly subsidized corn destined to be bio-
fuel, the prices of other crops and hence of food in general will increase 
as their supply decreases and the supply of corn for biofuel increases. At 
the same time as more corn is grown for biofuel and less for food, the 
prices of foods based on corn will increase. It has already been estimated 
that this was the main cause of an increase in the price of food in recent 
years. For example, corn prices increased by 21 percent in 2009 as a result 
of the use of corn for biofuels.
The short-term profit orientation of most capitalist practices is radi-
cally inadequate for dealing with long-term social and environmental 
costs. It gets us into trouble by ignoring the most important variables 
when it comes to the future quality of the environment and of life, which 
are, of course, thoroughly intertwined. One way forward would be to 
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collect all the profits generated by capitalism and then redistribute them 
in accord with criteria that advance long-term human and environmen-
tal flourishing while reducing social and environmental costs. This would 
require a transparent economy and new democratic institutions that 
would include expertise, practical experience, and people most impacted 
by the particular economic arrangements.
Food could increasingly be supplied by ecologically friendly means 
informed by advanced studies in ecology, as well as by practical knowl-
edge gained at local levels. Farms could mostly be run by cooperatives, 
families, or communal forms of organization. Last but not least, it could 
increasingly be understood how much health depends on a healthy diet, 
how much all human flourishing is integrated with environmental flour-
ishing, and how much the food system needs to be part of this integration.
06.22.2015

Part III
Interventions
A. Of God and Gods
Divine Violence in Ferguson 
Slavoj Žižek
In August 2014, violent protests exploded in Ferguson, a suburb of St. 
Louis, after a policeman shot to death an unarmed black teenager sus-
pected of robbery: for days, police tried to disperse mostly black pro-
testers. Although the details of the accident are murky, the poor black 
majority of the town took it as yet another proof of the systematic police 
violence against them. In U.S. slums and ghettos, police effectively func-
tion more and more as a force of occupation, something akin to Israeli 
patrols entering the Palestinian territories on the West Bank; media were 
surprised to discover that even their guns are more and more U.S. Army 
arms. Even when police units try just to impose peace, distribute human-
itarian help, or organize medical measures, their  modus operandi  is that 
of controlling a foreign population. The Rolling Stone magazine recently 
drew the conclusion that imposes itself after the Ferguson incident:
Nobody’s willing to say it yet. But after Ferguson, and espe-
cially after the Eric Garner case that exploded in New York 
after yet another non-indictment following a minority death-
in-custody, the police suddenly have a legitimacy problem in 
this country. Law-enforcement resources are now distributed 
so unevenly, and justice is being administered with such bra-
zen inconsistency, that people everywhere are going to start 
questioning the basic political authority of law enforcement.1
In such a situation, when police are no longer perceived as the agent 
of law, of the legal order, but as just another violent social agent, protests 
against the predominant social order also tend to take a different turn: 
that of exploding “abstract negativity”—in short, raw, aimless violence. 
When, in his Group Psychology, Freud described the “negativity” of unty-
ing social ties (Thanatos as opposed to Eros, the force of the social link), 
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he all too easily dismissed the manifestations of this untying as the fanati-
cism of the “spontaneous” crowd (as opposed to artificial crowds: the 
Church and the Army). Against Freud, we should retain the ambiguity 
of this movement of untying: it is a zero level that opens up the space 
for political intervention. In other words, this untying is the pre-political 
condition of politics, and, with regard to it, every political intervention 
proper already goes “one step too far,” committing itself to a new project 
(or Master-Signifier).
Today, this apparently abstract topic is relevant once again: the “unty-
ing” energy is largely monopolized by the New Right (the Tea Party 
movement in the U.S., where the Republican Party is increasingly split 
between Order and its Untying). However, here also, every fascism is a 
sign of failed revolution, and the only way to combat this Rightist untying 
will be for the Left to engage in its own untying—and there are already 
signs of it (the large demonstrations all around Europe in 2010, from 
Greece to France and the UK, where the student demonstrations against 
university fees unexpectedly turned violent). In asserting the threat of 
“abstract negativity” to the existing order as a permanent feature which 
can never be aufgehoben, Hegel is here more materialist than Marx: in his 
theory of war (and of madness), he is aware of the repetitive return of the 
“abstract negativity” which violently unbinds social links. Marx re-binds 
violence into the process out of which a New Order arises (violence as 
the “midwife” of a new society), while in Hegel, the unbinding remains 
non-sublated.
Are such “irrational” violent demonstrations with no concrete pro-
grammatic demands, sustained by just a vague call for justice, not today’s 
exemplary cases of what Walter Benjamin called “divine violence” (as 
opposed to “mythic violence,” i.e. the law-founding state violence)? They 
are, as Benjamin put it, means without ends, not part of a long-term strat-
egy. The immediate counter-argument here is: but are such violent dem-
onstrations not often unjust, do they not hit the innocent?
If we are to avoid the overstretched Politically Correct explanations 
according to which the victims of divine violence should humbly not 
resist it on account of their generic historical responsibility, the only solu-
tion is to simply accept the fact that divine violence  is  brutally unjust: 
it is often something terrifying, not a sublime intervention of divine 
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goodness and justice. A left-liberal friend from the University of Chicago 
told me of his sad experience: when his son reached high-school age, he 
enrolled him in a high school north of the campus, close to a black ghetto, 
with a majority of black kids, but his son was then returning home almost 
regularly with bruises or broken teeth—so what should he have done? 
Put his son into another school with a white majority or let him stay? 
The point is that this dilemma is wrong: The dilemma cannot be solved 
at this level since the very gap between private interest (safety of my son) 
and global justice bears witness to a situation which has to be overcome 
in its entirety.
03.09.2015
Notes
1. http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/
the-police-in-america-are-becoming-illegitimate-20141205.
God, Charlie, No One
Jean-Luc Nancy
Translated by Patrícia Vieira & Michael Marder
“Blessed be Thou, No One”: this verse of Paul Celan appears in his poem 
“Psalm”. This formula, like much of the poem, imitates a phrase in the 
Psalms of David (“Blessed be Thou,” or “Praise be unto Thee, Lord”). As 
various commentators have emphasized, and as is clear to anyone with 
some understanding of the spirit of “monotheism,” far from being blas-
phemous or “atheist,” this formula enunciates a deeper truth shared by 
the three great Abrahamic religions (and, in a completely different regis-
ter, also shared by Buddhism). Namely, that “God is not ‘someone’.”
When one says, “I am X” (for example, “Charlie”), one identifies with 
a name that refers to a specific person. Many may have the same name 
but each makes it more specific through one or more other names (fam-
ily name, sometimes that of the region, of a profession…). “Someone,” a 
person, is a concrete existence, recognizable in the world even if one can-
not be reduced to any kind of pure and simple “identity.” There are reli-
gions in which the gods have proper names because there are several of 
them (at times, a great number) and each has a particular mode of pres-
ence, with specific functions. Each can, therefore, have its own figuration 
that distinguishes it. These are not persons; they are figured presences 
that derive their life from the persons who pray to them and perform 
their rites.
The name “God” is not the name of such a figure. For this reason, the 
unique “god” of monotheism, in all its instantiations, cannot be repre-
sented. The images of God are not, in the first place, forbidden; they are, 
above all else, impossible. Even there where they are not formally prohib-
ited, the faithful know full well that these images are not God (this is true 
even when the images are attributed a sacred value, as is the case of the 
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icons in so-called “Orthodox” Christianity). “God” is nothing but a com-
mon name—god, a god—used to signal, rather than to define, that which 
escapes every name, that which is unnameable.
Each version of monotheism indicates, in its own way, this unname-
ability. For the Jews, God has a name that cannot be uttered. For the 
Christians, he has a kind of name by default, a defective proper name, 
that is the common name “god” (“deus” in Latin: the light of the sky, the 
day). In Islam, God has multiple names that refer to his qualities, and an 
oft-quoted tradition attributes 99 names to him, while the 100th remains 
unknown. The name Allah, which is a modification of an older denomi-
nation, denotes the infinite distance from the true name.
A common and very profound characteristic of monotheisms is that 
the affirmation of the one god is much more symbolic than arithmeti-
cal. The one god is a god whose uniqueness escapes every kind of rec-
ognition, determination, and identification. As the Quran affirms, he is 
“the Impenetrable” and “no one is equal to him” (Surah 112). If no one 
is equal to him, he himself is not equal to “one” according to any value 
we could attribute to unity and to uniqueness. To limit myself to an 
example, saying that he is “alone” has no more sense than saying that he 
is with everyone.
It is, therefore, impossible either to understand or to identify in some 
way this god that cannot be compared to any other god. It is only possible 
to worship him, if one wishes, in a way that would be deemed the least 
imperfect. We can further think that the division of monotheism into 
several big branches—at least three, but each also divided in its turn—
is nothing but a distribution of possibilities or of chances created by the 
opening up of a relationship. This distribution according to historical 
moments, places, and languages, is always renewing the forms of worship.
This does not mean either adulation or enslavement to idolatry, but, 
rather, the exact opposite. One of the distinguishing features of monothe-
isms is the rejection of “idols,” that is to say, in ancient Greek, of images 
in the sense of appearances, visions, or phantoms. It is simply unthink-
able to imagine that which has no relation with any kind of presence 
or representation. At most, we can, in the words of Montaigne, “imag-
ine the unimaginable” (Essays, II, 12)—which means to make the effort 
to abandon every identification with and every fixation on our subject, 
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even at the level of language. “Do not burden your heart with an idea that 
pertains to Him; you risk assimilating Him to what He is not” (Bistami, 
Shatahat, 203).
The tradition linked to the refusal of idolatry is the prophetic one. 
Prophets are not those who announce the future; they are those who 
speak “for,” in the Greek sense of the word. Moses, Jesus, Mohammed—
the three great prophets do not exclude the others—speak for the one 
who does not speak because he is not a person. They speak for No One. 
They convey “a speech that comes out of fire without any image,” as 
Moses put it in Deuteronomy 4:12, or they receive the task of reading 
or spreading the word (“Read!,” Surah 96). Insofar as they are prophets, 
they are admirable, prodigious men we could call saints, but they remain 
men, whose lives are well known. The texts that they write are entrusted 
to our understanding and our reflection. These writings come from far 
away in our history and they have been, and continue to be, read and 
reread, recited, commented upon and interpreted. The word of No One 
is not set in stone, since no word is: the meaning of words is revived and 
played out again and again, indefinitely.
This is why one says that the “signs of God are obvious in the hearts 
of those to whom the Science has been given” (Surah 29, 49). The 
Science in question is the knowledge acquired through meditation on the 
impossibility of giving only one meaning in our languages to the word 
of No One. That word tells us, above all, not to freeze any meaning of 
any word in any language. If there are many languages and many possi-
bilities of meaning in each of them, it’s because language points to some-
thing beyond it, towards an infinity of meaning and towards a truth that 
exceeds all signification and all naming.
That infinity of meaning, which is simultaneously obvious and 
obscure, is the true experience of our Jewish, Christian, Muslim and phil-
osophical traditions. Philosophy reflects the infinity of meaning but steers 
clear of the possibility of naming anything as a supreme name, including 
the name “No One.”
Philosophy is embroiled in all this history of the Mediterranean, 
Greek, Jewish, Arab, Roman, and European worlds (I am leaving aside 
here the parallels and the differences that link it to Hinduism, Buddhism, 
Taoism, etc.). In Greek philosophy, the name “god” no longer refers 
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merely to the different kinds of gods, all with their own proper names, 
but to a category without a name, i.e. the divine. The latter does not indi-
cate a kind of person or of existence but the fact that meaning is infinite 
and that the truth exceeds all attempts to pinpoint it. Philosophy rejects 
the possibility of attributing an immutable meaning to words, which 
entails rejecting the possibility of saying “Blessed be Thou” to some “one” 
or even to love the whisper of a name.
Even so, anyone can have very good reasons to name No One. No 
criticism can be opposed to this gesture. The demand of both monothe-
ism and philosophy is simply that the name should not become an idol. It 
should not become the representation of a “being” or of a “person.” And 
those who have faith should know that they utter this name, or this mis-
nomer, beyond all possibilities of naming.
The faithful should also know that the one God, or No One, pre-
scribes neither a fixed law nor a determined social, political, or economic 
regime, even if he does establish a certain number of precepts for his ado-
ration through this or that prophet. Because if all is prescribed, fixed, and 
unchangeable, divine infinity is denied. God/No One becomes a fetish, 
that is to say, a false god or an idol. This false god can become an instru-
ment for all sorts of desires for power and domination.
Since all figurations and all names of “god,” can be utilized in this way, 
it is legitimate and even advisable to criticize all instances of its use. This 
does not harm in any way the faith of those who trust in what lies beyond 
all names and figurations. On the contrary, it would honor a faith that 
does not lend itself to being usurped by interests of power and domina-
tion. The Christian faith was tainted by the colonizers and the conquer-
ors; this should not happen again.
The true God, or the truth of “god,” lies not in fetishism, that is to 
say, in the superstition of names, of figuration, and of various representa-
tions such as money, arms, verity, purity, salvation, and so on. It truly lies 
beyond these, in infinity, which is in another world but which opens itself 
here and now, each time, in the world where we live.
Infinity is neither enormous nor unattainable. It is simply this: not to 
get attached to something determinate, fixed, identified, named with a 
supposedly proper name.
03.02.2015
The Muslim ‘No’
Michael Marder
Each of the three monotheistic religions, commonly referred to as 
“Abrahamic,” has its own affirmation of faith, a single statement held to be 
fundamental by its adherents.
In Judaism, such a proclamation is  Shema (Listen), drawn from 
Deuteronomy 6:4. It reads: “Listen, O Israel: The Lord is our God, the 
Lord is One!” Observant Jews must recite Shema  daily—for instance, 
before falling asleep—and it is supposed to be the last thing they utter 
before dying. Even in the most private nocturnal moments and on the 
deathbed,  Shema announces monotheistic creed, in the imperative, to 
the religious community, united around “our God” who is “One.”
Christianity, too, has its dogma going back to the Apostles’ Creed, 
dating to the year 150. Still read during the baptismal ritual, the state-
ment of faith begins with the Latin word Credo, “I believe” and contin-
ues “…in the all-powerful God the Father, Creator of heavens and earth, 
and in Jesus Christ, His only Son, our Lord, conceived by the Holy Spirit, 
born of the Virgin Mary…” Credo  individualizes the believer; not only 
does it start with a verb in the first person singular, but it also crafts her or 
his identity through this very affirmation. While the Judaic Shema forges 
a community through a direct appeal to others, the Christian profession 
of faith self-referentially produces the individual subject of that faith.
The declaration of Islamic creed is called  Shahada, “Testimony.” In 
contrast to its other monotheistic counterparts, however, it commences 
with a negation. Its first word is “no,” lā: “There is no god [lā ilāha] but 
Allah, and Muhammad is his messenger.” Formulated in the early part of 
the eighth century, it plays an integral part in the conversion process and 
is the first of the Five Pillars of Islam. The first part of the “Testimony” is 
a confession of tawhid, or the oneness of God. Its rigorous monotheism 
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hinges on repudiating the existence of any other gods, which, itself, bor-
ders on atheism. (The four opening words in the English translation 
of  Shahada, “there is no god,” may be easily conflated with an atheist 
conviction).
Generally speaking, it is highly significant that the Islamic affirmation 
of faith is a negation of other deities and religions. Some will, no doubt, 
take this as evidence of the intolerance lodged at the very heart of Islam. 
For my part, I do not think things are that straightforward. After all, the 
Córdoba Caliphate (929-1031) was respectful of ethnic and religious 
diversity under Muslim rule. In the medieval Islamic world, astronomy, 
mathematics, and medicine were thriving. Arabic translations of and 
commentaries on Aristotle proved indispensable to the transmission of 
the Greek classics they helped reintroduce in Europe. So, the question is: 
how can the same principle of Shahada stand behind these developments 
and the current rise of the Islamic State?
I suggest that the negation, with which the Testimony begins, is the 
common element motivating the great achievements of Islamic science 
and philosophy, on the one hand, and the fundamentalist purges of non-
believers, on the other. The negative form of Shahada broaches the inde-
terminate space of freedom, untethered from a specific ethnic commu-
nity as much as from the subjective identity of the believer. Sweeping the 
ground clean of all idols, fetishes, and gods, the most recent of the three 
monotheisms endows its followers with the possibility either to create 
something new in this clearing or to carry the destructive drive through 
to its conclusion, destroying and negating itself. There is nothing inher-
ent in Islam as such that could influence the choice one way or another. 
What proves to be decisive here is the historical conjuncture at any given 
moment, as well as the capacity to endure and sustain the heavy bur-
den of freedom.
Amidst the crumbling traditional values of the West, with its own 
“death of God” announced by Friedrich Nietzsche, the religious “no” 
waxes more destructive than ever. Its response to the passive secular 
nihilism resulting in apathy, relativism, and the loss of meaning is the 
active nihilism of fanatical fervor, intolerance, and insistence on the abso-
lute truth… of nothing in the form of the negation. Although it appears 
that the fundamentalist option is the exact opposite of the liberal West, 
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the two nihilisms resonate with and reinforce each other logically, ideo-
logically, and militarily. Disenfranchised and disenchanted young people 
from Europe who, having converted to Islam, join the ranks of the Islamic 
State fail to realize this secret complicity. Adrift and in search for mean-
ing, they fall into the trap of yet another, more deadly, nihilism, which 
they mistake for a certain and secure foundation lacking in the milieu 
they are familiar with.
All this is not to say that basic religious pronouncements in the affir-
mative, like the Judaic Shema or the Christian Credo, are in any way supe-
rior to the basic negation in Shahada. Quite the contrary: the inaugural 
“no” holds a greater potential for freedom than they do. Nor do I claim 
that every Muslim person and community responds to the provocation 
of negativity in the same manner. Indeed, many in the past and in the 
present have embarked on a more difficult path of radical enlightenment 
and creativity, indebted to the dismantling power of the negation. But as 
the battle for hegemony in the Muslim world rages, it is crucial to under-
stand what is at stake in the most recent incarnation of the fundamental-
ist destructive fury, where it is situated on the global theologico-ideologi-
cal map, and which alternatives are available to the thoughtless dismissals 
(or endorsements) of Islam so prevalent today.
05.25.2015
B. Disasters, Natural and Cultural
The Tenth Anniversary of Hurricane Katrina
Warren Montag
Allegory, particularly in the form of personification, was one of the most 
important forms through which late Medieval society attempted to 
understand itself. And few literary texts display the ways in which alle-
gory served to capture and bind together the abstract and the concrete, 
the temporal and the eternal as William Langland’s  Piers Ploughman, a 
work composed in the late fourteenth century. At the conclusion of the 
text, the narrator, Will, awakens from a dream vision. What has been 
revealed to him, however, does not pertain to the spirit, but to the flesh. 
He is starving, and the soul can no longer ignore the demands of the 
body. Frightened, and without any prospect of a meal, Will encounters 
the allegorical figure of Need. Need offers him a kind of salvation, but it 
is a salvation of the flesh: he may take what is necessary for his survival 
without regard to conscience or doctrine, for “Need has no law and shall 
never fall in debt for the things he takes his life for to save.” Just as he 
needs no one’s permission to drink water from a ditch, Need tells Will, 
he may appropriate the food or clothing he requires not to perish from 
hunger or exposure, even if they are the property of another.
Langland here invokes the principle, by his time established in canon 
law, of “necessitas non habet legem,” reminding us that necessitas was typi-
cally understood not as “necessity” (defined in opposition to freedom 
or chance), but as physical need, above all, the need for food to sustain 
human life: need has no law, that is, laws determining ownership and use 
of goods do not apply to cases in which an individual, lacking food, cloth-
ing or shelter, faces the risk of death. Moreover, this principle indemni-
fied those who stole to supply a third party with necessities, as well as 
those who did not steal food or clothing, but objects that could be sold 
in order to purchase what was necessary to existence. To be sure, the 
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great Medieval thinkers, from Thomas Aquinas to William of Ockham, 
disputed the fine points of this principle: whether urgency required a 
suspension of property right (jus) or simply restored the original com-
munity of goods granted by God to all humankind; whether the act con-
stituted the crime of theft from which the thief, after the fact and more 
or less automatically, would be immunized, or whether the act was per-
formed outside the law’s jurisdiction, in a pre-legal state in which prop-
erty as such did not exist. The principle itself, however, was never really 
in dispute: the allegorical figure of Need was this principle brought to life 
and given voice.
Today, we have little taste for allegory even in its historical incarna-
tions. There appears little hope that Need will come alive and speak to 
us as he did to Langland’s Will, and even less that he would deliver, or 
we would hear, a lesson in what might be called the non-illegality of theft 
in cases of starvation or exposure. To understand how completely this 
doctrine has been forgotten and the extent to which its forgetting is the 
necessary condition of political and economic thought from Locke and 
Adam Smith to the present, we might turn to what in fact is an allegorical 
figure we do not recognize as such, the personification not simply of a 
powerful hurricane, but of both the state of need and the state of excep-
tion: Katrina. The occasion of the tenth anniversary of Hurricane Katrina 
allows, or compels, us to acknowledge the extent to which the principle 
“need has no law” appears unthinkable, as if it were nothing more than a 
superstitious remnant of the “dark ages,” without any connection to the 
economic realities of our time.
Although within a few days of the hurricane, nearly a thousand people 
had died in New Orleans itself, many directly or indirectly from expo-
sure, or the lack of water, food and medicine, few observers thought to 
question the enormous mobilization of resources to combat “looting,” a 
term that designates precisely the acts that Langland’s Need tells us can-
not justly be prevented or punished. Even the public declaration by the 
Governor of Louisiana that national guard troops had been given the 
order to “shoot and kill” looters, despite the fact that the residents had 
had by that point no “legal” access to drinking water for three days (dur-
ing which the average temperature was 35 degrees Celsius) and no sig-
nificant measures had yet been taken to provide them with food, water 
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and medicine, did not seem particularly noteworthy, let alone deserving 
of condemnation.
Perhaps Katrina spoke, and speaks, to us, as if she were Need’s own 
child, in incomprehensible words of wind and rain and water. Like 
Shakespeare’s Tempest, the storm embodied and represented in its vio-
lence the violence of the neo-liberal order itself, as if Katrina’s fury were a 
dim allegory of a far more extensive destruction.  This destruction oper-
ates according to the double strategy displayed so vividly in New Orleans 
ten years ago. On the one hand, the state acts by refraining from action, by 
exposing populations to total destitution, at the same time that it appro-
priates and offers up for sale vital resources which, once appropriated as 
property, confer on the proprietor immunity not only to the claims, but 
to the needs, of others. On the other, the rights and privileges granted to 
property owners are regarded as so absolute that those who violate these 
rights, irrespective of the circumstances that lead them to do so, can be 
killed with impunity (and not only by agents of the state but increasingly 
by private individuals).
Can we imagine what Need would say to us now, at a time when 
states have been ordered by their creditors to liquidate emergency food 
supplies and to allow the private appropriation of water, when climate 
change makes exposure to the elements a matter of life and death, that 
is, when the age-old right to subsistence, and finally existence, has been 
revoked in order to secure the world for capital investment? But Need, 
coextensive with our physical existence, is already among us, urging us 
to revoke the revocation of the right to go on living, to submit property 
right and market providentialism to the demands of life, and above all to 
resist the necro-economy that recognizes no limit but the power of those 
who refuse its inhuman order.
08.31.2015
Chernobyl as an Event: Thirty Years After
Michael Marder
There are those exceptional instances, in which a date or a place stands for 
a particular event that happened then and there. “9/11” and “Chernobyl” 
symbolize in a recognizable shorthand two traumatic occurrences, 
two catastrophes that have since become watersheds not only for the 
American and European consciousness but also for world history and 
politics. Why the tendency to represent these events in such shorthand? 
Do we lack the time or the space to elaborate upon them in more than a 
word and a couple of numbers? Or is something else, something more 
profound, masking itself behind this marked brevity?
Perhaps to symbolize an occurrence by means of a date or a place is a 
way to speak about the unspeakable. In so referring to traumatic events, 
we scarcely indicate them, keep them encrypted, or let them barely peer 
from the crypt of the unrepresentable. Perhaps, then, we cordon off, cir-
cumscribe, and condense them to a numeric or geographical inscription 
in order to tuck them into a far corner of the mind and not deal with 
them in all their excruciating, intolerable details. Psychoanalysts have a 
word for this mental operation, namely disavowal.
One thing is certain—there is always a price to pay for the tricks of 
our psychic economies. Supplanting the event (only one event, no mat-
ter how traumatic), the date and the place become exclusive and exclu-
sionary. Or, even, egoistic. “9/11” names one event and, with this, erases 
multiple others, not the least of them the one now known as “the other 
9/11,” the day in 1973 when General Augusto Pinochet carried out a 
bloody coup d’état  in Chile. “Chernobyl” not only designates the explo-
sion of Reactor 4 at a Ukrainian nuclear power plant on April 26, 1986 
but also expunges from collective memory the repeated massacres of its 
Jewish residents during the Russian Civil War and by the Nazi occupying 
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forces during the Second World War. The shorthand goes hand-in-hand 
with a pretentious supposition that nothing else of what has ever hap-
pened or will ever happen on that day or in that place really matters. The 
event prohibits all other events, including those that have already come 
to pass. It is like a black hole that sucks into itself the past and the future, 
along with vast stretches of space and language itself. 
I have noted how events designated by a date or a place mark a day in 
a calendar or a geographical locale with their exclusive and exclusionary 
associations. Chernobyl is, in this sense, the most eventful of all the ter-
rible events; it brands not only our conception of a given place but that 
very place itself, making it unfit for human habitation, extending a sizable 
“zone of exclusion,” from which we are barred, around it. This place that 
lends its name to an event loses every feature of place-ness, to the extent 
that it no longer admits anyone into its midst, unless you are willing to 
risk your life by staying there (as some older residents of Chernobyl, who 
have refused to be evacuated in the aftermath of the disaster or who have 
clandestinely returned to their abandoned homes, have chosen to do).
There is yet another price to be paid: when the conditions of pos-
sibility for any experience, among which Immanuel Kant counts space 
and time, blend with whatever is conditioned by them, they flip into the 
impossible. Chernobyl is this conditioned conditioning, an atopos where 
nothing can happen, at least for humans who have been permanently 
expelled from that non-place. It is the event of no event, the event that 
singularly negates the future, crushing it under the weight of nuclear 
eternity. Chernobyl, or that which now goes by that name, does not fill 
out the schema of experience because the radiation, which continues 
to emanate all around it, is not accessible to our senses. But despite—
thanks to?—its elusiveness, the event of Chernobyl also overwhelms our 
finite sensibility and nullifies the experiential schema itself. The condi-
tioned conditioning turns out to be totally unconditioned and deadly in 
its absolute excess.    
Nothing can happen in Chernobyl anymore  and  a lot is happening 
there, just not for us. In this post-apocalyptic workshop, the specimens 
of Homo sapiens have receded to the background, while “wild” flora and 
fauna have made their comeback. The choice between reality in-itself, 
including its animal and vegetal instantiations, and reality for-us proves 
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to be a false alternative; the post-Chernobyl world—a place now acquir-
ing temporal, chronological connotations—is a reality for the plants and 
animals that live and die and, in some cases, adapt to an environment 
laced with high levels of radioactive elements. Still, however vigorously 
we dehumanize the event, the shadow of  the future of no future  hangs 
over all living beings, and even the earth, in Chernobyl’s exclusion zone. 
If reports are true that the plants harmed by extreme radiation are not 
decaying as they should, then the current vegetal and animal growth in 
the “radioactive reserve park” is unsustainable and might be short-lived, 
seeing that the soil will not be enriched through the normal decomposi-
tion of organic matter. A place arrogates to itself the title of an event to 
the detriment of its placeness and of eventhood as such.
As we begin working through the “event” of “Chernobyl,” it is not 
advisable to dissolve the former in the latter, for instance at the level of 
everyday discourse: “Chernobyl happened.” A series of tough consider-
ations await us. What have our technologies done to a place exemplary 
of human-induced devastation but certainly not alone in suffering our 
impact? What has that place, converted into a vessel for the event, done 
to us? Where does the “event” of “Chernobyl” leave the consciousness 
rendered impotent by its effects? How does it influence human and other-
than-human bodies? A lonely word, which is moreover a geographical 
locution, cannot cope with the thinking of the event. Taken in isolation, 
it prompts us to act out, rather than work through, the nuclear trauma. 
In place of a designation for place, we sorely need both something less 
and something more than a word: a  logos no longer confined to human 
discourse and capable of bearing witness to the unbearable.
04.25.2016
A State of Foreclosure: The Guantánamo Prison
Jill H. Casid
One month has passed since U.S. President Barack Obama held a press 
conference on February 23, 2016 to announce the plan for the “once 
and for all” closure of the Guantánamo Bay prison as a means of “clos-
ing a chapter in our history.” That “Plan for Closing the Guantánamo 
Bay Detention Facility” was submitted to Congress by the Department 
of Defense seven years after President Obama signed the executive order 
(on January 22, 2009) that set the mandate “promptly to close detention 
facilities at Guantánamo.” It is not just that this closure is behind sched-
ule: the closure itself cannot come to a close.
Under the heading of “closing,” the plan lays out neither an end to 
indefinite detention nor a check on growing mass incarceration but, 
rather, a technique of transfer for the remaining 91 detainees. That clo-
sure cannot come to a close but must take the shape of transfer is not 
exceptional; it is integral to the state of exception that is the ongoing war 
on terror. Transfer, far from a problem with this particular closure plan, is 
a tactic of the broader closure problem that is the carceral state. To trans-
fer is to extend the temporal illogics of indefinite detention across an 
undefined and spreading global geography. It is to produce state power 
by a transferential expansion that is precisely without end in a death-
world driven by a psychosocial economy of violent foreclosure.
Whether Guantánamo closes or not in this extension of endless war, 
we inhabit a terror-zone in which the making of the death-worlds of the 
living dead ostensibly “over there” (in the occupied territories and extra-
legal limbo zones of the “black sites” referring to unseen incarceration) 
are also “right here” as the limits not just on right but also on the sen-
sible. What electrifies, what makes palpable the disavowed filaments of 
connection between the death-worlds ostensibly far away, in the floating 
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Guantánamo that cannot come to a close and those of mass incarceration 
right where we are?
Consider U.S. artist Laurie Anderson’s installation  Habeas 
Corpus  (October 2-4, 2015) that cast a projection of former detainee 
Mohammed el Gharani from an undisclosed location in West Africa into 
the interior of the Park Avenue Armory in New York City.1 It cast his live-
feed image onto a colossal white plaster rendering of a seated figure in 
an uncanny and virtual reversal of the Lincoln Memorial, in which the 
imprisoned takes the grand seat, white turns to black, and the history 
of slavery returns as the present condition of the carceral. The projec-
tion and magnification trick of the single and massive beamed-in figure 
converts the over-there into the unavoidably here. But the device of the 
story-telling projection also, at the same time, points to the limits of the 
monumental and sovereign figure of the solitary and surviving witness 
against the weight of the foreclosure of loss and vulnerability.
Reckoning with the death-worlds in which we lose ourselves demands 
a recognition of the contaminated mixtures of affect and the development 
of a capacity for an improper geometry, one committed to drawing lines 
that connect the non-reciprocal and the incommensurable. That closure 
must be held out as a promise, endlessly deferred in time and ceaselessly 
extended spatially, is fundamental to the fantasy logics of detainment 
that extend the prison as if it were the psychic space of fortified resolu-
tion. The expanding prison of indefinite detention does not close the 
wounds of injury and loss by incarcerating those who are made to fig-
ure their infliction. Rather, indefinite and expanding detention functions 
as a technology of violent foreclosure— a means of expelling even the 
possibility of the mortal facts of vulnerability by the violent transfer of 
the inevitable wounds and losses to come onto those detainees who are 
made to flesh them out for us. The closure that continues to enclose with-
out ever closing is the fossil fuel that powers what is condensed by the 
promise of the carceral state of foreclosure that is our current condition: 
that the infinitely extensible detention camp-prison could once and for 
all close on the materialization of a fantasy of security as an impossible 
invulnerability. This closure that cannot close but, rather, resorts to trans-
fers as a means of deferral and extension produces death-worlds in which 
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vulnerability and loss cannot be acknowledged or even registered as such 
because they have been foreclosed in the push to get over and get past.
Latin for “you shall have the body,” habeas corpus promises recourse 
against unlawful imprisonment by the action of a writ that is to deliver 
a chance for appearance before the law. In a letter from June 12, 1863, 
then president Abraham Lincoln defended the executive action to sus-
pend  habeas corpus  with a biopolitical diagram of the state as a body 
that must be treated by extreme measures to restore it to the norm of 
presumptive health: “Nor am I able to appreciate the danger …that the 
American people will …lose the right of public discussion, the liberty of 
speech and the Press, the law of evidence, trial by jury, and habeas cor-
pus … any more than I am able to believe that a man could contract so 
strong an appetite for emetics during temporary illness as to persist in 
feeding upon them during the remainder of his healthful life.”
This Civil War past of a slavery that is not at all over returns in this 
moment of police killings and mass incarceration as the crisis ordinary 
of chronic war where an “appetite for emetics” fuels the addictive secu-
rity fantasy of the state as a delimited body from which indefinite dangers 
to public safety can be vomited out. Gut fear and insatiable appetite for 
emetics—from water-board flushings and forced feedings to the inter-
minable terminal of the inside-out of the vomitoria of forced confine-
ment—can never be completely expelled as that fear and appetite are also 
ours. The transverse action of gnawing terror does not just return but also 
grows with and by the force of the viscous vulnerability recast as threat 
from the outside-in that it attempts to expurgate. The state of foreclosure 
puts us in a situation of living death without end. It is a situation of death-
in-life that demands a modality of not transversal grief but of transversal 
vulnerability as an uneasy practice of care for what cannot be foreclosed.
03.21.2016
Notes
1. For views of Laurie Anderson’s Habeas Corpus at the Park Avenue Armory, see 
http://armoryonpark.org/photo_gallery/slideshow/laurie_anderson
Redemption Rodeo
Jacob Kiernan
The price of admission is $20, but my mouse hovers over the Check Out 
button with a tinge of trepidation. My reluctance? To give money to an 
institution that forces hard labor at 2-20 cents an hour, houses its resi-
dents in 6 by 9 foot cells, and murders with the authority of the state. A 
timer on the page counts down and at, :23, I finalize the order. Tickets to 
the Angola Prison Rodeo are sent to my email.
In  Discipline and Punish, Michel Foucault traces the 17th century 
turn from draconian displays of torture, public stoning and the guillotine 
towards modes of imprisonment with the hope of “reform.” In opposi-
tion to displays of brute monarchical force, this reformative prerogative 
became the foundation of the modern prison system. For us, the linger-
ing question raised by Foucault’s work is: where has this reformative 
agenda gone today?
The Angola Prison Rodeo seems a brute and blatant return to this 
performative mode of “justice.” The prison website lists the Rodeo 
events: Bull Riding, where untrained inmates attempt to stay on angry 
bulls, Wild Horse Race, where three-man teams try to rope a horse for 
long enough for a team member to mount it (a latent parody of escape), 
Convict Poker, where four inmates sit at a card table in the middle of the 
arena playing poker, when “suddenly, a wild bull is released with the sole 
purpose of unseating the poker players” and, the finale, Guts and Glory, 
where an inmate attempts to remove a poker chip fastened to “the mean-
est, toughest Brahma bull available.” The contests are explicitly violent 
and obviously gladiatorial.
In 1998, a documentary about Angola Prison was released called The 
Farm. It provides a moving insight into one of the largest prisons in the 
United States. Angola, once rated the bloodiest prison in America, is 
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18,000 acres—larger than Manhattan—and is surrounded on three sides 
by the Mississippi river. 70% of prisoners are sentenced to life without 
parole; the majority of the rest have sentences so long they will die within 
the prison walls. Angola also houses and executes death row prisoners. 
And, twice a year, for one month, it hosts a rodeo where prisoners per-
form for a packed stadium of entertainment-seekers and fellow prisoners.
The documentary is a tragic and necessary introduction to the bi-
yearly festival.  It follows six prisoners, including a 22-year-old newly 
sentenced to life without parole and inmates who have been inside for 
20 and 25 years. Clips abound of angry German shepherds (bred on the 
facility for law enforcement), men (primarily black) being marched into 
the fields to grow cash crops like cotton, corn, and soybeans for four cents 
an hour (a clear evocation of the plantation that the prison was built on), 
and a slick-talking, unselfconscious warden explaining the economics 
and management of the institution.
Prisoners repeatedly talk about hope: hope of parole, hope of 
redemption, hope of escape—in dreams or in a coffin—as the warden 
smugly recites statistics about the miniscule number of prisoners granted 
clemency. Questions about the constitutionality of the death penalty are 
barely mentioned. And, those who give up hope, as one man who has 
served 25 of his 75 year sentence explains, fall into the darkest chasms of 
prison life.
In The New Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander argues that mass incarcera-
tion of urban blacks and Latinos in the 1970s was “a stunningly compre-
hensive and well-designed system of racialized social control.” She con-
tends that Ronald Reagan’s War on Drugs was a racially coded backlash 
against the Civil Rights Movement. Prisons were used to “warehouse” 
inner-city youth, denying them proper employment, education and 
social mobility, while ingraining a deeply rooted sense of shame in them 
and, by extension, their race.
While most inmates at Angola are charged with violent crimes, the 
warehousing of primarily black men, who make up three-quarters of the 
prison population, seems undeniable. Perpetrated through the mecha-
nisms of a radically biased court system, racist parole boards, and a hyper-
conservative governor’s office, lock-up in Angola is for life. In part, pris-
oners generate the means to sustain the institution that imprisons them, 
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ranging from work in the fields and cattle farms to senior inmates work-
ing as counselors. Despite decades of education and community service, 
parole is almost categorically denied: reform is not Angola’s agenda.
When I arrive at Angola, thousands of predominantly white 
Louisianans waddle towards a stadium surrounded by tall, barbed wire 
fences. A monolithic rock-climbing wall peaks over the top of the gates, 
as if poking fun at the dream of escape. The events draw around 70,000 
spectators on Saturdays and Sundays. Inside, inmates are ramparted 
between pinched fences, hocking hand-carved rocking chairs, beds and 
trinkets (and at what a low price!); the craftwork entices hungry consum-
ers, though the marketability of such a skill seems dubious outside the 
prison walls and within a global-industrial economy.
The stadium is packed: children gleefully run about, adults chat and 
cheer, popcorn and cotton candy is sold in the stands. Inmates, sitting 
stoically, are barricaded in their own sections of the arena. A few ranch 
hands lay hula-hoops in the center of the sandy stadium and half a dozen 
prisoners take their position within them. Suddenly, an irate bull is 
loosed, tossing the men in the air and goring them with uncovered horns. 
The last man standing, a stout white inmate, is the victor.
Inmates try to ride raging bulls—not one gets more than a meter 
out of the gate. Convict Poker is probably the most stomach-wrenching 
event. Four inmates uneasily sit at the table in anticipation. When the 
furious bull is released, it tears the table to shreds, tossing them aside, 
impaling their flimsy protective gear. Prisoners limp back to their enclo-
sure; from the stands, it’s impossible to tell whether with a sense of pride 
or just a tear in their gut.
As a spectator, the most frightening part of the Rodeo is that it is, in 
fact, entertaining. As the smell of fresh cracklins wafts through the stands, 
it’s too easy to get lost in the clapping, shouts and excitement. But it is a 
racist prison system with its own political agenda that has hoisted these 
men on the horns. Incarceration has sown and grown such a maddening 
sense of boredom that inmates volunteer to be the objects of this violent 
voyeurism. Their self-objectification and the risks they endure yield a few 
bucks and, at best, a bump in their social standing within the prison walls.
In a Foucauldian sense, this brute display of violence is a manifesta-
tion of an antiquated form of judicial power: it latently threatens potential 
232 Jacob Kiernan
offenders in an age when disciplinary modes of power are at work well 
before any sentence has been handed down. The lives and suffering of 
these prisoners has become pure spectacle, not limited to the offended 
and their families (as with the prison’s executions), but available to any-
one with twenty bucks. Imprisoned by a biased system, inmates’ lives, 
time and bodies have become a commodity that funds the institution 
that imprisons them.
Narratives of rehabilitation, upon which the modern prison system 
was formed, do not function within an institution where 90% of the 
inmates will never leave. There is no point in reforming for a society that 
you will never rejoin. In the context of a potent Christian philosophy, 
reformative narratives are reshaped into stories of religious redemption. 
The warden and prison pastors alike spread tales of redemption, which 
are internalized by prisoners force-fed false hope.
The Angola Prison Rodeo functions as self-flagellation for inmates 
within a racist and self-perpetuating prison system. Narratives of 
Christian guilt are used to exploit prisoners and paying spectators take 
pleasure in the violence inflicted upon the “guilty.” Profits from the 
Rodeo are routed back into the prison, which then warehouses more 
young black men. Louisiana, which has the highest incarceration rate in 
the world, keeps 1 in 55 adults behind bars. However, incarceration is big 
business throughout the United States, and the Angola Prison Rodeo 
is a loud and unapologetic display of how profitable those incarcerated 
are, and a revelation of a population unfazed by the brutalization of “irre-
deemable” bodies.
11.21.2016
C. Democracy Woes
Blackmailing the Greeks: The End of Democratic Europe
Patrícia Vieira and Michael Marder
The opposition of the Eurogroup to the Greek government’s plans to hold 
a referendum on July 5 on the proposals of its creditors reveals, beyond 
a shadow of a doubt, that the European Union is not a democracy. It is a 
heavily bureaucratic order that rules by decree and imposes its authority 
onto smaller, weaker member states. Many of the policies it undersigns 
emanate from non-elected financial institutions that do not represent 
the will of the Europeans. In other words, it is moving ever farther away 
from the democratic aspirations that energized the European project and 
beckoned with a promise of freedom and prosperity for its citizens.
Particularly disheartening was the statement by the German Finance 
Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, that, by holding a referendum, Greece 
was tacitly putting an end to negotiations. The very framing of a popular 
vote on the bailout terms as a “nuclear option,” which could explode the 
entire edifice of European collaboration on financial matters, is indicative 
of the establishment’s allergy to true democratic procedures with their 
oft-times uncertain outcomes. For what could be more democratic than 
a popular vote, where the people as a whole can determine what they 
consider to be their best interest? Why should the Greeks be prevented 
from deciding upon their future, if not out of the Eurogroup’s desire to 
dictate the country’s destiny and seal its fate as a destitute nation, mired 
in growing levels of debt, in order to continue filling the creditors’ pock-
ets with euros?
Throughout the lengthy process of negotiations, the Greek govern-
ment and, by extension, the Greek people have been infantilized, cast in 
the role of capricious children, who do not wish to follow the rules of 
the rational parental authority of the Troika. For instance, the symbolic 
refusal of male ministers—including the Prime Minister—to wear ties 
Blackmailing the Greeks: The End of Democratic Europe 235
was interpreted as a sign of their frivolity by the likes of the President of 
the European Commission, Jean-Claude Junker, rather than a political 
statement that rejects the “business as usual” technocratic management 
prevalent in Brussels.
Along with other Southern European countries, Greece is persistently 
depicted as a society in an immature condition, its members unable to 
realize what is good for them in the long run. Syriza’s initiative to change 
the disastrous pattern of European policies vis-à-vis its country is seen 
as a teenage rebellion, too idealistic to take into account the demands 
of “the real world” that are presumably identical to the Troika’s decrees. 
The exclusion of the Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis from the 
Eurozone finance ministers’ meeting on Saturday afternoon smacks of 
a punishment meted out to an undisciplined child who refused to com-
ply with the norms established by its wiser parents. It is as though the 
Greeks, among other citizens of indebted EU states, are unready to gov-
ern themselves and make sovereign decisions that will impact their lives 
and livelihoods.
The concrete economic proposals for raising funds, drafted by Alexis 
Tsipras’ government, have been rejected not because they are unrealis-
tic, but because they do not conform to the hegemonic vision of his 
European “partners” regarding who should be shouldering the price for 
the crisis. While the authorities of Greece wish to spare its people more 
hardship and suffering, the institutions that comprise the Troika aim to 
impoverish the country still further by cutting the already meager pen-
sions and raising the sales tax, which is the least progressive form of taxa-
tion, in that it is uniformly imposed on millionaires and unemployed 
workers alike. The outlines of the impasse are thus exceptionally vivid. 
On the one hand, there is an aspiration to build a Europe of and for its 
citizens, while, on the other hand, there is an ambition to maintain the 
Europe of business interests and to continue enriching the obscenely 
wealthy few.
This standoff has culminated in the concerted effort we have been 
witnessing over the past few days on the part of European Union authori-
ties to blackmail Greece: either the country complies with the unsus-
tainable requirements of its creditors, causing the lives of its citizens to 
deteriorate further as the country sinks deeper into debt, or it faces the 
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collapse of its economy by being forced to default on its payments and 
leave the Eurozone. Between the devil and the deep blue sea, as it were, 
the government’s answer was to restitute sovereignty back to the Greeks 
and ask them to express their collective opinion. That course of action 
was construed as a cardinal sin in the eyes of a Europe leaning ever closer 
to a totalitarian organization of political life.
The refusal of the Greek government to comply with the decrees of 
the Eurogroup, which it has rightly characterized as humiliating, is far 
from an adolescent revolt. Its intention to hold a referendum is an attempt 
to restore the very democratic ideals that the EU espouses, at least nomi-
nally. The present clash between the Goliath of the Troika and the Greek 
David is, in the last instance, not over the details of a financial deal, nor 
even over a broader economic plan for an isolated member state, but over 
the precise seat of sovereignty and the choice of a de facto political model 
in the EU for the years and decades to come.
If Greece is removed from the Eurozone through unilateral political 
wrangling that refuses to listen to the voices of the Greeks themselves, the 
entire project of a democratic European Union comes tumbling down. At 
stake in the decisions to be made on the Greek situation are the future 
contours of Europe: whether we are going to have a union of bankers and 
financiers or a union of peoples. Greece and its government stand at the 
forefront of this battle for the heart and soul of Europe.
06.29.2015
Why Trump Is Still Here
Linda Martín Alcoff
Why has Trump, or Cruz, for that matter, made such a strong showing in 
the presidential election? This question has been debated for months, by 
journalists, by social scientists, all the way from Fox News to MSNBC. 
Beyond all the pundits’ predictions of a quick nosedive, and an easy tran-
sition toward other candidates who represent what passes for Republican 
moderation these days, the race-baiting, carpet bomb-promising, 
avowedly Islamophobic extremists on the ticket had staying power, even 
rising to the top. Why?
Let me offer an explanation. White people.
The problem isn’t the innate or unchangeable nature of white people, 
nor is it the economic interests of white people, who for the most part 
don’t have a whole lot. Nor is the problem all white people. Nor is it even, 
sad to say,  just white people. But still, with these caveats in mind, in all 
seriousness: the problem is white people.
The problem is what has come to be called “the epistemology of igno-
rance.” This is the idea that an individual, or more likely, a group or com-
munity or society, can develop mechanisms to protect and maintain and 
pass down to the next generation their colossal ignorance. Ignorance 
about their own country’s history, about their economic prospects, and 
about the environment in which they live, including both the social and 
the natural ones.
The idea here, which has been picked up by numerous philosophers 
working in epistemology (the theory of knowledge) in recent decades, 
goes beyond a lack of knowledge. It’s not just that folks are not knowl-
edgeable. It is that their lack of knowledge is the product of some con-
certed effort, a conscious choice or, in actuality, a series of choices. 
Certain news articles, or news sources, are avoided, certain college 
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courses are kept away from, certain kinds of people are never asked for 
their opinion on the news of the day. The boundaries of the bubble of 
ignorance are monitored, protected, even nurtured as a positive good.
In other words, the resultant ignorance about the history of Islam, or 
the real effects of carpet bombing, or the high prevalence of rape in every 
society is not the product of a lack of effort, but of a sustained effort. And 
it is an effort that has become more rather than less difficult since the civil 
rights movement led to a greater integration of our public institutions, 
media, universities, and workplaces. Yet, it is an effort that continues to 
pay dividends.
In particular, ethnic studies programs have been under attack, banned 
in some states’ secondary education, zero budgeted by colleges, kept off 
the lists of required curricula. Officials in Arizona went so far as to enter 
high school classrooms to confiscate textbooks. These are the very books 
and courses that might correct the ignorance. And white students who 
have the temerity to sign up anyway sometimes have their tuition paying 
parents asking, why are you wasting our money?
Of course, there is widespread ignorance among almost all of the pop-
ulations in the United States. Comedians (many of them white) have con-
tinually enriched their careers from skits involving real people offering 
dismally uninformed answers to questions about global geography, the 
political institutions and histories of nations outside the U.S., and other 
matters. To some extent, the ignorance is nation-wide, not race-specific. 
But here is where the immigrants living amongst us have an advantage: 
they at least know something about the areas of the world from whence 
they came. African Americans have the “advantage” of painful family his-
tories, not to mention painful family experiences in the present day. As 
do Native Americans, Asian Americans and Latinos. These groups don’t 
live in bubbles in which racism and the legacies of slavery, genocide, and 
colonialism are only vaguely visible through light-filtering shades.
The real answer to Trump’s staying power is the conscious perpetua-
tion and protection of these layers of ignorance in white populations by 
individuals and too often by institutions and the mainstream media.
Political scientists are well aware of these trends, including those in the 
business of consulting on electoral politics to help people get elected or 
to help with tricky bond issues. How do you get a largely white electoral 
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district to vote for non-white candidates? Or to support an increase in 
taxes for the purpose of improving urban schools or saving urban hospi-
tals? An ingenious answer has been found that actually works: avoidance.
By carefully crafting candidates’ profiles and the wording of propos-
als on municipal bonds in such a way that race will not come to mind, 
that voters will not view tax proposals as racial redistributions, voters can 
actually be led to vote their true preferences for the candidate they take 
to be the most qualified or the bond issue they believe is legitimately nec-
essary. The bubble does not get burst, and those inside can stay safe and 
secure, yet their impact on those outside the bubble can be mitigated. 
This strategy has worked, and produced real results. It’s brilliant.
However, it is a colossal mistake. White people have a right to their 
own opinions and judgments, but they do not have a right to their igno-
rance. We have got to stop playing the avoidance game, the practice of 
avoiding topics at the family gathering that might trigger an outburst 
from the bigoted Uncle. The result of this game is that Donald J. Trump is 
leading in the polls.
Bernie Sanders provides an instructive counterexample. When activ-
ists from Black Lives Matter presumptively attacked him from the floor 
of one of his stump speeches last summer, he let them speak. He invited 
them for further conversations. He hired them into his campaign, not 
just to knock on doors, but to help lead strategy and develop agenda. 
He sat down for a five hour videotaped interview with Killer Mike, the 
brilliant Hip Hop artist and cultural analyst, filmed in Mike’s barbershop 
in Atlanta. In other words, Sanders admitted there were things he didn’t 
know, and he sought knowledge from the people who did. This is a true 
political revolution.
02.08.2016
The Con Artistry of the Deal: Trump, 
the Reality-TV President
Michael Marder
Four days prior to the US presidential elections, I read Trump’s The Art of 
the Deal—a manual for con artists and, as it turned out, an updated ver-
sion of Machiavelli’s The Prince for the media age. Having dismissed the 
Trump candidacy early on in the primaries season as a marketing gim-
mick intended to promote his overall brand, I wanted to avoid making 
the same mistake at the very final stages of the campaign. The same can-
not, unfortunately, be said of Clinton’s team, which clearly did not do its 
homework. Were her advisors at least to skim through The Art of the Deal, 
they would have promptly realized that no amount of negative publicity 
could damage the Republican candidate, for whom there is no such thing 
as “bad” advertisement. Whatever the context, to be mentioned 24/7 on 
Cable news is, for Trump, a goal in itself, making him larger than life and, 
therefore, an ideal in which common folk can espy their own unattain-
able dreams and desires of grandeur.
Perhaps the most emblematic passage from the con artist’s manual, 
and the one most relevant to Trump’s political strategy, is the following:
The final key to the way I promote is bravado. I play to people’s 
fantasies. People may not always think big themselves, but 
they can still get very excited by those who do. That’s why a 
little hyperbole never hurts. People want to believe that some-
thing is the biggest and the greatest and the most spectacular. 
I call it truthful hyperbole. It’s an innocent form of exaggera-
tion—and a very effective form of promotion.1
Isn’t this precisely what Trump did throughout the presidential cam-
paign? Did he not play to people’s fantasies, be they about the revival of 
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the country’s industrial might or, on the darker side, about the possibility 
of achieving social purity by excluding every kind of threatening Other? 
Far from “innocent,” the exaggerations in question helped Trump close 
the deal with the American public at the price of unleashing a whole 
range of sexist, racist, nationalist, and homophobic fantasies. It bears 
mentioning, however, that these fantasies were not created by Trump 
but merely driven out of hiding in the deep recesses of the unconscious, 
where they had been taking refuge from the superficial dictates of politi-
cal correctness. Positively buttressed by projective identification with the 
“greatest and the most spectacular” business mogul, such phantasmatic 
construction of “America’s greatness” put the self-professed artist of deals 
in the Oval Office.
The US already had its actor president in Ronald Reagan. And it is 
about to get its Reality TV president in Donald Trump. What this means 
is that not only the last dividing lines between fantasy and reality are 
being erased but fantasy itself, however ominous and disturbing, comes 
to dictate reality. To paraphrase Plato, Trump is going to be the sophist-
king, a master puppeteer of appearances who knows how to manipulate 
them and to manipulate their very manipulation (e.g., by lambasting the 
mass media that have literally made him what he is today). As I men-
tioned in my analysis penned in March of this year for The Philosophical 
Salon,  the manipulation of public opinion is nothing new; rather, what 
distinguishes president-elect from his rivals, including Hillary Clinton, 
is that “he fully assumes the bankruptcy of metaphysical ideals such 
as authenticity, essentiality, or firm principles, and acts accordingly… 
[T]he bygone values are supplanted by nothing—the nothing, to which 
everything has been reduced. Whereas Ted Cruz & Co. stand for the con-
sciousness of this nothingness, Trump represents its self-consciousness, 
and this gives him an unmistakable edge.”2
Instead of giving in to despair in the face of the current political suc-
cess of con artistry (after all, a strong tradition exists in philosophy, 
according to which politics is con artistry; Plato uses this conclusion to 
denounce the political realm of appearances as a whole, while Machiavelli 
builds upon it to enunciate the guidelines for successful politicians), I’d 
like to highlight two of its inherent limitations and one unexpected posi-
tive implication.
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First. Note that, in the case of Trump’s political ascent, the medium is 
not  the message. The form he resorts to is decidedly postmodern: the 
mediatic construction of reality, recently theorized in William Egginton 
and David Castillo’s fascinating book  Medialogies. But the content is 
hypermodern, embracing exclusionary nationalism and industrialism. 
Inevitably, that contradiction, the power of which Trump has harnessed 
and which he has been riding thus far, will be resolved in favor of one or 
the other extreme, contributing to the process of post-electoral normal-
ization. What will happen when @RealDonaldTrump (we can’t overlook 
the irony of “Real” in the Twitter handle) switches to @POTUS? When 
the so-called political movement that brought Trump to power culmi-
nates in the static and homogeneous—all-male, all-white—Politburo-
like structure of governance? When the new administration becomes one 
of the least transparent, most secretive in US history?
Second. All the self-contradictory promises the Trump campaign has 
made will have to give way to actual policy decisions, starting with the 
choice of Cabinet, which doesn’t at all look like it will be comprised of 
political outsiders. As Hegel reminds us in Phenomenology of Spirit, pos-
sibilities, capacities, talents, inclinations, etc. are abstract and, because 
not yet realized, admit everything into their ambit. With their realization, 
however, certain possibilities fall by the wayside insofar as they are not 
acted upon or insofar as they stand diametrically opposed to those actu-
alized. As a result, another crucial “Trump card,” namely his resistance 
to being pinned down to one concrete position, will be lost. The author 
of The Art of the Deal is aware of this mode of taming the otherwise unre-
strained fantasy: “You can’t con people, at least not for long. You can 
create excitement, you can do wonderful promotion and get all kinds of 
press, and you can throw in a little hyperbole. But if you don’t deliver the 
goods, people will eventually catch on.” The point is that, given the self-
contradictions he has been cultivating, Trump will have no other choice 
but to fail in “delivering the goods,” even if he tries to do so. The very 
strategy that got him elected will backfire in the period of his presidency; 
it is one thing to break definite election promises, but it is quite another 
to break promises in fulfilling them.
The positive implication of the Trump presidency resonates with Slavoj 
Žižek’s recent analysis of its prospects. Commentators are up in arms 
The Con Artistry of the Deal: Trump, the Reality-TV President 243
that Trump’s stint at the helm of the US will spell out  “disaster for the 
planet” and an assured defeat in the battle against climate change, disaster 
for the most vulnerable and the poor, disaster for race relations… They 
forget that the Paris climate agreement is too little, too late to keep the 
world livable, or that wages have not increased and that race relations 
have hit a new low under the Obama presidency. What the election of 
Trump signals is that the ideological screens concealing these and other 
unmitigated catastrophes have fallen and that we can no longer congratu-
late ourselves on symbolic victories while moving at full speed toward 
environmental and social collapse. That is how fiction realized makes dis-
avowed reality itself real.
11.11.2016
Notes
1. Donald Trump, The Art of the Deal, New York: Random House, 1987, p. 58.
Brexit: The Importance of Being Able to Leave
Daniel Innerarity
Everything that preceded the announcement of a referendum on whether 
the United Kingdom should remain in the European Union was a politi-
cal absurdity—demagoguery, irresponsibility, shameful concessions—
with one exception: it has politicized an issue that was placidly resting 
on unquestionable mechanisms. We do not hear a lot of good news out 
of Europe, which is why I am taking the opportunity to point out one 
piece of positive news, even if it may be only an unintended consequence 
of a bad decision: from now on, there will be less excuses to shelter 
European policies within the limbo that has protected them from the 
decisions of Europeans. Politics is returning to the European Union, not 
because of the dynamism of its institutions, but prompted by the pres-
sures of populism.
The Monnet method of bureaucratic integration has been mechanical 
and furtive, dominated by necessity. This is revealed by the language of 
integration: benign despotism, integration by stealth, spill over, irresist-
ible enlargement, irreversibility…. The principal drivers of integration, 
on the right and on the left, have been governed by a crude determinism 
presupposing that the desired institutional improvements would inevita-
bly follow economic development. The principal strategy of integration 
consisted of conceding primacy to processes over results and accepting 
as a given that success was guaranteed. That led to the idea of irreversibil-
ity, the lack of contingency plans and the absence of any reflection about 
a possible failure, of “exit options” in case things did not go well, some-
thing particularly obvious in the case of the single currency, which was 
agreed upon as an irrevocable commitment.
It is still a paradox that, while the Treaty of Lisbon admitted for the 
first time the possibility that a member state could leave the Union, 
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membership in the Eurozone continues to be irreversible. No appropri-
ate instruments have been designed for the management of crises, some-
times increasing the risk of future crises in favor of immediate short-term 
advantages, or leaving a large number of technical and institutional prob-
lems unresolved. When there has been a crisis, European leaders have 
not known how to do anything but convince their electorate that there 
was no choice; their rhetorical strategy consisted of replacing their habit-
ual absolute optimism with catastrophic visions of what would happen 
if integration or the monetary union were to fail. This is the conceptual 
framework in which the so-called “bicycle theory” of European integra-
tion was formulated, which posits that integration should not stop, espe-
cially in times of crisis. (Although, as Ralf Dahrendorf said, “I often cycle 
in Oxford, and if I stop pedaling I do not fall; I simply put my feet on 
the ground.”)
All of this had a certain logic, and I am not going to discuss its his-
torical appropriateness or the advantages of its results at this time; I will 
limit my attention instead to questions about its future utility. What is 
central to the limitations of this method is the fact that a system designed 
to minimize decisions cannot make them entirely superfluous, among 
other things because there are always implicit decisions, in the same 
way that technical decisions always mask some political motivation. In 
the 1960s and 70s, in the age of “permissive consensus,” when its main 
policies were distanced from people’s daily concerns, the European proj-
ect did not seem to need the explicit favor of the public. In the current 
context, which is very different, the type of discourse that is apparently 
most mobilizing (appealing to the need with which processes lead to 
established ends, completing what was put into motion, insisting that 
there is no other possibility…) is, precisely, what ends up irritating citi-
zens the most.
Conflicts like the one related to the Brexit are taking the European 
project back to a space of free decision making. Integration is a free option, 
not the inevitable consequence of a process that escapes our control.
I do not have a magic formula for achieving the full democratization 
of Europe, but I would like to make a modest proposal of democratiza-
tion centered on the type of discourse we must maintain. Let us begin 
by abandoning a functionalist language, the language of irresistible and 
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pressing needs, while barely making use of expressions that appeal to 
our freedom of choice toward the future. The practices of the European 
Union, which are consensual and gradual, through procedural adjust-
ments, also constitute a system that favors dissimulated or hidden deci-
sions, decisions that are democratically unauthorized, sometimes in the 
form of non-decisions or submissiveness to technological objectivities. 
Even if the dictum “federate or perish” by Alterio Spinelli is true, it still 
speaks the language of coercion. All our vocabulary is one of pure neces-
sity; none of it speaks to a free decision of the citizens. This is incendiary 
material in the hands of populists, who seek motives to denounce a con-
spiracy of the elite.
In the face of this type of surrender before a supposed historic neces-
sity, the only democratically acceptable imperative is that Europe must 
be politicized. From this point of view, the existence of conflicts, ques-
tioning and tensions should not be considered a symptom that politics 
is not working properly, but an opportunity for politicization. The fact 
that decisions are not easily adopted or accepted is what makes them, 
strictly speaking, political decisions, beyond unquestionable technolog-
ical motives.
We may need to thank the British one day for their contribution to 
politicizing the European Union. We will recognize it more if they stay 
than if they leave and will more fully appreciate a decision to stay, know-
ing that they could have left.
03.28.2016
Brexit: Why Referenda Are Not the 
Ultimate Democratic Tests
Mihail Evans
Western societies understand themselves to be democracies, yet we rarely 
discuss what this means. Presumably, politics has to do with the people’s 
choices, and the act of voting is taken to be the ultimate democratic test 
of their adequate expression. Those societies, such as Switzerland, where 
referenda are commonly used to decide on how the country should act 
on a given issue, are often seen to be particularly refined forms of democ-
racy. It thus seems natural that the only possible way to resolve the ques-
tion of whether the United Kingdom should remain a member of the EU 
is to “put it to the people.” I want to argue that this is a mistaken view, 
which misunderstands the nature of our democracy. I will do so by 
drawing on the work of a somewhat neglected Dutch political thinker, 
Frank Ankersmit.
Often, when we speak about our societies as democracies we imagine 
them as descendants of the ancient Greek political system. But there is 
a danger of overlooking important historical differences. The polis prac-
ticed direct democracy, in which every (male, non-slave) citizen had a 
direct say in the running of the city-state. Ours are representative democ-
racies where we elect particular individuals to engage in the process of 
decision-making for us. It is often assumed that this change was neces-
sitated by states becoming larger and more populous, the face-to-face 
decision-making process being no longer possible.
One political theorist, Frank Ankersmit, argues that the modern rep-
resentative system is superior to direct democracy for our contempo-
rary situation. He does so by looking at what is going on at the level of 
political representation. In order to understand this, he draws on what 
art theorists say about how artistic representation works. There are two 
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main theories offered by the discipline of aesthetics. The first suggests 
that resemblance is central to representation. But this conception is not 
very satisfying because no acceptable criteria have ever been put forward 
for what a successful resemblance might be. Paintings, as art historians 
will tell us, might resemble each other much more than they resemble 
the objects in the world that they depict. If we adhere to the resemblance 
theory in politics we will find that every difference between the elector-
ate and its representatives is a case of political misrepresentation. From 
this point of view, what matters above all is how much the representatives 
in the parliament appear to look like the population at large.
Ankersmit is much more convinced by the substitution theory, 
advanced by Burke, Gombrich and Danto, among others. For them, rep-
resentation is a making-present again of what is currently absent. These 
aesthetic theorists stress that something original is going on in the pro-
cess of artistic creation. Looked at from this perspective, without repre-
sentation, there is no represented. That is, politically, without legislative 
bodies, there would be no nation as such. The very existence of represen-
tative institutions brings into being a political society, which would not 
exist otherwise. This theory further suggests that what is most important 
is the interaction between the represented and the representative, and in 
particular, that representatives should be in a position to transform the 
situation of which they are a part. Ankersmit argues that a politician must 
possess an “essentially aesthetic talent of representing political reality in 
new and original ways.” Politicians then, contrary to received wisdom on 
the issue, need to have a certain distance from citizens in order to be most 
effective. Conflicts that appear hopelessly irreconcilable at the level of the 
population (the represented) are often resolvable at the level of represen-
tation (political institutions). A great example in our time was the peace 
settlement in Northern Ireland. Direct democracy viewed from this per-
spective risks undermining political artistry. Constantly consulting the 
electorate can be a way of passing the buck to the population, a way of 
“doing something” when nobody has the political inspiration needed to 
move forward. Arguably, this is the situation, in which we have found 
ourselves with the referendum on the British membership of the EU.
The role of political representatives is particularly important today, as 
many of the most important contemporary issues are ones about which 
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people are conflicted. In the twentieth century, we had clear battles, such 
as capital versus labor. Today, many issues, such as environmental prob-
lems, are ones where most people suffer from the adverse effects they, 
themselves, cause. Ankersmit ultimately argues that what we need to do 
is make our political institutions more representative, that is, to widen 
the gap between the represented and the representatives so “that our leg-
islative representatives be less responsive to the daily desires of their con-
stituents and more attentive to the whole picture.” The great challenges 
of our era are unlikely to be solved by constantly asking the populace 
what they want. If a political solution is ever found for climate change, it 
will be among relatively small groups of people who have been delegated 
the power to make radical change and who will produce a document as 
utterly surprising as was the Good Friday Agreement. Asking the popula-
tion what they want through plebiscites, Ankersmit argues, works well 
for very defined problems that are not linked to wider contexts. What 
residents would like for a particular locality involves a fairly clear-cut and 
uncomplicated set of choices. For questions that are complex and inter-
linked with many other concerns, simplification will inevitably occur. 
Britain’s membership in the European Union is an immensely complex 
and many-sided issue. Yet the recent campaign in the UK became a ref-
erendum on immigration (despite the fact that non-EU immigration has 
been as high or higher than that originating from the EU in recent years) 
and an outlet for an associated general feeling that politicians are not 
addressing the situation of those in low paid and precarious jobs.
There was an almost perverse reaction among the electorate to the 
fact that many of the opinion-makers in society were in favor of remain-
ing. So much so that we could say there was a rejection of politics as 
such. Indeed, the accusations of democratic failure, brought to bear on 
the European Union, could equally well be leveled at the British political 
scene. I would suggest that what is profoundly wrong at the moment with 
Western democracies is that the art of politics has been replaced by the 
technique of politics. For some time now, democratic struggles between 
divergent points of view in the national and international areas have been 
replaced by a coalescence around an agreed-upon set of ideas. Politics 
becomes a wrangling about implementation rather than a competition 
among fundamentally different ideas. We are now asked to vote for the 
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best managerial team to achieve a set of goals that, with minor variations, 
both political sides pretty much agreed on. Both in the EU and in the 
UK, there is a dearth of new ideas and a complete lack of political creativ-
ity. By default, the population was asked to decide on the future, but the 
vote and the debate that surrounded the referendum have still left much 
in the dark. The public has had its say and now, more than ever, we are in 
need of political artistry to find a way forward.
06.27.2016
D. On Refugees
Freedom and the Refugees
Patrícia Vieira
Liberty is arguably the bedrock of modern, Western-style democracies. 
From the French Revolution’s trinity “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,” the 
last term echoes nowadays as a quaint, out-of-the-grandma’s-closet rev-
erie. Equality fares a bit better. But while we firmly believe that everyone 
is equal before the law, things get more complicated when it comes to 
economics. Should everyone (and every nation) have the same amount of 
money? The rising inequality both within and between countries reveals 
that, good intentions and the Millennium Development Goals notwith-
standing, reducing the differences between haves and have-nots is not 
high on the agenda. Liberty, however, seems to have held its ground. 
True, there are plenty of unfree societies, but Europe and the United 
States are persuaded of the urgency to improve this situation. Many a war 
has been and is still being fought today with the goal of “exporting” free-
dom and democracy to those countries that keep resisting them.
A key component of liberty is freedom of movement. People should 
be allowed to circulate within the borders of their own country and, ide-
ally, also between nations. We are so enamored with freedom of move-
ment that we have granted it even to non-human, more abstract entities 
such as companies and capital. Free trade relies precisely on the flow of 
money and goods across boundaries and borders, a circulation acceler-
ated by economic globalization. The Schengen area that now encom-
passes 26 European nations—22 EU and 4 non-EU members—is part of 
this generalized push towards freedom of circulation.
In a globalized world of constant movement, refugees appear as grains 
of sand in a well-oiled machinery. The onslaught of economic migrants 
and refugees arriving by the thousands to the coastal areas of Greece, Italy 
and Spain, fleeing civil war in Syria and Iraq, violence in Afghanistan and 
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Pakistan, and economic hardship throughout sub-Saharan Africa in the 
hope of reaching what they conceive of as social and economic havens 
is testing faith in the advantages of freedom of circulation through-
out Europe. Walls and fences have sprouted in the migrants’ path, from 
Hungary to Calais, in the North of France, in an attempt to protect the 
European fortress from the waves of outsiders trying to get in. How do 
we square freedom of movement with the migrations of refugees? Or, 
better yet, what does the refugee crisis tell us not only about free circula-
tion, but also about liberty itself?
We have been witnessing for quite some time a mutation in the con-
cept of freedom, a transformation that the successive crisis of migrants 
and refugees—on the Mexico/US border, in Africa, in Southern 
Europe—have only made more apparent. The notion of freedom was 
originally applied only to people, who should be free from violence, dan-
ger, etc., and free to engage in the pursuit of happiness in whichever way 
they saw fit, as the US Declaration of Independence would have it. These 
two streams of freedom roughly correspond to the negative and positive 
liberty theory developed by Isaiah Berlin in the mid-twentieth century.
With the development of economic modernity, however, human free-
dom became increasingly associated to economic liberty, to the point 
where the former runs the risk of being eclipsed by the latter. Writing at 
the dawn of capitalism, Immanuel Kant already tied freedom of move-
ment to that of commerce in his famous essay “Perpetual Peace: A 
Philosophical Sketch.” On the one hand, each person has the right to be 
treated hospitably when they enter into someone else’s territory, a pre-
condition for peaceful coexistence that has fed into today’s legislation on 
the Status of Refugees. On the other hand, the “spirit of commerce” that 
leads human beings to freely establish relationships with one another 
would also promote peace. For Kant, then, hospitality and commerce 
were two paths towards the common goal of a free and peaceful world.
From the 18th  century onwards, freedom has increasingly become 
an economic value that displaced a more person-centered conception of 
the term. Human freedom has been reduced to an appendix of economic 
liberty, useful only insofar as it bolsters economic growth. Arguably, the 
Schengen Agreement was not about freedom of movement for European 
citizens but about the economic integration of European markets.
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Nowhere is the contrast between human and economic-based free-
dom clearer than in current discourses about the refugee crisis. While the 
migration of highly skilled professionals and other workers needed to fill 
gaps in the labor markets of advanced economies is generally welcome, 
refugees tend to be looked down upon as a burden to a nation. Even 
when they try to justify receiving large numbers of refugees in their coun-
tries, European politicians are forced to resort to economic rhetoric by 
pointing out the benefits of rejuvenating the ageing European workforce 
with youthful migrants.
Freedom of movement for people, for the sake of their being-people, 
is on the wane. Beneath the veneer of humanitarianism, the economy 
rules supreme. The current refugee crisis unfolding on the borders and at 
the heart of the European Union reveals that liberty is only for those who 
promote economic growth. The freedom of circulation for commodities, 
capital, and a few select people will continue to hinge upon the shackles 
of the many refugees trying to reach European shores.
12.21.2015
Rescuing the Enlightenment from the Europeans 
Nikita Dhawan
In his 1795 treatise Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, the German 
philosopher Immanuel Kant argued that all “world citizens” should have 
a right to free movement, a right which he grounded in humankind’s 
common ownership of the earth. One can hardly imagine a right that 
has been so extensively violated as the right to mobility. In this sense, 
the migrant is the bearer of Kant’s message for the cosmopolitan right 
to move fearlessly and freely across borders, even as the humanitarian 
disaster unfolding at Europe’s doorstep signals the European betrayal of 
Enlightenment principles.
Kant proposes cosmopolitism as a guiding principle to protect people 
from war and wishes to morally ground cosmopolitan right in the notion 
of universal hospitality. Promoting sociality and humanity, cosmopoli-
tanism symbolizes a transcultural competence of negotiating cultural dif-
ference, a move beyond narrowly territorial understandings of identity 
and belonging. Irrespective of national, religious, ethnic, and gender dif-
ferences, people appear as belonging to a single global community based 
on their shared pasts and entangled futures. According to Kant, a world 
citizen acts from the pluralistic standpoint of humanity as a collective 
actor, and not as an egoistic individual. Cosmopolitanism, based on the 
normative espousal of an expansive global consciousness, opposes nar-
row and limited territorial loyalties. We, as citizens of liberal democracies, 
are expected to take on responsibilities beyond the limits of our narrow 
self-interest, particularly in the face of growing global interdependence. 
Thus the Enlightenment notion of cosmopolitanism has as its normative 
ideal the pursuit of the perfect civil union of humankind.
The recent boat tragedies at the shores of Europe signal a failure of 
Enlightenment commitment to humanity and humanitarianism. We are 
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once again witnessing a crisis of European claims to being upholders of 
global justice, human rights and democracy. The disenchantment with 
Europe in the aftermath of colonialism and the holocaust looms large 
anew. Current EU border politics amounts to letting migrants die in the 
name of securing European territory.
In his deconstructive reading of Kantian cosmopolitan ethics, the 
French philosopher Jacques Derrida discusses how Kantian hospitality 
is temporary in nature and hinges on the entrant not causing any trouble. 
Derrida traces elements of hostility intrinsic in Kantian reflections on 
hospitality and speaks of the “hostipitality” (namely, hostile hospitality) 
inherent in Kant’s “conditional hospitality.” According to Derrida, a truly 
cosmopolitan ethics would entail absolute hospitality, which is uncon-
ditional and is not qualified upon the guest fulfilling certain criteria or 
duties to receive it.
The vulnerability of those at the mercy of the sea is testimony to 
the fact that the progressive goals of the Enlightenment are at risk in 
Europe, the purported place of its birth. To counteract the pervasive 
disenchantment with the lofty principles of the Enlightenment neces-
sitates rescuing norms of cosmopolitanism and humanitarianism from 
the cynical approach of EU migration policy. The recent Mediterranean 
boat disasters are a grim reminder that not only the migrants but also 
Enlightenment ideals are endangered in postcolonial Europe.
04.27.2015
By Sea and by Land: European Migration Routes 
Claudia Baracchi
The situation is fluid and rapidly changing, information is not easily avail-
able through official news agencies (which, in and of itself, is remarkable), 
but it appears that the formidable migratory movement towards Europe, 
from east and south, is far from abating. The phenomenon is not recent, 
but in recent times has acquired genuinely biblical proportions. It is as 
if enormous masses of nameless human beings were moving according 
to the laws of physics, rather than the unpredictability quintessentially 
defining human individuals. By sea and by land, their movement resem-
bles that of shoals, or flocks, and is similarly ominous, unstoppable. It is 
as if nothing would stay in its own place any longer, available as an inert 
resource, a disposable reserve, an obedient work force. A world order is 
being radically destabilized.
They have been arriving for months, years, crossing the Mediterranean 
from south and east on improbably overcrowded boats, striving to 
reach the northern shores. They often find death at sea and are buried 
there—on occasion a few corpses (but more frequently only the remains 
of a shipwreck) reach a Sicilian beach, less than 100 miles across from 
Tunisia. Or they travel by land, from East to West, mostly aiming to get 
to Germany. Some European countries have expressed the intention of 
controlling their borders, effectively suspending the Schengen agreement 
granting free circulation within the Union. The decision of Austria to 
erect a metallic barrier at the Austro-Italian border, following the exam-
ple of others (Bulgaria, Hungary, Croatia), has caused some clamor—but 
indignation seems to be short-lived these days, and unable to translate 
into political action.
I am writing in early April 2016, shortly after the implementation 
of the agreement between the European Union and Turkey. Migrants 
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reaching the shores of the islands of the Dodecanese (it is not clear 
that the migratory influx is decreasing, as authorities claim) are imme-
diately arrested and confined in detention centers. They have no access 
to legal assistance or basic information about their situation. Médecins 
Sans Frontières and UNHCR (the United Nations High Commission 
for Refugees) refuse to take part in these operations because living con-
ditions in the camps are deemed “inhuman.” The camps in mainland 
Greece likewise present grave inadequacies: electricity, running water, 
and sanitation infrastructure are lacking or insufficient, which heightens 
the risk of infections—not to mention the often scarce supply of food, 
clothing, covers. The Greek-Macedonian border is closed and the Balkan 
route is no longer practicable. The Republic of Macedonia has pushed 
back incoming migrants with vigorous methods, occasionally resort-
ing to torture. The refugee camp of Gevgelija, in Macedonian territory, 
is empty. At the Greek camp of Idomeni, just South of the border, there 
have been tensions among different ethnicities, clashes with police, and 
cases of suicide.
Whether by metallic fences or psychological walls, Europe is pursu-
ing the illusion (pernicious as all illusions are) of impassable frontiers. As 
if the human swarm could be halted. In the last year we grew accustomed 
to see images on TV of entire families, adults and children alike, unde-
terred, dig their way under the fences (or barbed wire) to the other side, 
crawling in the mud. We have watched young people attaching them-
selves to the bottom of trucks at Calais, trying to cross the Channel and 
reach England. We have watched endless rows of people walking silently, 
eyes to the ground, across indeterminate distances, to very uncertain des-
tinations. We have seen them at sea, hanging on to the floating remains of 
shattered dinghies.
Who are “they”? They come from impoverished Eastern Europe, from 
the Near and Middle East; from China, India, South-East Asia; from 
Northern Africa and the sub-Saharan regions. They come from countries 
ravaged by secular exploitation by foreign powers, economically impov-
erished to the point of utter dejection, politically unsettled under cor-
rupt governments, murderous dictatorships, or raving fanaticism. They 
seek refuge. They come to survive—and possibly, even just marginally, 
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to flourish. However dimly lit, as fragile as an idea, this is what sustains 
them in their quest.
And who are “we”? Where are we from, and to what end? Our own 
roots have become opaque to us. And it is far from clear whether or not 
there is life in them still—whether or not what goes under the name of 
“Europe” may yet vitally contribute to human becoming. This is a way of 
asking whether or not Europe has a future—for cultures, just like plants 
and anything living, are not immortal.
05.16.2016
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